Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.
Synopsis.
- Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees: Grounds
- Denial of Trust Itself
- Assertion to Private Ownership
- Betrayal of Fiduciary Position
- Obligations Cannot be Faithfully Discharged
- Removal Necessary to Save Trust Property
- No Removal of Trustees: Bona Fide Action
- Mistake or Misunderstanding
- Removal of Trustees: Valid Grounds
- Removal of Trustees Cannot be by Executive Order
- Mismanagement: Judged not by Result; but, by Situation at Relevant Time
- If Breach of Trust or Mismanagement, Suit Can be Brought
- Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
- Accounting by Trustees
- Trustee Acted Under Competent Legal Advice: No Answer to Charge
- Removal of Pujaries
Introduction
Under the law of associations, it is a trite principle that an act done beyond the objects mentioned in the memorandum of the association or company would be ultra vires. It is also well accepted that such an ultra vires action is void[1] and cannot be ratified[2] by any body of the company or association. These principles attached to companies and associations would also equally apply to Trusts.[3] Under law of trusts, such acts constitute ‘breach of trust’. Madras High Court in Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO,[4] dealing with the question whether the founder of a trust had power to revoke the same, observed as follows:
- “If the trust had been really and validly created, any deviation by the founder of the trust or the trustees from the declared purposes would amount only to a breach of trust and would not detract from the declaration of trust. Therefore, the subsequent conduct of the founder in dealing with the funds of the trust long after the creation of the trust may not put an end to the trust itself.”
This passage of Madras High Court has been quoted with approval by our Apex Court in Agasthyar Trust Vs. Commr. IT Madras.[5]
Appointment of Trustees Irrevocable
A dedication of property to a public trust or deity is irrevocable, and the rules, if any, laid down by the founder at the time of dedication regulating succession to the office of the trustee or shebait should also be deemed to be irrevocable unless the power of revocation is reserved by the grantor. The condition relating to the rule of succession of trusteeship or shebaitship forms an integral part of the dedication itself.[6]
Breach of Trust and Removal of Trustees: Grounds
1. Denial of Trust Itself
The denial of validity of trust by a trustee, by itself, is sufficient to remove him from the trusteeship.[7]
2. Deviation by the Trustees from the Declared Purposes
Any deviation by the trustees from the declared purposes of the trust[8] or ultra vires acts[9]would amount to a breach of trust.
3. Assertion to Private Ownership and Adverse Title
Indian Trusts Act , 1882 reads as under:
- Sec. 13. Trustee to protect title to trust property.—A trustee is bound to maintain and defend all suits, and to take such other steps as may be reasonably requisite for the preservation of the trust property.
- Sec. 14. Trustee not to set up title adverse to beneficiary.—The trustee must not for himself or another set up or aid any title to the trust property adverse to the interest of the beneficiary.
A trustee cannot claim adverse title. An assertion to private ownership is enough ground for removal of a trustee.[10] Apart from Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a Shebait or Mutawalli is not permitted, under Common Law, to make any adverse assertion of title upon a property of the temple or wakf he holds. When a property is assigned for a public purpose in perpetuity it is burdened with obligations. A transferee of such property will not acquire title without qualifications.[11]
The Supreme Court has held as to the claim of Shebaits, in Sree Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew Vs. Sushila Bala Dasi (1952),[12] as under:
- “If a Shebait by acting contrary to the terms of his appointment or in breach of his duty as such Shebait could claim adverse possession of the dedicated property against the idol it would be putting a premium on dishonesty and breach of duty on his part and no property which is dedicated to an idol would ever be safe. The Shebait for the time being is the only person competent to safeguard the interests of the idol, his possession of the dedicated property is the possession of the idol whose Shebait he is, and no dealing of his with the property dedicated to the idol could afford the basis of a claim by him for adverse possession against the idol. “
The Supreme Court held as to adverse possession, with respect to mosque-property, in Mohammad Shah Vs. Fasihuddin (1956),[13] as under:
- “A stranger to the trust can encroach on the trust estate and will in course of time acquire a title by adverse possession. But Mutawalli cannot take up such a position. If the Mutawallis of a mosque choose to build on part of the mosque property in such a way as to integrate the whole into one unit then the Court is bound to regard this as an accretion to the estate of which they are trustees, and they will be estopped from adopting any other attitude because no trustee can be allowed to set up a title adverse to the trust or be allowed to make a benefit out of the trust, for his own personal ends.”
In Abdul Rahim Khan Vs. Fakir Mohammad Shah (1946)[14] it was heldby High Court at Nagpur as under:
- “Where a person is a Mutawalli of a public charitable trust, all his acts which are claimed as acts showing adverse possession are referable to his lawful fiduciary position as Mutawalli. Adverse possession, in such circumstances, is a notion almost void of content. …. Having entered into possession as trustee he is estopped from setting an adverse title until he obtains a proper discharge from the trust . . . The mere fact that a person is described in the record of rights as the owner or describes himself as the “Mutawalli of a private mosque or imambada will not make that property his own if there is evidence on record to prove that the property was wakf. Nor will the mere fact that in certain applications the person uses expressions like “my mosque” or “my imambada” make the mosque his own when to his knowledge the property was held as wakf. “[15]
In Hafiz Mohammad FatehNasib Vs. Sir Swarup Chand Hukum Chand, a Firm (1948)[16], the same principle is reiterated by the Privy Council as under:
- “In law a title by adverse possession can be established against wakf property, but it is clear that a trustee for a charity entering into possession of property belonging to the charity cannot, whilst remaining a trustee, change the character of his possession and assert that he is in possession as a beneficial owner.”[17]
Apart from Section 116 Evidence Act, a Shebait or Mutawalli is not permitted to make any adverse assertion of title upon a property of the temple or wakf, he holds. Betrayal of fiduciary position of a trustee entails his removal. Assertion to private ownership was enough ground for removal of a trustee.[18] A Mahant is liable to be removed if he sets up an adverse title to the properties of the Math.[19]
4. Betrayal of Fiduciary Position
Betrayal of fiduciary position of a trustee entails his removal. It is not open to the court on any sound principles, either of administration or of law, to permit the continuance of the trustee in the office in such a case.
5. Obligations Cannot be Faithfully Discharged
In Peary MohunVs. Manohar,[20] the Privy Council observed:
- “… As a part of office it is indisputable that there are duties which must be performed, the estate does need to be safeguarded and kept in proper custody and it be found that a man in the exercise of his duties has put himself in a position in which the Court thinks that the obligations of his office can no longer be faithfully discharged that is sufficient ground for his removal.”
6. Mismanagement and Removal Necessary to Save Trust Property
Courts will order removal of trustees when such removal is necessary or desirable for the good of the charity, necessary in the interests of the trust,or to save the trust property.[21] In Bapugouda Yadagouda PatilVs.Vinayak Sadashiv Kulkarni[22] it was held that proof of breach of trust or mismanagement was not essential for the removal of a trustee of a charitable institution and the court had a wide discretion under Sec. 92 to take such action as it thought necessary or desirable for the good of the charity.
In S. Veeraraghava Achariar Vs. Parthasaruthy Iyengaar[23] it was held that once a person accepted an office of trusteeship the motive for all his actions should be the interest of the institution and that alone. Even though the evidence in a case against the trustees may not be sufficient to warrant, generally speaking, their removal from office on the ground of misconduct or negligence, still their removal may be ordered, if, in the opinion of the court, such removal is necessary in the interests of the trust to be administered.
Mismanagement:
Judged not by Result; but, by Situation at Relevant Time
It was observed by Allahabad High Court in Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das[24] that the degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him and the transaction would have to be judged not by the result, but by what might have been expected to be its results at the time it was entered into.
Administration Should Not be Ultra Vires
The trustees are bound to administer the affairs of the trust in accordance with the direction of the founder in the trust-deed; and it should not be ultra vires. In the leading case in this subject, Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar Vs. LIC,[25] the Supreme Court, in the context of interpretation of the Object Clause of a Memorandum of Association of a Company, observed as under:
- “Power to carry out an object, undoubtedly includes power to carry out what is incidental or conducive to the attainment of that object, for such extension merely permits something to be done which is connected with the objects to be attained, as being naturally conducive thereto.”
In Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax[26] it was pointed out that although the above observation of the Apex Court was made, in the context of interpretation of the Object Clause of a Memorandum of Association of a Company, the principle would also be applicable to determine whether any activity is ultra vires the purpose of a Trust.
If Breach of Trust or Mismanagement, Suit Can be Brought
If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee, a suit can be brought in a Civil Court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment.[27] With respect to public trusts it is governed under Sec. 92 CPC. A suit can also be filed for settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the objects of the trust.[28]
Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’
In KC Kappor Vs.Radhika Devi,[29] the Supreme Court has held that the expression “compelling necessity” (qua alienation of property held by a trustee-Kartha) must be interpreted with due regard to the ‘conditions of modern life’. The Apex Court quoted from with approval the Bombay decision, NagindasManeklalVs. Mahomed Yusuf Mithcella[30].
Trustee Acted Under Competent Legal Advice:
No Answer to Charge
It is no answer to a charge of breach of trust that the trustee acted under competent legal advice.[31] Our Apex Court, in TMA Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka,[32]observed that a wrong legal advice may not give protection to the contemnor.[33]
Who can File Suit for Removal of Mahant
For the removal of aMahant or for recovery of endowed property, the action can be initiated by a person having legal authority to do so. It can be:
- 1. Shebait,
- 2. Trustee, Manager or Pujari,
- 3. Persons having interest
- 4. Worshipper,
- 5. State or its officers.[34]
No Removal of Trustees:
Bona Fide Action of a Trustee
When an action is taken bona fide, though it be a mistaken one, that will not entail actions on breach of trust.[35]In the absence of any proved and deliberate dishonesty on the part of the trustee he is not liable to be removed, though he is held to have been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties.[36] The test which must be applied is whether the acts or omissions complained of disclose conditions which render intervention necessary in order to save the trust property; whether such state of affairs were brought about deliberately or willfully; and whether the trustees were actuated by dishonest and corrupt motives.[37]
Mistake or Misunderstanding
There must be gross negligence or misconduct for removal of trustees. Want of capacity or of fidelity which is calculated to put the trust in jeopardy will be actionable. But, failure in the discharge of duty on account of mistake or misunderstanding is not a ground for removal unless such failure shows want of capacity to manage the trust.[38]
Where there is no willful default but merely a misunderstanding, the court will not necessarily visit the trustee with removal. Some degree of latitude is also allowed by the courts which do not order accounts against managers where there is no fraud or dishonesty but only mere error of judgment.[39]
In Azizor RehmanVs. Ahidennessa[40] it is held by Calcutta High Court as under:
- “In the case of removal of a trustee the Court should be guided by considerations of the welfare of the trust estate, and before a removal of the trustee is directed, a clear necessity for the intervention of the Court to save the trust property must be established. It is not every mismanagement or neglect of duty which will induce the Court to remove a trustee. There must be such gross negligence or misconduct as to evidence a want either of capacity or of fidelity which is calculated to put the trust in jeopardy. Failure in the discharge of duty on account of mistake or misunderstanding is not a ground for removal unless such failure shows want of capacity to manage the trust.”[41]
In Managing Committee Vs. Hakim Mohd.[42] it is held by Oudh High Court as under:
- “Errors of judgment or miscarriage of discretion have to be disregarded unless they be sufficiently chronic. One is apt occasionally to magnify such shortcomings into what are sometimes characterised as breaches of duty, misconduct, misfeasance or gross neglect. But if they are not the result of want of fidelity they cannot be made the basis of interference.”
Losses out of ‘Ultra Vires’, But ‘Bona Fide’,Acts of Directors
The Madras High Court in Karnataka Films Ltd. Vs. Official Liquidator, Chitrakala Movietone Ltd.[43] considered the judgment in the case of Liverpool Household Stores Association Ltd., In re, [1890] 59 LJ Ch 616 where the directors were charged with misfeasance on several grounds. The Madras High Court referred to the said decision in the said case and quoted the following passage therefrom (at p. 159):
- “Section 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, enables a creditor of a company to obtain by summary process any relief to which he is entitled in respect of damages incurred through the misfeasance of an officer of the company, but the remedy afforded by the section is only for the recovery of damages for losses incurred. The misfeasance to which the section is directed is not restricted to acts of commission, but extends to all breaches of trust in relation to a company through which loss is incurred. Misfeasance is not to be imputed to a director unless he has dishonestly acted, or abstained from acting, in conflict with his plain duty and the burden of proof lies on the party making the charge; but in considering the question of the director’s liability, there must be imputed to him a special knowledge of the business which he has undertaken. Directors are liable for losses occasioned through acts done by them as directors in matters which are ‘ultra vires’ the company, and this liability is not dependent upon any question of honesty of intention. “
- 10. THE principles are well -settled but the question is whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the principles laid down by the aforesaid decisions can be applied at all. There is no allegation of misapplication of the assets of the company by the directors. The ground now urged by Mr. Sinha, learned advocate for the official liquidator, is that the company carried on business which is ultra vires the object clause and, accordingly, the directors are liable to make good the loss arising therefrom. Even if the business carried on by the directors is ultra vires, it cannot by itself constitute an act of misfeasance. The word “misfeasance” does not cover every misconduct by a director. There must be a breach of trust. Unless a director has done something wrongly by misapplying or retaining in his own hands any money of the company or the director has done something by which the company’s properties had been wasted resulting in actual loss to the company, there cannot be any misfeasance. The case of misfeasance in this case is on the ground that the company has indulged in speculation business. The auditor has stated in his evidence what, according to him, is speculation business. According to the auditor, the company indulged in a speculative transaction within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The speculative transaction is not something like a wagering contract. Unless it is proved that at the very inception, the intention was only to deal in difference and in no circumstances to call for or give delivery, there cannot be any wagering contract. The mere fact that on settlement of same contract, the differences were entered into the book cannot establish that it was the intention of the parties not to call for and give delivery. The basic ingredients of a speculative transaction are that the contracts are to be periodically or ultimately settled and the settlement would be otherwise than by actual delivery or transfer of commodity. There is no evidence in this case that there was no delivery. The evidence is that the goods were bought and sold. Speculation business is separately treated under the Income Tax Act. It is treated as distinct and separate from any other business. No evidence whatsoever has been produced to show that the Income Tax Officer treated the business of the company as speculation business. On the contrary, in the report of the auditor, the auditor has referred to the assessment order where the Income Tax Officer held that in view of the financial difficulties, M/s. Abdul Karim Md. (1963) Company at 59, Biplabi, Rash Behari Avenue, Calcutta, took delivery of the goods and sold the same on behalf of the assessee-company. For this the company paid additional commission and ‘arat’ charges. The auditor has also referred that commission and ‘arat’ charges were paid as the company was unable to sell its goods. The directors were sought to be made liable for the amount of commission and arat charges paid. I am unable to appreciate the comment of the auditor “that instead of doing regular business in the normal course, the directors were found doing transactions of adventure, some of a wholly risky nature, but offering a chance of great or unusual gain in complete disregard of the objects clauses of the company. Upon scrutiny of the objects clauses, it would be evident that the company was not permitted to do any speculative businesses per objects clauses contained in the memorandum of association of the company. But the directors were found doing purely ” fatka ” business on behalf of the company in clear violation of the objects clauses.”
- 11. THE said comment is not based on facts. The auditor has drawn from his own imagination facts and circumstances which are not apparent from the records. There is no material to hold that the directors were engaged in speculation business. Even the Income Tax Officer did not go to the length of holding that the business was not carried on in the usual course. For the reasons aforesaid, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sinha.
Removal of Trustees:
Valid Grounds
When a Junior is legally nominated to succeed to the Mahanthe cannot be removed, arbitrarily, even by the Head of the Mutt, except for a good and valid cause.[44]In Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma,[45] BP Jeevan Reddi, J., held:
- “We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charges, at any rate the main charges, on which the excommunication is based were not available as grounds of excommunication and could not constitute valid grounds therefore. Accordingly, it is held that the excommunication of Catholicos is not valid and legal.”
Cannot be by Executive Order
The Supreme Court, in Bishan Das Vs. State of Punjab,[46] held that a trustee can be removed only by procedure known to law and that he cannot be removed by an executive fiat. It is held in this decision:
- “Even if the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should have taken appropriate legal action for the removal of the trustee as was opined by the State’s Legal Remembrancer. It is well recognised that a suit under S. 92, Civil Procedure Code, may be brought against persons in possession of the trust property even if they claim adversely to the trust, that is, claim to be owners of the property, or against persons who deny the validity of the trust.”
In Wazir Chand Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh[47] it is held that the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts.[48]
Removal of Mahant: Where Duties as Administrator
A Mahant is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for maladministration since he has to administer the endowed properties as trustee for general, pious and religious purposes and obligations attached to his office.[49]
Where the office of a Mahant is attached to administration of endowments he can be removed by a court of law when misconduct is proved. Even when no misconduct is established, he may be removed if it is proved that his continuance would prevent due execution of the trust.[50]
Removal of Mohants: Where Duties Purely Spiritual
In Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi[51] Allahabad High Court observed that a Mahant possesses two capacities. He is spiritual head of the Mutt and administrator of its properties. Both are closely intermingled.[52] The whole assets are vested in him as the owner thereof in trust[53] for the institution itself. If it is found that the Mahant cannot faithfully discharge his functions without danger to the endowment, he can be removed from both the offices.
Where the duties of an office are purely spiritual[54] and moral, entirely unconnected with any office, with no pecuniary benefit attached to it, or property,[55]the Civil Court may not have jurisdiction to interfere. Even if the Mahantship on its spiritual side is regarded as purely an office of dignity, notwithstanding that the functions of such office are associated with religious rites and ceremonies, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, as being of a civil nature under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.[56]
Religious Acts: No Court-Interference, Unless Whimsical, Arbitrary, Capricious etc.
If a spiritual or ecclesiastical offence is committed by anybody, his spiritual superior or ecclesiastical tribunal has to punish him in a proper proceeding. The civilcourt has nothing to do with such spiritual offence,[57]unconnected with office[58] or property.[59]
Math is an institutional sanctum presided over by a superior, the Mahanth. The dual office of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult of religious fraternity and the office of the manager of the secular properties of the institution are combined in him.[60] The succession to Mahantship is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution.[61]Selection of the successor to the post of Mahanth and withdrawal of such person after selection are purely spiritual matters and religious in nature. They are not administrative or secular acts. Therefore, if such actions were the result of bone fide acts of the authorities concerned, the court will not interfere.[62]
It is a well-known custom that the Heads in several Mutts nominate their successors.[63] When a Junior is legally nominated to succeed to the Mahant and a status as such is created, it cannot be withdrawn or cancelled at the mere will of the parties.[64] But, in His Holiness Kasi-viswanatha Pandara Sannidhi Vs. State of Tamil Nadu[65] the High Court of Madras did not interfere in the action of removal of the petitioner as Junior PandaraSannathi holding that the act on the basis of bone fide consideration by the then Head of the Mutt and such action was purely religious in nature and the same fell outside the judicial reach. The said act of removal was found to be purely religious in nature and it was pointed out that such act cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny unless the same appears to be for an extraneous consideration or the same was per se out of extraneous consideration, whimsical, arbitrary,capriciousoragainst the public interest. It was pointed out that the court exercising its judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in judgment[66] over what is good cause except for the factors as stated above. Referring to Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt[67] and Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar Vs. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments[68] it was pointed out that generally a sanyasin is a person who has renounced wordly affairs. It would appear that he will not have any career at all. The High Court relied heavily on its earlier decision, His Holiness Sri-La-Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannathi Avergal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu,[69] where it was held that the act of nomination of Pandara Sannathi is purely in religious nature and not an administrative act.
The Madras High Court also referred to the Supreme Court decision, AKKaulVs. Union of India,[70]arose from disciplinary action taken against certain Govt. Intelligence Officers in the intelligence Bureau, in a summary manner, by President of India, in the interest of the security of the State. Our Apex Court pointed out that ‘on account of want of judicially manageable standards, there may be matters which are not susceptible to the judicial process’.
Removal of Pujaries and Sevadars
In Balram Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain[71] it was found that an appointed pujari, for the purpose of worship and of maintaining the temple, was a servant and he got possession of temple property in a fiduciary capacity and that he was estopped as long as he continued to be in possession in that capacity from asserting his own title. When a servant occupied or came into possession of property belonging to his employer he was nothing more than a licensee or a bailee. In a general sense it was also a trust. Unless the pujuari handed over the temple to the panchas and acquires the capacity of a third party–of somebody other than a servant–he could not have been heard either to question the panchas’ title or to set up his own. It was held that plaintiffs (panchas as the trustees) were entitled to remove the pujaries who were in possession of the temple.
In Bhagwan DassVs.Jairam Dass[72] it was held by P&J High Court that the Sevadarwas liable to be removed where Sevadar asserted title hostile and failed to keep regular accounts.
The property vests in deity. It being a religious concern and there is no public element in it, Writ jurisdiction on the basis of public interest cannot be invoked.[73]
[1]Claude Lila ParulekarVs. Sakal Papers: AIR 2005 SC 4074: 2005-11 SCC 73.
[2]LakshmanaswamiMudaliar Vs. LIC: AIR 1963 SC 1185;
Gajadhar Prasad Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 105.
[3]Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222
[4]Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261,
[5] 1998 AIR (SCW)3945 ;1998-5 SCC 588
[6] Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita LalNandy and another: AIR1947 Cal 301
Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchandlaws: AIR 1997 Bom 46
[7] Mrs. KalidhaAdib Begum Vs. S.A. Bashirunnissa Begum Hussaini: 1970-83 Mad LW 116.
[8] Thanthi Trust Vs. ITO: 91 ITR 261
[9]Mool Chand Khairati Ram Trust Vs. Director of Income Tax: 2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222
[10] Srinivas Chariar Vs. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar: AIR 1922 PC 325.
See also: Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588;
Idol of A M Kamakala Kameshwarar Temple Vs. Sri Siddaraja Manicka Prabha Temple: 2011-6 Mad LJ 386;
Deputy Commissioner Judicial Vs. M Perumal: 2003-3 Mad LJ 151 .
[11] Gnanasambanda Pandora Sannadhi Vs. Valu Pandaram: 27 I.A. 69
Bonnerji Vs. Sitanath Das: 491 A. 46:
Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.
[12] AIR 1954 SC 69
[13] AIR 1956 SC 713
[14] AIR 1946 Nag 401
[15] Quoted in: Balram Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81
[16] AIR 1948 PC 76
[17] It is quoted in Balram Chunnilal Vs. Durgalal Shivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81
[18] Srinivas Chariar and another Vs. C.N. EvalappaMudaliar: AIR 1922 P.C. 325.
See also: Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588.
[19]Ajudhia Das v. Laky Malik, AIR 1923 Lah 131; Miyaji v. Sk. Ahmed Sahib, ILR (1908) 31 Mad 212; Chintaman v. Dhondo, 15 Bom 612.
[20] (1921) ILR 48 Calcutta 1019
[21] Managing Committee of S.S. Endowment Vs. Mohd. Ahsan: A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 28.
[22] AIR 1941 Bom 317
[23] AIR 1925 Mad. 1070
[24] AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).
Referred to in: Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs.Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.
[25]AIR1963 SC 1185
[26]2015-280 CTR 121: 2015-222 DLT 102: 2015-377 ITR 650: TAXMAN 2015-234 222
[27] Thenappa Chettiar Vs.Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915
[28] Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915;
Cheriyathu Vs. Parameswaran Namboodiripad: 1953 Ker LT 125;
Also Manohar Mukherji Vs. Raja Peary Mohan Mukherji: 24 Cal WN 478;
Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar RadhaBalla: 1937 Cal 338;
Rajasekharan Naicker Vs. Govindankutty: 1983 KerLJ 506.
[29] AIR 1981 SC 2128.
[30] AIR 1922 Bom 122.
[31] S. Chettiar Vs. R. Dorai, (1909) ILR 32 Mad 490
[32] 1995 Cr. LJ 3220
[33] Referred to in: Arun Kumar Gupta and Eleven VS Jyoti Prasanna Das Thakur: 1996-2 CalLJ 89; 1996-2 CHN
[34]Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018) 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591
[35] Vidyodaya Trust Vs. Mohan Prasad: AIR 2008 SC 1633.
[36] Sivasankara Vs. Vadagiri: ILR 13 Mad. 6.
Refered to in: Janardhana Mishra Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588.
[37] Managing Committee of SS Endowment Vs. Mohd. Ahsan AIR 1947 Oudh 28
[38] Azizor Rahman Choudhury Vs. Ahidennessa Choudharani: AIR 1928 Cal. 225
[39] Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588.
[40] AIR 1928 Cal 225
[41] Also See: Balmakund Vs. Nanak Chand AIR 1929 All 433.
[42] AIR 1947 Oudh. 22
[43] [1951] 21 Comp Cas 138 (Mad)
Referred to in Bholanath Kundu Vs. Official Liquidator, Bholanath Kundu : 1987-61 CC 10.
[44]Mahalinga Thambiran v. ArulnandiThambiran : AIR 1974SC 199;
Relied on:Tiruvambala Desikar v. Chinna Pandaram1915 30 M.L.J. 274 : I.L.R. (1915) Mad. 177.
[45] AIR 1995 SC 2001.
[46] AIR 1961 SC 1570.
[47] AIR 1954 SC 415,
[48] See also: Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi Vs. The State of Bihar: AIR 1953 SC 215;
State of U.P. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh: AIR 1989 SC 997.
[49]Nillappa Achari v. Punnai Vanam Achari, AIR 1927 Mad 614;
Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591.
[50] Satish Chandra Vs. Dharnidhar, AIR 1940 PC 24;
Perumal Nayak Vs. Swaminatha Pillai, ILR 19 Mad 498;
Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi: 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591
[51]2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591
[52] Ram PrakashVs. Ananda Das: AIR 1916 PC 256: ILR (1916) 43 Cal 707.
[53] Baijaynanda Giri Vs. State of Bihar:AIR 1954 Pat 266;
Ram Parkash Das Vs. Anand Das: AIR 1916 PC 256.
[54] His Holiness Kasi-viswanatha Pandara Sannidhi Vs. State of TN: 2018 6 MLJ 32;
His Holiness Sri-La-Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannathi Avergal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu: 1982 (2) MLJ 221;
AB Seshadri Vs. State of AP: 2019 3 ALD 209; 2019 1 ALT 235;
MG Chari Vs. Government of AP: (1997) 5 SCC 388.
[55] VarkeyVs. St. Marys Catholic Church: AIR 1997 Ker 337.
[56] Satish Chandra GiriVs.Dharanidhar Singh Roy: (1940) 1 MLJ 371.
[57] Moran Mar BasseliosCatholicosVs.Thukalan Paulo Avira: AIR1959 SC 31.
[58] His Holiness Kasi-viswanatha Pandara Sannidhi Vs. State of TN: 2018 6 MLJ 32.
[59]Varkey Vs. St. Marys Catholic Church: AIR 1997 Ker 337.
[60] Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707
[61] Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707;
Mahalinga Thambiran Vs. La Sri Kasivasi Arulnandi Thambiran: AIR 1974SC 199
[62] His Holiness Sri-La-Sri Ambalavana Pandara SannathiVs. St. of TN: 1982 -2MLJ 221
Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir: AIR 1980 SC 707
[63] Mahalinga Thambiran Vs. La Sri KasivasiArulnandi Thambiran: AIR 1974SC 199;
Relied on Gnana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi Vs. Kandaswami Thambiran: ILR1887 Mad. 375.
[64] MahalingaThambiran v. Arulnandi Thambiran : AIR 1974SC 199;
Relied on: Tiruvambala Desikar v. Chinna Pandaram1915 30 M.L.J. 274 : I.L.R. (1915) Mad. 177.
[65] 2018-6 MLJ 32.
[66] Riju Prasad SarmaVs State of Assam: (2015) 9 SCC 461
[67] AIR 1954 SC 282
[68] AIR 1963 SC 966
[69] 1982 -2MLJ 221
[70] AIR 1995 SC 1403
[71] AIR1968 MP 81.
[72]AIR 1965 P&H 260;
Referred to in: GhatTalabKaulanWala Vs. Baba GopalDass: 2020 Supreme(SC) 104.
[73] Shree Shree Ram JankiJiAsthanTapovanMandirVs State of Jharkhand: 2019-6 SCC 777
