Snippet #317

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Synopsis.

1. Introduction
2. Expulsion, Strict Compliance of Rules Essential
3. Principles of Natural Justice
4. Three Principles of Law as to Enquiry
5. Judicial Review: Constraints
6. Courts’ Jurisdiction in Disciplinary Matters
7. Sources of Civil Court’s Jurisdiction
8. Natural Justice: Commonsense Justice
9. Natural Justice: Strict Compliance
10. Natural Justice: Rules and Subsidiary Rules
11. Natural Justice: Audi Alteram Partem – Requirements
12. Natural Justice: Courts Generally Read-Into the Provisions
13. Natural Justice: Recognized as part of Article 14
14. Hearing: Must be a Genuine Hearing
15. Natural Justice: Circumstances
16. Natural Justice: Not Unruly Horse
17. Natural Justice: Principles Undergone a Sea Change
18. Compliance of Substantive and Procedural Provisions
19. Natural Justice: Laxity in Disciplinary Action
20. Natural Justice: Laxity in Disciplinary Action
21. Natural Justice: Laxity in Domestic Tribunal
22. Natural Justice: Violation and Alternate Remedy:
23. Natural Justice: Administrative Process & Urgency
24. Natural Justice: Inordinate Delay in Disciplinary Proceedings
25. Charges Should Not be Vague
26. Court Jurisdiction – Expulsion in Violation of Natural Justice
27. Court’s Jurisdiction in Expulsion from a Political Party
28. Court Does Not Sit in Appeal
29. Appointment of Impartial Enquiry Officer
30. Ex-communication
31. Proof in Disciplinary Action
32. Misconduct in Labour Cases
33. Court Scrutinises Acts of Trustees
34. No Action against Trustees, if Bona Fide Act
35. Degree of Prudence Expected
36. Jurisdiction of Courts in Removal of Persons Holding Office
37. Breach of Bye-law or Mismanagement Entails removal
38. Trustees Actuated by Dishonest and Corrupt Motives
39. Misconduct or negligence
40. Claim of Adverse Title by a Trustee
41. Assertion of Private Ownership
42. If Trustees have Interest Adverse to Beneficiaries
43. District Courts’ Jurisdiction under S R Act, Limited
44. Court Examines Reasons of Supersession of Societies
45. Non-Payment of Subscription: Not Amount to Resignation
46. No expulsion for arrears if no notice
47. Office-Bearer Can be Removed by No-Confidence Motion
48. Office-Bearer – Removal by Motion of No-confidence
39. Removal of Earlier Committee

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

1. Societies formed by memorandum of association and registration
Any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in section 20 of this Act, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with Registrar of Joint-stock Companies [..] form themselves into a society under this Act.
2. Memorandum of association
The memorandum of association shall contain the following things, that is to say, the name of the society; the object of the society; the names, addresses, and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee, or other governing body to whom, by the rules of the society, the management of its affairs is entrusted. A copy of the rules and regulations of the society, certified to be a correct copy by not less than three of the members of the governing body, shall be filed with the memorandum of association.
15. Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months

Introduction

The associations have the right to manage their affairs by themselves. They have the right to enforce the internal discipline even by expelling an erring member.

Since expulsion of a member from society or club visits him with harsh adversities, it will always be an exceptional decision and ithas to be taken only in exceptional circumstances. It has to be done cautiously and after due considerations. And, it should also be strictly in accordance with law.

In Halsbury’s Laws of England[1] it is stated:

“201. Expulsion. As a society is founded on a written contract expressing the terms on which the members associate together, there is no inherent power to expel a member, and a member may not therefore be expelled unless the rules provide that power. Any power of expulsion must be exercised in good faith, for the benefit of the society and strictly in accordance with the rules. If rules give the committee or some other authority power to expel a member for some act of disobedience or misconduct on his part, its decision cannot be questioned, provided the decision is arrived at after the member’s defense has been heard or he has been given an opportunity of being heard. If a member is not given the opportunity the decision will be null and void. If the rules have been strictly observed, and the member has had due notice and full opportunity of answering the charges made against him and the power of expulsion has been exercised in good faith and for a reason which is not manifestly absurd, no tribunal can interfere to prevent the expulsion”.

Expulsion, Strict Compliance of Rules Essential

Strict compliance of Rules and bye laws is essential for expulsion of a member from a society.[2] In the celebrated decision, TP DaverVs. Lodge Victoria,[3] the Supreme Court held:

“4. The source of the power of associations like clubs and lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis of which they become members. This principle has been restated by Lord Morton in Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union. There, one Bonsor, who became a member of a trade union, was expelled. In that context Lord Morton observed:‘When Mr. Bonsor applied to join the respondent union, and his application was accepted, a contract came into existence between Mr. Bonsor and the respondent, whereby Mr. Bonsor agreed to abide by the rules of the respondent union, and the union impliedly agreed that Mr. Bonsor would not be excluded by the union or its officers otherwise than in accordance with the rules’.
This contractual origin of the rule of expulsion has its corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a member the conditions laid down in the rules must be strictly complied- with. In Maclean v. The Workers’ Union, the contractual foundation of the power is described thus:‘In such a case as the present, where the tribunal is the result of rules adopted by persons who have formed the association known as a trade union, it seems to me reasonably clear that the rights of the plaintiff against the defendants must depend simply on the contract, and that the material terms of the contract must be found in the rules’.
Proceeding on that basis, the learned Judge observed:‘It is certain, therefore, that a domestic tribunal is bound to act strictly according to its rules and is under an obligation to act honestly and in good faith.’
The same idea was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Ezra Vs. Mahendra Nath Banerji thus: ‘where the rule provides in any particular respect that some condition must be fulfilled, then that condition must be strictly complied with, since the power of expulsion is itself dependent on the terms of the rule’.
The next question is whether the doctrine of strict compliance with rules implies that every minute deviation from the rules, whether substantial or not, would render the act of such a body void. The answer to this question will depend upon the nature of the rule infringed; whether a rule is mandatory or directory depends upon each rule, the purpose for which it is made and the setting in which it appears.
8. The following principles may be gathered from the above discussion.
(1) A member of a Masonic lodge is bound to abide by the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules.[4]
(2) The lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules, whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case, having regard to the well settled rules of construction in that regard.
(3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice as explained in the decisions cited supra.”[5]

Principles of Natural Justice

In AR Antulay Vs. RS Nayak[6] a seven Judge Bench of our Apex CourtCourt has held that when an order has been passed in violation of a fundamental right or in breach of the principles of natural justice, the same would be nullity.[7]

The Supreme Court in SL Kapur Vs. Jagmohan[8] held as under:

“In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.”

The principles of law as to natural justice, to be applied in an action for termination of an employee, are applied in the matter of expulsion of a member of a society also.

Three Principles of Law as to Enquiry

Following are the three important principles of law as to enquiry:

(i) It should be on proper charge or show cause notice[9]
(ii) Finding should be based on proper evidence.[10]
(iii) Natural justice should be complied with.

When a member is expelled on the allegation of violation of Rules,the Rules violated has to be cited in the show-cause notice.[11]

It is laid down by our courts that preliminary enquiry cannot be the basis of findings for punishment[12]and that collection of materials from outside sources by enquiry officer vitiates enquiry. The enquiry officer is also not expected to travel beyond charges.[13] Granting opportunity for cross examination is integral part of natural justice.[14]

Judicial Review: Constraints

The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.[15]

The jurisdiction of the courts to interfere with the decision of the domestic[16] or departmental authorities is limited. It was not for the Court to consider whether the ground adopted by the tribunal or authority alone would have been sufficient to bring home the action imposed.

The court, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. But, in proper cases the court or tribunal would remit[17] the matter to the concerned authority to impose appropriate punishment or appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation; it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.[18]

Courts’ Jurisdiction in Disciplinary Matters

The courts have jurisdiction in the actions of the disciplinary authority in the following circumstances:

(i) Actions without jurisdiction;[19]
(ii) Acts not in good faith;[20]
(iii) The findings, prima facie, did not make out a case of misconduct,[21] or without evidence[22] and utterly perverse;[23]
(iv) The proceedings were held in violation of the principle of natural justice,[24]such as noproper charge or vague charge,[25] full opportunity had not been given to the employee to meet the charge, etc.;
(v) The proceedings were in violation of the statutory Regulations[26] or Rules[27] prescribing the mode of enquiry;
(vi) The decision is vitiated on the principle of perversity.[28]
(vii) Punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court.[29]
(ix) The appellate authority had not adverted to the relevant facts;[30]
(x) Punishment without sufficient reasons or valid grounds.[31]
(xi) Without any credible material.[32]

While dealing with CP and Berar Municipalities Act, it is held by the Full Bench in Municipal Commissioner, Kareli Vs. State of MP[33] that the Court has power to examine the sufficiency of reasons. It was observed:

“In a democratic society it is of the essence that democratic institutions are allowed to function and not superseded on trumpery charges inadequately brought home or unreasonably accepted. The Courts will be vigilant to see that such over-reaching powers are kept within the four corners of the statute granting them. We think that the fact that a reasonable opportunity to show cause has been made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power and that reasons for the supersession have to be notified to the electorate shows that there is not to be a subjective appraisal but that the reasons must be sufficient under the Act and an objective test is indicated. The requirements of the law are not satisfied by accepting insufficient or inadequate reasons for supersession. We think that the Courts are at liberty to examine the reasons for this limited purpose in addition to the purposes which the learned Judges of the earlier Division Bench (Mangalmurti and Mudholkar JJ.) have already indicated in their order.”

Participation of a delinquent in the inquiry by itself does not absolve management from the blemish of bringing a defective charge.[34]

Where punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court,[35] the court or tribunal would, in proper cases, appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed; or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

Sources of Civil Court’s Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of a civil court to interfere with the internal affairs of associations is ‘rather limited’.[36] Courts get jurisdiction to interfere with the internal affairs of associations if there are cogent grounds such as acts without jurisdiction, acts in violation of the principles of natural justice, acts with malafides, etc.[37]Beyond the general jurisdiction of courts to intervene and set right illegalities, the jurisdiction thereof is obtained by Courts from three sources:

(i) contract,[38]
(ii) court is the protector of all charities[39] and
(iii) formation of associations is, besides common law right as well as statutory right, a fundamental right[40] protected by our courts.

Courts will not delve in the internal disputes of an association[41] unless it is shown[42] that the aggrieved parties have worked out and exhausted their remedies[43] (but, failed to resolve disputes)under the bye laws, before (a) the machinery or body (domestic tribunals)[44], if any, provided in its bye laws,[45] or (b) the body or authority which has to take cognisance of the matter, under the scheme of its bye laws, or (c) the authorities under the statute, if any, holds the field.[46]

Natural Justice: Commonsense Justice

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs

Natural Justice: Strict Compliance

Natural justice has been variously defined. It is another name for common sense justice. It is held in Canara Bank v. Debasis Das:[47]

“Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.”[48]

In this decision it is also held:

“Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences[49] must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. This Court has elaborated the expression `civil consequence’ by observing that it encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. This Court has further stated, that, in its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in civil life.”[50]

Removal of a member or an office bearer of a society on the basis of proved misconduct[51] is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. Therefore, the principles of natural justice[52] are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defense to such member or office bearer.

In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, UP Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta[53] the Supreme Court observed as follows:

If a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the Statute to act judicially. The statute is not likely to provide in so many words that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially; that can only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute in the first instance in each case and no one circumstance alone will be determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute. A duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively.”[54]

Any breach of a bye-law would not result into automatic cessation of membership but the procedure for removal or expulsion from membership would be required to be followed even in case of breach of bye-laws of a society.[55]

When a committee of an association continues to exercise powers even after cessation of their period of office opportunity of being heard should be given to the members of the committee concerned.[56] It is well settled that principles of natural justice must be read into the byelaws and the statute, unless there is a clear directive to the contrary.[57]

Natural Justice: Rules and Subsidiary Rules

Formerly, only two rules were recognised:

(1) Nemo debet esse judex propria causa
(2) Audi alteram partem

Subsequently, more subsidiary rules were recognized, such as:

Without bias
Right to reasons.

Our Apex Court expounds the purport and extent of principles of natural justice in A.K. KraipakVs. Union of India[58] as under:

“The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely:
(1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.
Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Under our Constitution an administrative decision is subject to judicial review if it affects the right of a citizen, it is therefore desirable that reasons should be stated.”

Natural Justice: Audi AlteramPartem – Requirements

Charge/show cause notice;
Examination of witnesses and opportunity to cross-examine;
Opportunity to the delinquent to examine witnesses including himself; and
Findings with reasons.

It is observed in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen:[59]

“… An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held unless,

the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges leveled against him,[1]
(ii) the witnesses are examined ordinarily in the presence of the employee in respect of the charges,
the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in his defense if he so wishes on any relevant matter, and
the inquiry officer records his findings with reasons for the same in his report.”

In Chamoli District Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Raghunath Singh Rana[60] our Apex Court laid down that the following principles would emerge as to the enquiry against a workman:

“(i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities.
(ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer.
(iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him.
(iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.”

In this case (Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Raghunath Singh Rana) our Apex Court referred to the following decisions:

(i) Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs.Their Workmen.[61]
(ii) State Bank of India Vs. R.K. Jain.[62] It is held: “……As emphasised by this Court in Ananda Bazar Patrika Vs.. Its Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 601, the termination of an employee’s service must be preceded by a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, it is evident that if the inquiry is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice or if no reasonable opportunity was provided to a delinquent to place his defense, it cannot be characterized as a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the rules of natural justice ……”
(iii) State of Uttranchal Vs. Kharak Singh.[63] It is held: “… … If an officer himself sees the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that the enquiry should be left to be held by some other person who does not claim to be an eye-witness of the impugned incident. As we have repeatedly emphasised, domestic enquiries must be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine whether the charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become empty formalities. … ….. It is necessary to emphasise that in domestic enquiries, the employer should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before any other evidence is led against him……” Followed Associated Cement Co. Ltd. Vs.The Workmen.[64]
(iv) ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar.[65]It is held: “(1) Where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted.
It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. …..
Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. …. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges leveled against him. That right is a part of the employee’s right to defend himself against the charges leveled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
(v) Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation.[66]It is held in this decision: “34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. ….”
(vi) Syndicate Bank Vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati.[67]It is held: “18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. It is only those documents, which are relied upon by the enquiry officer to arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause prejudice, being violative of principles of natural justice. Even then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case of the delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent officer. It is well-settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a strait jacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice.”

No order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him; and such an order if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.[68] Failure to supply the delinquent the documents, on the basis of which charges were framed, along with the charge-sheet, amounts to non observance of natural justice.[69]

Natural Justice: Courts Generally Read-Into the Provisions

Even if the statute does not provide for notice, it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the concerned persons disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be initiated against them, failing which the conclusion would be that principle of natural justice are violated.[70] Courts generally read into[71] the provisions of the relevant sections a requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made which would have adverse civil consequences for the parties affected.[72]

It is held in C.B. GautamVs. Union of India:

“The observance of principles of natural justice is the pragmatic requirement of fair play in action. In our view, therefore, the requirement of an opportunity to show cause being given before an order for purchase by the Central Government is made by an appropriate authority under Section 269 -UD must be read into the provisions of Chapter XX -C. There is nothing in the language of Section 269 -UD or any other provision in the said Chapter which would negate such an opportunity being given. Moreover, if such a requirement were not read into the provisions of the said Chapter, they would be seriously open to challenge on the ground of violations of the provisions of Article 14 on the ground of non-compliance with principles of natural justice.”[73]

Natural Justice: Recognized as part of Article 14

In Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel[74]the Supreme Court declared that principles of natural justice have now come to be recognized as being a part of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 14 of the Constitution.[75]

Hearing: Must be a Genuine Hearing

The Supreme Court, in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India,[76] has held that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.

Authority has to Apply its Mind

In Ravi Yashwant BhoirVs. Chief Minister[77] the Supreme Court observed:

”34. In a democratic institution like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office-bearer sought to be removed.”

Natural Justice: Requirements Depend Upon the Circumstances

Principles of natural justice are neither treated with absolute rigidity nor as imprisoned in a straight-jacket. It has many facets. Sometimes, this doctrine is applied in a broad way, sometimes in a limited or narrow manner.[78]

Applicability and requirements of natural justice depend upon the circumstances of the case [79] and it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply; nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter.[80] Whether an order in violation of natural justice is bad or not is depended on facts and circumstances of each case.[81] Its essence is good consciousness in a given situation; nothing more but nothing less.[82]

In Keshav Mills Co Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 389 it is held:

“… We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of Natural Justice cannot be put into a straight-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of Natural Justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably…”

Natural Justice: Not Unruly Horse & Doctrine of ‘Straight-Jacket’

Natural justice is not an unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all.It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another.[83]

It was observed by our Apex Court in Suresh Koshy George Vs. University of Kerala[84] that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.

In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination Vs. Ramjee,[85] V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. observed as under:

“Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be financial nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt – that is the conscience of the matter.”

In Union of India Vs. P K Roy,[86] V. Ramaswami, J. observed:

“But the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case.”

Natural Justice: Principles Undergone a Sea Change

Natural Justice& Principle of ‘No Prejudice’

Denial of natural justice ‘itself causes prejudice’ was the uniformly followed legal concept in early times. It is pointed out in Gulab Babusaheb Bargiri Vs. Executive Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Board[87] that after Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India,[88] the principle of natural justice has undergone a sea change.

In PD Agrawal v. State Bank of India[89] the Apex Court observed that the principles of natural justice had undergone a sea change. Relying on State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma[90] and Rajendra Singh v. State of MP[91] the Court pointed out that principle of law was that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant.

Analysing previous judgments it is observed in State of UP v. Sudhir Kumar Singh[92] that the following are the tests to determine the non-observance of natural justice:

“(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
(2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
(3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
(4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
(5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.”

PD AgrawalVs. State Bank[93] of India speaks as under:

“The principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.
… In Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia,[94] a Three Judge Bench of this Court opined: “We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated: ‘To do a great right after all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong.’ [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (Bhopal Gas Disaster),[95] SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than ‘precedential’.
…Decision of this Court in S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379], whereupon Mr. Rao placed strong reliance to contend that non-observance of principle of natural justice itself causes prejudice or the same should not be read “as it causes difficulty of prejudice”, cannot be said to be applicable in the instant case. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, has undergone a sea change. In view of the decision of this Court in State Bank of Patiala & Ors.vs. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] and Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460], the principle of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in the order being rendered a nullity. To the principal doctrine of audialterempartem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principal. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straightjacket formula. [See VivekaNandSethi vs. Chairman, J. & K. Bank Ltd. & Ots. (2005) 5 SCC 337 and State of U.P. vs. Neeraj Awasthi & Ors.JT 2006 (1) SC 19. See also Mohd. Sartaj vs. State of U.P. (2006) 1 SCALE 265.]”

In Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad Vs. B Karunakar II[96] it is held:

“The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.”
“Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/ Tribunal and given the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/ Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as it regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.”

The Supreme Court has, in Uma Nath Pandey Vs. State of UP,[97] held as follows:

“The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been caused, it may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, ‘useless formality theory’ can be pressed into service.”

It is further held in this decision as under:

“8. Natural justice is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
9. The expressions ‘natural justice’ and ‘legal justice’ do not present a watertight classification, It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defense.
10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences; is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the ‘Magna Carta’. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to ‘vocate, interrogate and adjudicate’. In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works the principle was thus stated: ‘(E)ven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defense. “Adam” (says God), “Where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of, the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?”

In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati[98] our Apex Court held:

“Even if it is found by the Court that there is a violation of principles of natural justice, the Courts have held that it may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision after complying with the procedural requirement in those cases where non-grant of hearing has not caused any prejudice to the person against whom the action is taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that order passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of ‘prejudice’. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing.”

But, in this decision our Apex Court held that the administrative authority cannot jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose and dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person against whom the action is contemplated.

“At the same time”, our Apex Court pointed out “it cannot be denied that as far as Courts are concerned, they are empowered to consider as to whether any purpose would be served in remanding the case keeping in mind whether any prejudice is caused to the person against whom the action is taken.”

In A.S. Motors Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union of India[99] our Apex court observed:

“What the Courts in essence look for in every case where violation of the principles of natural justice is alleged is whether the affected party was given reasonable opportunity to present its case and whether the administrative authority had acted fairly, impartially and reasonably. The doctrine of audi alteram partem is thus aimed at striking at arbitrariness and want of fair play. Judicial pronouncements on the subject have, therefore, recognised that the demands of natural justice may be different in different situations depending upon not only the facts and circumstances of each case but also on the powers and composition of the Tribunal and the rules and regulations under which it functions. A Court examining a complaint on violation of rules of natural justice is entitled to see whether the aggrieved party had indeed suffered any prejudice on account of such violation”.

Compliance of Substantive and Procedural Provisions

It is observed in KL KatyalVs. Central Secretariat Club (RC Lahoti, J.)[100]that the court may not interfere except in a clear case of violation of the provisions of the constitution or of the principles of natural justice.

In State Bank of India at Patialia Vs. SK Sharma[101] it is held:

“(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/ regulations/ statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.”

The court held further:

“(2) A substantive provision has normally to be compliedwith as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance of the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/ employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under -“no notice”, “no opportunity” and “no hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz. whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/ or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/ government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defense in his evidence, in a case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/ employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the persons proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/ employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the appropriate adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/ regulations/ statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/ action – the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audialteram pattern) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/ “no hearing” and “no fair hearing”, (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it ‘void’ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the later cases, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/ employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.)
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/ tribunal/authority must always bear in the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the court may have to balance public/ State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.”

Natural Justice: Laxity in Disciplinary Action

In HiraNath Mishra Vs. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi[102] the Supreme Court examined the application of principles of natural justice in the context of an order that was passed by the Principal of a College expelling certain male students against whom grave misbehaviour towards the girls had been alleged. The Enquiry Committee had not recorded the statements of the girl students in the presence of the male students. After making necessary enquiry, the Committee found that the male students were guilty of misconduct and recommended that they should be expelled. Acting on this report, the Principal passed the order of expulsion. The Supreme Court held that in such circumstances, the requirement of natural justice was fulfilled.

In Avinash NagraVs. Novodaya Vidyalaya Samiti[103] also the Supreme Court upheld dispensing with a regular enquiry in the matter of misbehaviour of a teacher against a girl student and observed that the denial of cross-examination did not vitiate the enquiry on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice.

Natural Justice: Laxity in Disciplinary Action of a Voluntary Association

The executive committee of a voluntary association cannot be put on par with a Court or a Tribunal when dealing with the disciplinary matters concerning the membership of the Body. They have very wide latitude in deciding as to when disciplinary action is warranted. The procedure to be followed by such an association also cannot be that which is normally expected to be followed in a Court, or a Tribunal. Even principles of natural justice are not required to be applied with the same degree of rigour as they would be in the case of adjudication before a Court or a Tribunal.[104]

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[105] it is observed:

“So if the statute which authorises compulsory amalgamation of Co-operative Societies provides for notice to the societies concerned, the requirement of natural justice is fully satisfied. The notice to the society will be deemed as notice to all its members. That is why S. 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members. S.13(9)(b), however, provides the members also with an opportunity to be heard if they desire to be heard. Notice to individual members of a Co-operative society, in our opinion, is opposed to the very status of a Co-operative society as a body corporate and is, therefore, unnecessary. We do not consider it necessary to further elaborate the matter except to point out that a member who objects to the proposed amalgamation within the prescribed time is given, by S. 31(11), the option to walk-out, as it were, by withdrawing his share, deposits or loans as the case may be.”

Natural Justice: Laxity in Deptl. Proceedings & Domestic Tribunal

It is well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein, do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal.[106] A domestic tribunal is free to evolve its own procedure.[107]

But in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen,[108] the Supreme Court observed that the application of the principles of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. It was pointed out that the minutes of the meeting could not have been relied upon when neither the original was produced nor was any justification put forth for the absence of the signed copy of the original.

Natural Justice: Violation and Alternate Remedy:

Courts will not delve in the internal disputes of an association unless it is shown[109] that the aggrieved parties have worked out and exhausted[110] their remedies (but, failed to resolve disputes) under the bye laws, before: (a) the machinery or body (domestic tribunals), if any, provided in its bye laws,[111] or (b) the body or authority which has to take cognizance of the matter, under the scheme of its bye laws, or (c) the authorities under the statute, if any, holds the field.[112] But, the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedy does not apply if there is violation of principle of natural justice,[113] as action in violation of natural justice is void.[114]

In Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa[115] though the appellant pleaded that there was violation of natural justice and the impugned order was without jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner should avail his alternate remedy of appeal.

In Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[116] it is held:

“In our opinion, the High Court was not right in interfering with the process of election especially when the process of election had started upon publication of the election program on 27th January, 2011 and more particularly when an alternative statutory remedy was available to Respondent No.1 by way of referring the dispute to the Central Government as per the provisions of Section 5 of the Act read with Regulation 20 of the Regulations.”

With respect to election to the office of Chairman of a Panchayat Union under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 it was held in S.T. MuthusamiVs. K. Natarajan[117] that election petition is an effective alternative remedy. Umesh Shivappa AmbiVs. Angadi Shekara Basappa[118] is a case relating to election of the President, Vice – President and Chairman, etc. under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, wherein our Apex Court reversed the judgment with the observation:

“Once an election is over, the aggrieved candidate will have to pursue his remedy in accordance with the provisions of law and the High Court will not ordinarily interfere with the elections under Article 226. The High Court will not ordinarily interfere where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy available, particularly in relation to election disputes.”[119]

Natural Justice: Administrative Process & Urgency

The maxim audi alteram partem cannot be invoked if the import of such maxim would have the effect of paralyzing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency so demands. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia[120] it is held that the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than precedential. The concept of natural justice sometimes requires flexibility in the application of the rule.[121]

Natural Justice: Inordinate Delay in Disciplinary Proceedings

Unexplained and unjustifiable long delay in initiating and in conducting departmental disciplinary proceedings will result in causing great prejudice to the person against whom such a proceeding is initiated and it will be a ground for quashing the proceedings.[122]

Right of Appeal: Not an Ingredient of Natural Justice

Right of Appeal is a creation of statute.[123] Right to appeal is neither an absolute right[124] nor an ingredient of natural justice.[125] It must be conferred by statute and can be exercised only as permitted by statute.[126]If the legislature provides for no appeal in a particular case, or provides for an appeal subject to certain conditions, it is a piece of proper legislation. Even if a statute denied right of appeal, the same cannot be said to be a bad legislation.[127]

Charges Should Not be Vague

The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.[128] In Surath Chandra Chakravarty Vs. The State of West Bengal[129] our Apex Court held that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry on vague charges, as the same do not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make out an effective defense as he will be unaware of the exact nature of the allegations against him, and what kind of defense he should put up or rebuttal thereof.

The Court observed as under:

“The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the specific contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him.”[130]

In Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan[131]our Apex Court found that charges were vague and it was difficult to meet the charges. Therefore although the concerned delinquent had participated in the inquiry, the Court opined that participation by itself does not exonerate the department to bring home the charge.

Civil Court has Jurisdiction when Expulsion in Violation of Natural Justice

Where a member of an association is expelled without observing the principles of natural justice,[132] or where a club had followed a procedure not warranted by the Rules of the Club,[133] the civil court will have the jurisdiction to interfere.[134]

In State of Kerala Vs. M/s N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons[135] the Supreme Court held:

“It is true that even if the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded, where the provisions of the statute have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine those cases.”[136]

Halsbury’s Laws of England[137] reads:

“Where the rules providing for expulsion have been strictly observed and the Committee or the members have otherwise acted properly, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere even though it considers that the Committee or the members voting for expulsion have, in fact, come to a wrong conclusion. The burden of proving want of good faith lies on the person who alleges that he has been wrongfully expelled.”

Court’s Jurisdiction in Expulsion of a Member from a Political Party

Whether a Civil Court has a jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to expulsion from membership of a political party, particularly when an appeal against such order of expulsion was pending before the appellate authority was the question came up for consideration in Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee Vs. Kalikho Pul.[138] In this case no notice was ever served upon the member giving him an opportunity to defend himself and explain before expelling him from the party. The party could not say about the procedure to be followed by the appellate authority and/or when such appeal was going to be disposed. The court upheld the contentions of the expelled member observing that that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to examine whether the expulsion was in good faith, in conformity with the Constitution and whether notice as required under the Constitution of the Party was served and the established principles of law of natural justice was followed by giving the member a chance of defense and explanation.[139]

Court Does Not Sit in Appeal

It is trite law that the Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiry officer as observed by our Apex Court, in UP State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Musai Ram.[140] It is held in Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar:[141]

“We are at any rate not sitting in appeal against the findings of a domestic tribunal set up to enquire into the allegations of misconduct leveled against a team official of a participating team. We are not, therefore, reappraising the material that has been assembled by the probe committee and relied upon to support its finding. The finding is by no means without basis or perverse[142] to call for our interference with the same.”

The Supreme Court in TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria,[143] held that jurisdiction of courts to interfere in cases involving expulsion of a member from the organization is extremely limited, and the Court’s enquiry is confined to find out whether the decision making is within the four corners of the rules, and the Courts cannot sit in appeal over the decisions of the organization.[144]

In Leo Francis Xaviour Vs. The Principal, Karunya Institute of Technology, Coimbatore[145] it is held as under:

“26. As it is found on the facts that there was an enquiry satisfying the requirements of the principles of natural justice, this Court cannot interfere with the finding of the Enquiry Committee and the consequential order of expulsion passed against the petitioner. The plea taken by the first respondent that it is a private college and the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked by the petitioner against the said College is well founded. Inasmuch as the principles of natural justice have been complied with, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of expulsion passed against the petitioner.”

In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. KS Gandhi[146] it is observed that the power of judicial review in case of student indiscipline is very limited and in such cases this Court does not sit in appeal over decisions of the school authorities.[147]

Appointment of Impartial Enquiry Officer

Merely because all the members of a society have participated in the discussion concerning an allegation against a member, the Society can’t be expected to appoint an outsider to hold the disciplinary proceeding, to avoid blame of institutional bias. In Lalit Kumar ModiVs. Board of Control for Cricket in India[148] it was pointed out that it may not be financially possible as well for such small societies. Merely because a member has participated in such a meeting he cannot be accused of bias to disentitle him from being appointed on the Disciplinary Committee, especially when only a prima facie opinion was formed in such meeting.

Ex-communication:

‘Ex-communication’ is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘a sentence of censure pronounced by one of the spiritual courts for offences falling under the ecclesiastical cognizance. It is described as two-fold: (1) The lesser excommunication, which is an ecclesiastical censure, excluding the party from the sacraments; (2) the greater, which excludes him from the company of all Christians.[149]

Sardar Syedna Taher Saiffuddin Saheb Vs. State of Bombay[150] (1962 – B P Sinha, CJ., A.K Sarkar, Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudholkar, J.J.)

Note: Sarkar, Das Gupta , Rajagopala Ayyangar were also judges in Durgah Committee, Ajmer Vs. Syed Hussain Ali.

The Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 was challenged in this decision. This Act made act of “ex-communication” illegal under Sec. 3, which reads as under:

“3. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom or usage for the time being in force to the contrary, no excommunication of a member of any community shall be valid and shall be of any effect.”

Sec. 4 made excommunication, a punishable offence. The Act was challenged by the head of the Dawoodi Bohras, as:

being impinging upon the right of the Dawoodi Bohras to freely practice their religion according to their own faith and practice, a right guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
It was contended that the right of the head of the Dawoodi Bohra community to ex-communicate is an essential part of the creed of the Dawoodi Bohra sect as it is a necessary measure of discipline for maintenance of integrity of the community, to hold together the community, so that the community faith, belief and practice can be preserved and hence protected by Article 26(b).

The Supreme Court, by majority (4 : 1), accepted the argument and struck down the Act as violative of Article 26(b) of the Constitution. It is pointed out in this decision as under:

“The content of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution came up for consideration before this Court in:
- The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt;
- Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das Vs. The State of Orissa;
- Sri Venkatamana Devaru Vs. The State of Mysore;
- Durgah Committee, Ajmer Vs. Syed Hussain Ali and several other cases
and the main principles underlying these provisions have by these decisions been placed beyond controversy.
- The first is that the protection of these articles is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief, they extend also to acts done in pursuance of religion and therefore contain a guarantee for rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion.
- The second is that what constitutes an essential part of a religious or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its religion.”

In this decision the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court:

observed that the exercise of the power of ex-communication by the religious head on religious ground form part of the management of its affairs in matters of religion and
held that it was difficult to agree that court was not a forum for vindication of such right. [151]

While considering the question whether the ex-communication of the Catholicos by the Patriarch of Antioch was valid, in Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma,[152] Sahai, J. observed that two questions arose: one, the jurisdiction of the civil court to examine ex-communication; and second, whether the ex-communication was in accordance with law.

RM Sahai, J. further held as under:

“Taking up the first question as to whether the civil courts are competent to decide on the validity of the excommunication, the answer, in this connection, has been given while deciding the objection of maintainability of the suit under Section 9 Civil Procedure Code. Yet it would not be inappropriate to mention how far the protection of a civil court extends regarding the ecclesiastical matters. The law has been explained in paras 315, 332 and 337 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 14. A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations. It is further settled that discipline of a church cannot affect any person except by express sanction of the civil power or by the voluntary submission of the particular person. But, for purposes of enforcing discipline within a church religious body may constitute a tribunal to determine whether its rules have been violated by any other members or not and what will be the consequence of that violation. In such case the tribunals so constituted are not in any sense courts, they derive no authority from the statutes and they have no power of their own to enforce their sentence. Their decisions are given effect to by the courts as decision of the arbitrators whose jurisdiction rests entirely on the agreement of the parties. Consequently if any member of such body has been injured as to his rights in any matter of mixed spiritual and temporal character the courts of law will, on due complaint being made, inquire into the laws and rules of the tribunal or authority which has inflicted the injury and will ascertain whether any sentence pronounced was regularly pronounced by competent authority, and will give such redress as justice demands. See Long, Dame and Anadrav. In Hasanali Vs. Mansoorali, it was held that a court of law cannot recognise a purported ex-communication as valid if principles of substantial justice have not been complied with.”

Proof in Disciplinary Action

The Supreme Court has, in Union of India Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar,[153] held that serious charges of corruption against the employees are to be proved to the hilt, as it brings civil and criminal consequences upon them. It was held that such serious charges can’t be proved on the basis of mere probabilities. The Court held that disciplinary inquiry must strictly adhere to the statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice and inquiry must be conducted fairly and finding should not be perverse[154] or unreasonable and suspicion can’t take the place of proof.

A Constitution Bench of our Apex Court in State of Orissa Vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra[155] held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence[156] to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable.

Regional Manager, U.P.S.R. T.C.,Etawah Vs. Hoti Lal[157]the Supreme Court held that the court, while exercising the power of judicial review cannot substitute its own conclusions on the penalty imposed on the employee, by imposing some other penalty. If the punishment imposed on the employee shocks the conscience of the Court it can mould the relief by directing the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.[158]

Misconduct in Labour Cases

In Pearce Vs. Foster (QBD) it is held:

“If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service of the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant.”

The assessment of evidence in a domestic enquiry is not required to be made by applying the same yardstick as a Civil Court could do when a lis is brought before it. The Indian Evidence Act is not applicable to the proceeding in a domestic enquiry so far as the domestic enquiries are concerned, though principles of fairness are to apply. It is also fairly well settled that in a domestic enquiry guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt and the proof of misconduct would be sufficient. In a domestic enquiry all materials which are logically probative including hearsay evidence can be acted upon provided it has a reasonable nexus and credibility.[159] Confessional evidence and circumstantial evidence, despite lack of any direct evidence, was sufficient to hold the delinquent guilty of misconduct and to justify the termination.[160]

The principles generally apply to erring office bearers and members of societies also.

Court Scrutinises Acts of Trustees

Generally, superior authorities and authorities with supervisory powers will have disciplinary jurisdiction over those who are appointed or supervised; and normally, trustees may not have such superior authorities and authorities with supervisory powers. Therefore, in the matters of public trusts, the beneficiaries, or other persons who have a right to complain, can approach the civil court, invoking Sec. 92 CPC or otherwise.

No Action against Trustees, if Bona Fide Act

Actiontaken bona fide, though it is a mistaken one, will not lead to take action on breach of trust.[161] There must be gross negligence or misconduct for removal of trustees. Want of capacity or of fidelity which is calculated to put the trust in jeopardy will be actionable. But, failure in the discharge of duty on account of mistake or misunderstanding is not a ground for removal unless such failure shows want of capacity to manage the trust.[162] It is legitimate to bring-in these principles into the acts and duties of the office-bearers of a society or a club also.

Degree of Prudence Expected

It was observed in Jagat Narain Vs. Mathura Das[163] that the degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him and the transaction would have to be judged not by the result, but by what might have been expected to be its results at the time it was entered into.

While considering the sale of an old house by the manager of a temple, which was not in a dilapidated condition but it required extensive repairs, it was held in BehariLal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji[164] that the sale was neither a prudent act nor it was for the benefit of the estate. In K.P.L.S. Palaniappa Chetty Vs. Shreenath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi[165] it was laid down that a Shebait would not be justified in selling debutter land solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the money lending business. Mulla’s Hindu Law reads:

“He (Shebait) is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself.”[166]

Jurisdiction of Courts in Removal of Persons Holding Office

If obligations not faithfully discharged

If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of the trustee, a suit can be brought in a Civil Court by any person interested for the removal of the trustee and for the proper administration of the endowment.[167]

In Raja Peary Mohan MukerjiVs. MonoharMukerji,[168] the Privy Council observed:

“… As a part of office it is indisputable that there are duties which must be performed, the estate does need to be safeguarded and kept in proper custody and it be found that a man in the exercise of his duties has put himself in a position in which the Court thinks that the obligations of his office can no longer be faithfully discharged that is sufficient ground for his removal.”[169]

It is appropriate to say that these principles relating to trust[170] fully apply to the affairs of the societies and clubs also. It is trite law that if a trustee denies the validity of the trust, that by itself is sufficient to remove him from the trusteeship.

Breach of Bye-law or Mismanagement Entails removal

The members of a club or society, both registered and unregistered, are bound by the memorandum of association and its rules and regulations. The bye laws bind its members as a contract.[171] When a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality[172] qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws;[173] and the rights of members merge in the rights of the society.[174]

In State of U.P. Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society[175] it is held:

“Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfillment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, Rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, Rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, Rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.”

Nevertheless, any breach of a bye-law would not result into automatic cessation of membership but the procedure for removal or expulsion from membership would be required to be followed even in case of breach of bye-laws of a society.[176]

Trustees Actuated by Dishonest and Corrupt Motives

The principles apply to office bearers of societies also.

In Managing Committee of SS Endowment Vs. Mohd.Ahsan[177] the Oudh Court held that the test which must be applied is whether the acts or omissions complained of disclose conditions which render intervention necessary in order to save the trust property. The court also said that it is to be seen whether such state of affairs was brought about deliberately or willfully and whether the trustees were actuated by dishonest and corrupt motives.

Misconduct or negligence

In S. Veeraraghava Achariar Vs. V. Parthasaruthy Iyengaar[178] it was held that once a person accepts an office of trusteeship the motive for all his actions should be the interest of the institution and that alone. Even though the evidence in a case against the trustees may not be sufficient to warrant, generally speaking, their removal from office on the ground of misconduct or negligence, still their removal may be ordered, if, in the opinion of the court, such removal is necessary in the interests of the trust to be administered.

Claim of Adverse Title by a Trustee

Apart from Section 116 Evidence Act, a Shebait or Mutawalli is not permitted to make any adverse assertion of title upon a property of the temple or wakf, he holds.

Assertion of Private Ownership

Betrayal of fiduciary position of a trustee entails his removal. In Srinivas Chariar Vs. CN Evalappa Mudaliar[179] the Judicial Committee held that an assertion to private ownership[180] was enough ground for removal of a trustee. It was also said that it was not open to the court on any sound principles, either of administration or of law, to permit the continuance of the trustee in the office in such a case.

If Trustees have Interest Adverse to Beneficiaries

Trustees become disqualified if they have any interest adverse to that of the beneficiaries. In Avanthi Explosives Vs. Principal Subordinate Judge Tirupathi[181] Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the obligation of a director to disclose his interest in a contract entered into or to be entered into is an obligation similar to that of a trustee and directors are in the position of trustees according to common law and they have a fiduciary relation towards the shareholders.

In Narayandas Vs. Sangli Bank[182] it was held by our Apex Court that a director of a company stood in a fiduciary position towards the Company and was bound to protect its interest. He must not place himself in a position in which his personal interest conflicts with his duty.

District Courts’ Jurisdiction under S R Act, Limited[183]

First proviso of Sec. 13, Societies Registration Act, 1880, lays down that in the event of any dispute arising among the governing body or the members of the society while in its dissolution, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the principal court of original civil jurisdiction of the district in which the chief building of the society is situate; and the court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite.

Several State (Societies Registration) Acts/Amendmentsprovide for a specific forum – District Court – as the authority to entertain and try suits or applications for certain specific matters as to the administration of the societies. But, generally, restricted or limited jurisdiction alone is conferred to such forum under those Acts/ Amendments.

The reliefs outside the purview of these provisions can be validly raised in a proper Civil Court;[184]as otherwise, arbitrary and inequitable results will be brought-in and it will leave the aggrieved persons without any remedy at all, in respect of matters which are not specifically provided for in these provisions.[185]

In R. R. Rajendra Menon Vs. Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd.[186] it is observed:

“No provision in the Act has been brought to our notice as specifying expressly or impliedly that an application to compel a company to comply with the requirements in S. 257 will lie in the company court. The Act specifies certain questions or disputes to be resolved by the Central government, certain others by the Company Law Board and certain matters to be dealt with by the company court. Only such matters as are specified in the Act or in the rules to be dealt with by the court could the company court deal with. The jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court can be regarded as impliedly barred in respect of those matters specified in the Act to be dealt with by the court. It cannot be held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of all other matters relating to a company is barred. The corollary is that, unless a particular matter is specified in the Act to be dealt with by the company-court, it cannot exercise jurisdiction merely because it is also a matter which relates to a company.”

Court Examines Reasons or Grounds of Supersession of Societies

While dealing with CP and Berar Municipalities Act, it is held by the Full Bench in Municipal Commissioner, Kareli Vs. State of MP[187] that the Court has power to examine the sufficiency of reasons. It was observed:

“In a democratic society it is of the essence that democratic institutions are allowed to function and not superseded on trumpery charges inadequately brought home or unreasonably accepted. The Courts will be vigilant to see that such over-reaching powers are kept within the four corners of the statute granting them. We think that the fact that a reasonable opportunity to show cause has been made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power and that reasons for the supersession have to be notified to the electorate shows that there is not to be a subjective appraisal but that the reasons must be sufficient under the Act and an objective test is indicated. The requirements of the law are not satisfied by accepting insufficient or inadequate reasons for supersession. We think that the Courts are at liberty to examine the reasons for this limited purpose in addition to the purposes which the learned Judges of the earlier Division Bench (Mangalmurti and Mudholkar JJ.) have already indicated in their order.”

Section 33 of the M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973 speaks of supersession[188] of the Governing Body by the State Government by removing the governing body and appointing a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a specified period not exceeding two years in the first instance. It is held in Suresh Vs. State of MP[189] that the power of supersession was not an administrative power but was a quasi-judicial in nature.

In Indian National Congress Vs. Institute of Social Welfare[190] it is observed by the Supreme Court, when it considered as to what constitutes exercise of quasi judicial power, as under:

“24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these: Where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial.”

Mere Non-Payment of Subscription: Not Amount to Resignation

While considering Section 2 (b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act (similar provision to Sec. 15 of the Societies Registration Act), High Court of Karnataka, in Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies,[191] referred to dictionary meaning of ‘resignation’ and Supreme Court decisions[192] and held:

“In view of what we have noted hereinabove, it cannot be said that mere non-payment of the subscription would amount to resignation within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act.
Nonpayment of subscription would also not amount to relinquishment of membership, unless a person is afforded a specific opportunity of making payment by calling upon him to pay the arrears or face the consequences.”

It is also held that the Rule of the Society which declared a person would cease to be a member merely on his default to make the subscription, without even providing him an opportunity to show cause for not making the payment within a specified period appeared “to be very harsh” and that “confiscatory and deprivatory provisions made, resulting in civil consequences, should not have been allowed” to be incorporated in the bye laws.It is on the principle that rules of natural justice require that that no person can be condemned unheard[193]

The Division Bench struck down the impugned Rule it being contrary to the provisions of the Act.

No expulsion for arrears if no notice

The rules of natural justice requires notice calling upon a member of a society to pay the arrears, before he be expelled for nonpayment.[194]

Office-Bearer of a Co-Op Society Can be Removed by No-Confidence Motion

In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary Vs. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited,[195] Chairperson of a Co-operative Society was removed from the office through a ‘no confidence motion’ by the Director Board. Power is vested in the General Body to remove the entire committee by passing a vote of no-confidence. To the question whether, in the absence of a specific provision for removal of the Chairperson/ elected-office-bearer by ‘no-confidence’ in the Act, Rules or even Bye-laws of a Co-operative Society, the Chairperson or the elected-office-bearer can be removed by a motion of no-confidence, our Apex Court held that Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution, provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies – including the concept as to ‘collective responsibility to the Parliament, or Legislative Assembly itself implies that the Council of Ministers shall be liable to be dismissed if it ceases to enjoy the confidence of the House.’

Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society. In the background of the constitutional mandate,the question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must say. If the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws do not say, what they should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to read the Constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. Applying the Constitutional spirit, our Apex Court held that removal of the Chairperson from the office through the ‘no confidence motion’ was valid.

Office-Bearer of a Society or a Club: Removal by Motion of No-confidence

Sans the constitutional mandate with respect to Co-operative Societies, as mentioned above, it has to be stated that, without an express power in the Act or bylaw, an elected-office-bearer of a society or club cannot be removed by a motion of no–confidence of the managing committee which elected that office-bearer.

Before the decision of the Supreme Court stated above, Kerala High Court in S Lakshmanan Vs. V Velliankeri,[196]relying on Sec. 16 of the General Clauses Act, (It lays down that when a power to make any appointment is conferred by a statute, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the authority having such power of making the appointment shall also have the power to suspend or dismiss any person so appointed whether by itself or by any other authority in exercise of such power.) and considering the following arguments, it was heldthat the Chairperson or the elected–office–bearer of a Co-operative Society cannot be removed by a motion of no–confidence:

(i) Passing of a no-confidence resolution was not a matter of day to day affairs of the society, and it was a matter of great importance; and therefore, could not be the subject matter of an implied power or procedure of passing of an ordinary resolution such a drastic power could not be read into the Act, where there were no provisions.
(ii) The principles of collective responsibility, adverted to in the Constitution and the Constitutional conventions based upon British Parliamentary practice, were hardly applicable in the matter;
(iii) The affairs of a Co-operative Society could never be equated to that of the Parliament or a Legislative Assembly.
(iv) A Co-operative Society was the creature of the statute and must function within the parameters of the statute and the rules thereunder; and where the statute wanted to recognise and prescribe a procedure for a no-confidence motion, it had to deal with it specifically.
(v) Once this term had been prescribed by the statute, the members of the Committee are entitled to hold their office for the full term unless their tenure is terminated in accordance with the manner prescribed in the statute itself. That manner can be prescribed either in the Act, or in the Rules or in the Bye-laws. If there is no such prescription, then the members of the Committee shall be entitled to hold their office for the full tenure as indicated in the Rules. such a tenure cannot be cut short by exercise of an implied power.
(vi) A right arising in connection with election laws is not a common law right. It is a special right created by the conditions and manner prescribed by the law concerned,[197] and the argument of implied power by application of common law principles has no relevance.
(vii)The term of office prescribed is to give a security of tenure to carry on the management of the society effectively and efficiently in the interest of the Society as a whole.

It was also pointed out that under the provisions of the Co-operative Act, members of the committee had no licence to do what they please. They were controlled by the overriding ‘supervisory powers of the authorities’ under the Act; and there was also a specific provision in the Co-operative Societies Act which empowered the General Body to remove the entire committee by passing a vote of no-confidence.

It is legitimate to state that without an express enabling power in the bylaw, an elected-office-bearer of a society or club cannot be removed by a motion of no–confidence of the managing committee even though the managing committee had elected that office-bearer. It is a right arising under the provisions of its bye laws, and not conferred under the common-law-principles.

Since General Body of a society or club is supreme,[198] the properly convened General Body has the right to remove any one or all of the elected-office-bearers (subject to the fundamental principles of substantive justice, including observance of natural justice) unless no clause in the bye laws restricts the same.

Removal of Earlier Committee

When a committee of an association continues to exercise powers even after cessation of their period of office, it is within the competence of the General Body of the Association to take up the matter,if provisionsof the byelaws or the enactment concerned do not, expressly or impliedly, mandates otherwise. In proper cases, the members can approach the civil court also.

In any event, opportunity of being heard should be given to the members of the committee concerned.[199] It is well settled that principles of natural justice must be read into the byelaws and the statute, unless there is a clear directive to the contrary.[200]

In K. Srinivas Vs. Commissioner of Fisheries[201]it was observed that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies being conferred the power of general superintendence and to issue directions, in the public interest, to prevent the affairs of the society from being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the members of the society, it was the Registrar of Co-operative Societies who had the power to declare that the managing committee had ceased to hold office.

[1] Fourth Edition, Vol. 19(I), p 143: Referred to in D Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. ChaitnyaBharathi: AIR 2007 SC 1794

[2] Md. Moinuddin Vs. Commr. for Cooperation: AIR 2014 SC 2680; Narayan Vs. Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies: AIR 1994 Bombay 239; Bhaskar Laxman Rane Vs. Shri Gurudev Nityanand: 1998 (3) Mh.L.J.127; Kolhapur ZillaSahakariDoodh Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2008 (2) MAH. L.J.231; SurenderRohilla Vs. Inderprastha Cooperative House Building Society: 2014-2-CPJ 272; M. Sekar Vs. The Tamil Nadu State Council of the CPI: 2015-7 MLJ 689.

[3] AIR 1963 SC 1144.

[4] See also: Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Association: AIR 2015 SC 3194; Capt. DK Giri Vs. Secunderabad Club: AIR 2018 AP 48.

[5] Quoted in : Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Association: AIR 2015 SC 3194; D Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Ednl. Society : AIR 2007 SC 1794

[6] (1988) 2 SCC 602

[7] See also: Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Association: AIR 2015 SC 3194; Capt. DK Giri Vs. Secunderabad Club: AIR 2018 AP 48.

[7] Quoted in : Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Association: AIR 2015 SC 3194; D Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Ednl. Society : AIR 2007 SC 1794

[7] (1988) 2 SCC 602, See also: State of Haryana Vs. State of Punjab: (2004) 12 SCC 673; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Vs. ZakirHussain: (2005) 7 SCC 447.

[8] AIR 1981 SC 136.

[9] Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. : AIR 2006 SC 1748; Rajasthan STC Vs. Bal Mukund Bairawa: (2009) 4 SCC 299 : (2009)5 SCJ 757; Firstone Tyre and Rubber Company Vs. Employees’ Union: AIR 1981 SC 1626; Union of India Vs. Gyan Chand Chatter: (2009) 12 SCC 78. Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1986 SC 995; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao; AIR 1963 SC 1723; U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Ram Chandra Yadav: AIR 2000 SC 3596; Union of India Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78; Anil Gilurker Vs. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank : (2011) 14 SCC 379.

[10] Workmen Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. : AIR 1985 SC 251; Rajastan STC Vs. Bal Mukund Bairawa: (2009) 4 SCC 299: (2009)5 SCJ 757; MV Bijlani Vs. Union of India : 2006 SC 3475; Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank – AIR 2008 SC (Sup.) 921; Vijay Singh Vs. State of U.P. – AIR 2012 SC 2840; M.S. Bindra Vs. Union of India – AIR 1998 SC 3058; Registrar Vs. Uday Singh – AIR 1997 SC 2286; Zora Singh Vs. JM Tandon – AIR 1971 SC 1537; State of Uttaranjal Vs. Kharak Singh: 2008 AIR (SCW) 7507; Union of India Vs. Naman Singh Sekhawat: 2008 AIR (SCW) 2813.

[11] A.C. Muthiah v. Board of Control for Cricket: (2011) 6 SCC 617: 2010 (2) CTC 429

[12] Amlendu Ghosh Vs. District Traffic Superintendent: AIR 1960 SC 992. See also: NaryanDattatraya Ramteerathakhar Vs. State of Mahastra: AIR 1997 SC 2148

[13] Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co: AIR 2006 SC 1748

[14] AyaaubkhanNoorkhanPatan Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2013 SC 58

[15] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484

[16] Lalit Kumar Modi Vs. Board of Control Cricket: 2011-10 SCC 106; Workmen of Firestone Tyre Co Vs. Management: Sheikh Ismail: AIR 1973 SC 1227; Delhi Cloth And General Mills Company Limited Vs. LudhBudh Singh: AIR 1972 SC 1031 ; Labour Commissioner Madhya Pradesh Vs. Burhanpur Tapti Mills: AIR 1964 SC 1687.

[17] State Bank of India’s case: AIR (SCW) 1465

[18] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484; Union of India Vs. G. Ganayutham: AIR 1997 SC 3387.

[19] TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, 1963 AIR SC 1144; State of Orissa Vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra: AIR 1963 SC 779. Referred to in BC Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484; Lalit Kumar ModiVs. Board of Control for Cricket in India: 2011-10 SCC 106.

[20] TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, 1963 AIR SC 1144

[21] Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur: (1972) 2 SCR 218: (1972) Lab IC 627).

[22] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484; Jagmohan Dalmia Vs. BCCI: AIR 2008 Cal. 227

[23] Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh: AIR 1983 SC 454

[24] TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, 1963 AIR SC 1144; High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil: (2000) 1 SCC 416; Jagmohan Dalmia Vs. BCCI: AIR 2008 Cal. 227

[25] Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1986 SC 995

[26] High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil: (2000) 1 SCC 416

[27] TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, 1963 AIR SC 1144

[28] High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil: (2000) 1 SCC 416

[29] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484; Union of India Vs. G. Ganayutham: AIR 1997 SC 3387.

[30] State Bank of India’s case: AIR AIR (SCW) 1465

[31] Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[32] Dr. TP Senkumar Vs. Union of India: 2017 (2) Ker LT 453 (SC)

[33] AIR 1958 MP 323 (FB).

[34] Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1986 SC 995.

[35] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484; Union of India Vs. G. Ganayutham: AIR 1997 SC 3387.

[36] TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144

[37] TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144, Capt. DK Giri Vs. Secunderabad Club: AIR 2018 AP 48; M. Sekar Vs. The Tamil Nadu State Council of the CPI: 2015-7 MLJ 689; D. Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Educational Society : AIR 2007 SC 1794; Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Asson. of Bihar: AIR 2015 SC 3194.

[38] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144; Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commir. of IT, Kolhapur: AIR 2004 SC 4716; Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973; Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005 SC 2306; State Bank of India Staff Association Vs. Mohindra Bhattacharyya: AIR 1991 Cal 378; BCCI Vs. Netaji Cricket Club: AIR 2005 SC 592.

[39] C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa: 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar 14: Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915. Nelson Vs. KallayamPastotate: AIR 2007 SC 1337

[40] A P Dairy Development Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298; Dharam DuttVs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295.

[41] Kowtha Suryanarayana Rao Vs. Patibandla Subrahmanyam: AIR 1940 Mad 902.

[42] Madras Gymkhana Club Vs. KC Sukumar: 2010-1 CTC 199.

[43] A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan: 2000 (7) SCC 695: AIR 2000 SC 3032; Superintending Engineer Periyar Electricity Distribution Circle Erode Vs. Pavathal: 2002-2 CTC 544; 2002-1 Mad LJ 515. G. Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP AryaVysyaMahasabha Vs. MutyapuSudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227; Umesh Shivappa Ambi Vs. Angadi Shekara Basappa: (1998) 4 SCC 529: AIR 1999 SC 1566; Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (2006) 8 SCC 487; Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh: AIR 2006 SC 52; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer1952 SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64

[44] UjjalTalukdarVs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224. Rashmi Bala Saxena Vs. Jiwaji University Gwalior: AIR 1989 MP 181

[45] Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774

[46] G. BalaSubrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP Arya Vysya Mahasabha Vs. Mutyapu Sudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227.

[47] AIR 2003 SC 2041: (2003) 4 SCC 557

[48] Quoted in Poonam Vs. State of U.P. 20016-2 SCC 779.

[49] See: D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. AIR 1992 SC 1795

[50] AIR 2003 SC 2041. Referred to in Prakash Ratan Sinha Vs. State of Bihar: 2009-14 SCC 690.

[51] Indian National Congress (I) Vs. Institute of Social Welfare: AIR 2002 SC 2158; Bachhitar Singh V. State of Punjab: AIR 1963 SC 395; Union of India v. H.C. Goel: AIR 1964 SC 364; Jyoti Basu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR 1982 SC 983; Mohan Lal Tripathi Vs. District Magistrate, Raebareli: AIR 1993 SC 2042; Ram Beti Vs. District Panchayat Rajadhikari: AIR 1998 SC 1222.

[52] Chamoli District Co-Op. Bank Ltd.. Vs. Raghunath Singh Rana: 2016 AIR (SCW) 2510

[53] AIR 1962 SC 1110

[54] Quoted in K Chelliah Vs. Chairman Industrial Finance Corporation: AIR1973 Mad 122.

[55] Hree Vitthal Sahakari Vs. Wadikuroli Vividh KaryakariSeva Society: 2011-4 BCR 290

[56] AwariDevannaVs Divisional Co Operative Officer: 1994-1 ALT 363; K. Srinivas VS Commissioner of Fisheries: 2009 3 ALD 1; 2009 2 ALT 604.

[57] Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna: AIR 1987 SC 71; C.B. Gautam Vs. Union of India: (1993) 1 SCC 78.

[58] AIR 1970 SC 150. Quoted in: Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Election Commissioner: (1978) 1SCC 405

[59] (1964) 3 SCR 616

[60] 2016 AIR (SCW) 2510

[61] (1964) 3 SCR 616

[62] (1972) 4 SCC 304.

[63] (2008) 8 SCC 236.

[64] [1964] 3 SCR 652

[65] AIR 1994 SC 1074.

[66] (1999) 2 SCC 2.

[67] (2006) 3 SCC 150.

[68] J.S. Yadav Vs. State of U.P.: (2011) 6 SCC 570

[69] Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Madanlal Tandon: AIR 2015 SC 2876.

[70] East India Commercial Company Vs. The Collector of Customs: 1962 AIR SC 1893; U.O.I. Vs. Madhumilan Syntex 1988-3 SCC 348; Morarji Goculdas Vs. U.O.I. 1995 Supp3 SCC 588; Metal Forgings Vs. U.O.I. 2003 2 SCC 36.

[71] S.P. Malhotra Vs. Punjab National Bank” AIR 2013 SC 3739; Manohar Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2013 SC 681; Punjab National Bank Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, AIR 1998 SC 2713; Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra : AIR 1999 SC 3734; State Bank of India Vs. K.P. Narayanan Kutty: AIR 2003 SC 1100; J.A. Naiksatam Vs. Prothonotary: AIR 2005 SC 1218; P.D. Agrawal Vs. State Bank of India : AIR 2006 SC 2064; Ranjit Singh Vs. Union of India : AIR 2006 SC 3685; Canara Bank Vs. Shri Debasis Das: AIR 2003 SC 2041; KanwarNutwar Singh Vs. Director of Enforcement: 2010 AIR (SCW) 6427.

[72] C.B. Gautam Vs. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 78. Referred: Union Union of India Vs. Col. J. N. Sinha (1970) 2 SCC 458, Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545.

[73] Quoted in: Arcot Textile Mills Vs. Regional Provident Fund: AIR 2014 SC 295.

[74] AIR 1985 SC 1416; referred to in Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar: AIR 2015 SC 3194.

[75] See also: Central Inland Water Trans. Corpn. Vs. BrojoNath Ganguly: AIR 1986 SC 1571.

[76] (1978) 1 SCC 248

[77] (2012) 4 SCC 438

[78] Arcot Textile Mills Vs. Regional Provident Fund: AIR 2014 SC 295

[79] Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager, Indian Oil Corpn.: AIR 2005 SC 4217;

[80] Natwar Singh Vs. Director of Enforcement (2010) 13 SCC 255

[81] Ex Armymen’s Protection Service Vs. Union of India: AIR 2014 SC 1376; A.S. Motors Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union Of India: 2013 AIR (SCW) 3830; Muhammed Yunus Khan Vs. State of U.P.: 2010-10 Scale 2867.

[82] Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Election Commissioner: (1978) 1SCC 405; A.K. Kraipak Vs. Union of India: AIR 1970 SC 150.

[83] Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. Vs. M/s. Suvarna Board Mills: 1994-5 SCC 566.

[84] AIR 1969 SC 198

[85] AIR 1977 SC 965

[86] AIR 1968 SC 850

[87] 2001-1 Bom CR 390: 2000-3 Bom LR 741: 2001 1 MhLJ 63

[88] AIR 1978 SC 597

[89] AIR 2006 SC 2064

[90] (1996) 3 SCC 364

[91] (1996) 5 SCC 460

[92] 2020 SCC OnLine SC 847

[93] AIR 2006 SC 2064. See also: A.S. Motors Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union of India: 2013 AIR (SCW) 3830.

[94] AIR 2005 SC 4217: (2005) 7 SCC 764.

[95] (1990) 1 SCC 613: AIR 1990 SC 1480.

[96] AIR 1994 SC 1074

[97] (2009) 12 SCC 40

[98] 2015 AIR (SCW) 3884: 2015 (8) SCC 519. Followed, Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad Vs. B Karunakar II: AIR 1994 SC 1074.

[99] 2013 AIR (SCW) 3830

[100] 1994-30 DRJ 669

[101] AIR 1996 SC 1669; (1996) 3 SCC 364

[102] (1973) 1 SCC 805

[103] (1997) 2 SCC 534

[104] Chennai Kancheepuram Tiruvelore District Film Distributors Association Vs. Chinthamani S. Murugesan: 2001 (3) CTC 349: 2001-Supp. Mad LJ 48; A C Muthiah Vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India: (2011) 6 SCC 617: 2010 (2) CTC 429.

[105] AIR1985 SC 973

[106] Maharashtra State Board of Secondary Edn. Vs. K.S. Gandhi: (1991) 2 SCC 716. See also: Executive Engineer Vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill: (2012)2 SCC 108; Harekrishna K. Vadhwani Vs. Vasupujya Smruti Co -op. Hsg. Soc.: 2004(1) GLH 257; Banaskantha District Co -op. Union Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat 2011(2) GLR 1707; State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd : AIR 1997 SC 1413; B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484.

[107] Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 Pj&Hr 21

[108] AIR 1972 SC 330

[109] Especially, in discretionary reliefs: Madras Gymkhana Club Vs. Sukumar 2010-1 CTC 199

[110] See: A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan: 2000 (7) SCC 695: AIR 2000 SC 3032; Superding Engineer Periyar Electricity Vs. Pavathal: 2002-2 CTC 544; 2002-1 Mad LJ 515.

[111] Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774

[112] G. Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP Arya Vysya Mahasabha Vs. Mutyapu Sudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227

[113] A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector Vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani : AIR 1961 SC 1506; SatwatiDeswal Vs. State of Haryana: [2010] 1 SCC 126 ; State of H.P. Vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd.: AIR 2005 SC 3936; Dhulabhai Vs. State of M P : AIR 1969 SC 78; Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai: AIR 1999 SC 22.

[114] Rajasthan STC Vs. Bal Mukund Bairawa: (2009) 4 SCC 299 : (2009)5 SCJ 757;

[115] AIR 1983 SC 603

[116] AIR 2016 SC 1094

[117] AIR 1988 SC 616

[118] AIR 1999 SC 1566

[119] Quoted in: Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh GurdwaraMgent. Comte. (2006) 8 SCC 487. Similar view in: Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh: AIR 2006 SC 52. Also see: Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer: AIR 1952 SC 64.

[120] AIR 2005 SC 4217.

[121] See also: Arcot Textile Mills Vs. Regional Provident Fund: AIR 2014 SC 295.

[122] State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh : 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, (more than 12 years); State of Punjab Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal: (1995) 2 SCC 570 (5½ years); M. Balakrishnan Vs. The Corporation of Madurai: 1995 (II) CTC 589; The Commr, Sankarapuram Panchayat Vs. S.A. Abdul Wahab: 1996 Writ L.R.677, State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan: (1998) 4 SCC 154, B. Loganathan Vs. The Union of India: 2000 (III) CTC 351 (SC) (15 years); Union of India Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal: 2005 (2) CTC 169(20 years); P.V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board: 2005 (4) CTC 403(SC) (20 years); M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India: (2006) 5 SCC 88, (13 years), P. Anand Vs. The Principal Commissioner: 2006 (5) CTC 723; K. Kumaran Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu: 2007 (3) CTC 763 (18 years); Ranjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana 2008 (3) CTC 781 (SC) (9 years).

[123]Usha Udyog Vs. Customs, Excise and Gold: 2000-86 DLT 667: 2000-71 ECC 416, Mohan Lal Saraf Vs. Chairperson, Debts Recovery: 2013-2 ADJ 497, 2013-3All LJ 99

[124]Satya Nidhan Banerji Vs. Mdhazabbur Ali Khan: AIR 1932 All 47; Gadagotlu Sitaramaiah Vs. Collector Of Central Excise Hyderabad: AIR1960 AP 294, Iddesh Tours And Travels Vs. Comrof Service Tax Mumbai: 2019-367 ELT 235

[125] Vijay Prakash D. Mehta Vs. Collector of Customs: AIR 1988 SC 2010; Unicipal Committee Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board: AIR 2011 SC 209, Tecnimont Pvt Ltd Vs. State of Punjab: 2019-12 SCALE 562, Usha Udyog Vs. Customs, Excise and Gold: 2000-86 DLT 667: 2000-71 ECC 416; Shyam Kishore Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi: AIR 1991 Del 104

[126]Usha Udyog Vs. Customs, Excise and Gold: 2000-86 DLT 667: 2000-71 ECC 416; Discharged Servicemens Assn. Vs. State of Kerala: 1999-2 KerLJ 1133: 2000-1 KerLT 281.

[127] Nathamani Gounder Vs. State of Tamil Nudu: 1986-2 LLJ 423,

[128] State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao; AIR 1963 SC 1723; Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR 1986 SC 995; U.P.S.R.T.C. Vs. Ram Chandra Yadav: AIR 2000 SC 3596; Union of India Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78; Anil Gilurker Vs.Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank : (2011) 14 SCC 379 .

[129] AIR 1971 SC 752.

[130] See also: Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance: AIR 2006 SC 1748; Rajastan STC Vs. Bal Mukund Bairawa: (2009) 4 SCC 299: (2009)5 SCJ 757; Anil Gilurkar Vs.Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Bank 2011 AIR (SCW) 5327; FirstoneTyre and Rubber Company Vs. Employees’ Union: AIR 1981 SC 1626; Union of India Vs. Gyan Chand Chatter: (2009) 12 SCC 78.

[131] AIR 1986 SC 995

[132] Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. Phiros H. Antia: AIR 1939 Bom. 35. See also: C.D. Sekkilar Vs. R. Krishnamoorthy: AIR 1952 Mad 151. Husein Miya Dosumiya vs. Chandulal Jethabhai: AIR 1954 Bom 239; Rajasthan State Road Trant. Corpn. Vs. Bal Mukund Bairawa: (2009) 4 SCC 299. Personal hearing necessary: Mumbai Cricket Asson. Vs. Ratnakar: (2014) 2 Mah LJ 726. Action on report of enquiry officer based on ‘no evidence’: Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank : AIR 2008 SC (Sup.) 921; Jagmohan Dalmia Vs. BCCI: AIR 2008 Cal. 227. Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. : AIR 2006 SC 1748, T.P. Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria AIR 1963 SC 1144; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly: AIR 1986 SC 1571; Institute of Chartered Accounts of India Vs. L.K. Ratna, 1986 (4) SCC 537; Delhi Transport Corp. Vs. DTC Mazdoor Congress 1991 (Supp.1) SCC 600; LIC of India Vs. Consumer Education and Research Centre 1995(5) SCC 482; Escorts Farms Vs. Commissioner Kumaon Division (2004) 4 SCC 281; SM Kamble Vs. Jt. Registrar, Co-Op. Societies: (2008) 1 AIR Bom R 274.

[133] Kalyan Kumar Dutta Gupta Vs. B.M. Verma: AIR 1995 Cal. 140 (DB). Also see: Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India: ILR 2009-19 Dlh 216.

[134] T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C. Belgaum: AIR 1963 SC 1144.

[135] AIR 1966 SC 1738.

[136] See: Firm Seth Radhakishan Vs. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana: AIR 1963 SC 1547; Secretary of State Vs. Mask & Co.: AIR 1940 PC 43; Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantnram: AIR 1975 SC 2238: Rajasthan STC Vs. Bal Mukund Bairawa: (2009) 4 SCC 299 : (2009)5 SCJ 757: Referred to: Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. : AIR 2006 SC 1748; Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank : AIR 2008 SC (Sup.) 921; Dhulabhai Vs. State of M P : AIR 1969 SC 78. See also: ShridharMisra Vs. Jaichandra Vidyalankar: AIR 1959 All 598; K K Jain Vs. Federation Of Indian Export Organisations: AIR 2002 Del 408; Gegong Apang Vs. Sanjoy Tassar: AIR 2001 Gau 1; Sardar Kanwaldeep Singh Vs. Assistant Registrar Firms, Societies and Chits, Faizabad: AIR 1994 All 161; Gaurav A Jain Vs. M P University of Agriculture And Technology, AIR 2004 Raj 247.

[137] 4^thEdnVol 6: Para 241: Quoted in K.L. Katyal Vs. Central Secretariat Club (Regd):1994-30 DRJ 669 .

[138] AIR 2015 Gau 179.

[139] See also: M. Sekar Vs. The Tamil Nadu State Council of the CPI: 2015-7 MLJ 689

[140] 1999-3 SCC 372.

[141] AIR 2015 SC 3194

[142] General Manager (P), Punjab Sind Bank Vs. Daya Singh: (2010) 11 SCC 233

[143] AIR 1963 SC 1144

[144] See: All India Hockey Federation Vs. Indian Olympic Association: (1994) 55 DLT 607, Ashok Kumar Vs. SBI Officers Association: (2013) 201 DLT 433. See also: Meghal Homes Pvt Ltd Vs. Niwas Girni K K Samiti: AIR 2007 SC 3079; Capt Kailash Nath Harsh Vs. D C Patel: AIR 1999 Bom 133.

[145] AIR 1993 Mad 233

[146] (1991) 2 SCC 716

[147] See also: BC Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484. Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh: AIR 1983 SC 454.

[148] 2011 AIR-SCW 5919: 2011-10 SCC 106

[149] Quoted in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, by RM Sahai, J.

[150]AIR 1962 SC 853

[151] Referred to in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001, by RM Sahai, J.

[152] Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001

[153] (2009) 12 SCC 78

[154] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484

[155] AIR 1963 SC 779: B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484.

[156] B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 484

[157] AIR 2003 SC 1462

[158]Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Vs. Munna Lal Jain: AIR 2005 SC 584

[159]Workmen of Balmadies Estates Vs. Management Balmadies Estate: Supp AIR 2008 SC 1366; 2008 4 SCC 517.

[160]J.D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India and Anr. (1982) 1 SCC 143;

Referred to in Workmen of Balmadies Estates Vs. Management Balmadies Estate: Supp AIR 2008 SC 1366; 2008 4 SCC 517.

[161] Vidyodaya Trust Vs. Mohan Prasad: AIR 2008 SC 1633.

[162] Azizor Rahman Choudhury Vs. Ahidennessa Choudharani: AIR 1928 Cal. 225

[163]AIR 1928 All 454 (FB). Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad KhetanVs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[164]AIR 1961 All 73. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[165]AIR 1917 PC 33. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[166] Quoted with approval in Sridhar Vs. Sri Jagannath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[167] Thenappa Chettiar Vs.Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915

[168] AIR 1922 PC 235; (1921) ILR 48 Cal. 1019

[169] See also: Satish Chandra GiriVs. Dharanidhar Singha Boy: AIR 1940 PC 24.

[170] Mrs. Kalidha Adib Begum And Anr. Vs. S.A. Bashirunnissa Begum Hussaini : 1970-83 MadLW 116

[171] Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commr of IT: AIR 2004 SC 4716; Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973. Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. Dist Regtr, Co-op. Societies: AIR 2005 SC 2306; State Bank of India Staff Association Vs. Mohindra Bhattacharyya: AIR 1991 Cal 378.

[172] Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973; Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966; Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. Dist Regtr, Co-op. Societies: AIR 2005 SC 2306

[173] Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. Dist Regtr, Co–operative: AIR 2005 SC 2306; Syed Munir Hoda Vs. Bader Sayeed: TLMAD-2012-0-2262; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: : (2011) 13 SCC 774; State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd : AIR 1997 SC 1413.

[174] Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. Dist Regtr, Co-op. Societies: AIR 2005 SC 2306

[175] AIR 1997 SC 1413. Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Dist. Regtr: AIR 2005 SC 2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B D Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[176] Hree Vitthal Sahakari Sahakar Karkhana Ltd Vs. Wadikuroli Vividh Karyakari Seva Society Ltd. 2011-4 BCR 290

[177] AIR 1947 Oudh 28

[178] AIR 1925 Mad. 1070

[179] AIR 1922 PC 325; See also Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588

[180] SrinivasChariar and another Vs. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar: AIR 1922 PC 325. See also: Janardhana Mishra Alias Janardhana Prasad Vs. State (1996) 1 Mad LJ 588; Idol of A M Kamakala Kameshwarar Temple Vs. Sri Siddaraja Manicka Prabha Temple: 2011-6 Mad LJ 386; Deputy Commissioner Judicial Vs. M Perumal: 2003-3 Mad LJ 151 .

[181] 1987- 62 Comp. Cases 301

[182] AIR 1966 SC 170

[183] See Chapter: COURT’S JURISDICTION TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

[184] With respect to Companies, see: Dwarka Prasad Agarwal Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala: AIR 2003 SC 2696; R. Prakasam Vs. Sree Naryana Dharma Paripalana: (1980) 50 Comp. Cases 611(Ker); R. R. Rajendra Menon Vs. Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd.: (1990) 69 Comp. Cases 256

[185] Firm of Illuri Subbayya Chetty Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1984 SC 322; Antony Vs. Thandiyode Plantations: 1995 (2) KLT 512. Parayakadu Nalukulangara Devaswom Vs. Padmanabhan: 1983 KLJ 232: 1983 KLT 803; Dhulabhai Vs. State of M P : AIR 1969 SC 78; R. Prakasam Vs. SreeNarayana Dharma ParipalanaYogam: (1980) 50 Comp. Cases 611(Ker).

[186] (1990) 69 Comp. Cases 256

[187]AIR 1958 MP 323 (FB).

[188] A few States give power in the Act to the Government to supersede societies.

[189]AIR 1970 MP 154

[190] (2002) 5 SCC 685

[191] ILR 1997 Kar 3127

[192] J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of UP, AIR1990 SC 1808; Union Of India Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra, AIR 1978 SC 694

[193] Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585.

[194] Shri Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR (1989) II Delhi 585

[195] AIR 2015 SC 1960

[196] AIR 2002 Ker 325: Followed: Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana Vs. Dty Registrar: ILR 1975 AP 242; Hindurao Vs. Krishnarao, AIR 1982 Bom. 216; Jagdev Singh Vs. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Haryana: AIR 1991 P & H 149; Narayanan Nair Vs. Joint Registrar, 1982 KLT 602; Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Bar Council of India, AIR 1975 Delhi 200.

[197] Jyoti Basu Vs. Debi Ghosal(1982) 1 SCC 691

[198] Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Registrar of Societies: ILR 2012-22 Del 1031; Girish Mulchand Mehta Vs. Mahesh S. Mehta. 2010 (1) Bom. C.R 31

[199] Awari Devanna Vs Divisional Co Operative Officer: 1994-1 ALT 363; K. Srinivas VS Commissioner of Fisheries: 2009 3 ALD 1; 2009 2 ALT 604.

[200] Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Vs. L.K. Ratna: AIR 1987 SC 71; C.B. Gautam Vs. Union of India: (1993) 1 SCC 78.

[201] 2009 3 ALD 1; 2009 2 ALT 604

Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

Created: 07 Jul 2024 at 23:29

Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

Legal Personality of Trustees and Office Bearers of Societies

Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies