Wild Landscape

State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Created: 07 Jul 2024 at 23:29

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Introduction
  • 2.      Article 19(1)(c) ‘Reasonable Restrictions’
  • 3.      Management and Vesting of Property of Societies, Separate
  • 4.      TN So. Regn. Act Provides for Compulsory Election
  • 5.      Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Supervisory in Nature
  • 6.      Art. 19 (1)(c) & Takeover – Considerations: Public interest
  • 7.      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State
  • 8.      Take-Over: Enactment Struck Down
  • 9.      Parliament Cannot Infringe Constil. Rights:  Damyanti’s Case
  • 10.    Damyanti’s Case Distinguished in Subsequent Cases
  • 11.    Authorities Required To Record Reasons
  • 12.    Take-Over: Bad, Where No Provision in the Acts Concerned
  • 13.    Co-operative Societies – Created by Statute
  • 14.    A Member Cannot Assail Statutory Interference:
  • 15.    Take-over and Appointment of Administrator
  • 16.    Take-over: Balance Between Institutional and Public Interest
  • 17.    Take Over: Management of Property, for a limited period
  • 18.    Admission of New Members: State Cannot Compel
  • 19.    Action of Legislature: If Violative of Article 14, Arbitrary
  • 20.    Formation of Assons. – Different From Running Business
  • 21.    Escheat

1. Introduction

Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom and right ‘to form associations or unions’. The right to ‘form’ association includes in itself the right for effective functioning of the association so as to enable it to achieve its lawful objectives.  Article 19 lays down

  • Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – 
  • (1) All citizens shall have the right. –
    • (a)….  (b) …. 
    • (c) to form associations or unions, co -operative societies; 
    • (d) … (e) … (f) … (g) . … 
  • (2) ….
  • (3) … 
  • (4) Nothing in Sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
  • (5) … 
  • (6) ….”

2. Article 19(1)(c) ‘Reasonable Restrictions’

The right to form associations is not absolute. It is not incapable of regulation; because, it is subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’, which the State can impose, as laid down in clause (4) of Article 19.[1] In A. Umarani Vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies[2] the Apex Court has observed that except playing supervisory role, the State has no administrative control over the day-to-day affairs of a co-operative society. 

Following are the important Apex Court rulings on this point:

  • Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Kerala.[3]
  • Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India.[4]
  • SP Mittal V. Union of India.[5]
  • LN Mishra Institute of Economic Development Vs. State of Bihar.[6]
  • Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab.[7]
  • Kamareddy Suryanarayana Vs. District Co-operative Officer[8]
  • All India Bank Employees’ case.[9]
  • The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi.[10]
  • State of Madras v. V.G. Row.[11]

3. Management and Vesting of Property of Societies[12], Separate

In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[13] it is observed in para 27:

  • “If what is vested in the College Committee or its governing body is a right of management simpliciter, there is no question of the members of the society or the members of the governing body being beneficially interested in its property. It necessarily follows that by the fact of appointment of a treasurer, there can be no deprivation of the society of its rights in property. The consequence, which would flow on the appointment of a treasurer by the Government under the provisions of the Charitable Endowments Act, would be that he will take charge of the management of the properties held by the society. There is no divesting of the rights of the society in its properties. As already stated, what all the society is deprived of would be right of management which cannot be equated to any right in the property.”[14]

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[15] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration  under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

4. T.N. Societies Registration Act Provides for Compulsory Election

No Violation of ‘Fundamental Right to Form Association’

No Constitutional Guarantee – Without Interference by Law

Deviating from the (Central) So. Registration Act, 1860, T.N. Societies Registration Act, 1975, Sections 15(3) and 15(4) provide that the office of any member of the Committee cannot ensure beyond a period of three years and thereafter the election process has necessarily got to be adopted. S. 26(4) enables the Registrar to depute an officer to be present at the general meetings of the Institution and the Charitable Society.

In Periyar Self-respect Propaganda Institution, Trichy Vs. State of TN[16] the constitutional validity of these provisions were upheld observing the following:

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society arid certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. …..  As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, nor the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterised as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. This is not a case where the composition of the association is being altered. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

5. Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Regulatory or Supervisory in Nature

Our Apex Court in Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala[17] observed as under:

  • “34. … Powers exercised by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and others under the Co-operative Societies Act are only regulatory or supervisory in nature, which will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled.”[18]

6. Art. 19 (1)(c) & TakeoverConsiderations: Public interest[19]

Within its sphere of activity, an association has the right of internal management. Nevertheless, if its functioning is deleterious to the interests of its members or the general public,[20] the association-right in the Constitution of India [Art. 19 (1)(c)] does not render the institution immune from take-over of management by the State or the executive agencies invoking the powers given in the statute concerned,[21] or by proper legislation.[22] The existence of the association-right, ipso facto, is no guarantee that if the functioning of  the  institution  is  not  conducive  to  its  objects,  it  would nevertheless be left alone.[23] 

The Supreme Court, in LN Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna Vs. State of Bihar,[24] upheld the Constitutional validity of an Ordinance (later replaced by an Act) under which an Institute (Lalit Narain Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna – started by a Society with the same name) was taken over by the State Government ‘to ensure a high level of educational and training facilities and the co-ordination of the training with important industrial and business units’. The Ordinance had been challenged alleging mala fides, and on the ground of infraction of fundamental right to form an association under Article 19(1)(c). It is held:

  • “The fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 (1)(c) does not extend to or embrace within it the objects or purposes or the activities of an association. In other words, it does not carry with it a further guarantee that the objects or purposes or activities of an association so formed shall not be interfered with by-law except on grounds as mentioned in Article 19 (4), viz., sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality.”

Our Apex Court, in Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India,[25] summarised the finding in L.N. Mishra Institute as under:

  •  “All assets and properties were vested in the State Government, and the Commissioner was deemed to have taken charge of the Institute. As all incidence of ownership and management were taken over by the State, what was left to the Society was paper ownership and management. Turning down the challenge, this Court held that the impugned Ordinance and the Act merely took over the Institute. Although, the name of the Society and of the Institute are the same, they were two different entities. The impugned legislations took over the Institute and not the Society. No restriction whatsoever was imposed on the functioning of the Society. The provisions of the Act referred to the Institute. The Institute constituted one of the activities of the Society. The petitioner-Society had constituted itself into an association in exercise of the fundamental right conferred by Article 19(1)(c). That right of that Society remains unimpaired and un-interfered with by the impugned Act and Ordinance.”

In OK Ghose Vs. EK Joseph[26] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court held that the restriction placed on Government Servants to form unions infringed the fundamental right of the Government servants to form associations or unions guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) and could not be justified as a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of public order under Art.19 (4). But, the Court reiterated what had been said by other Constitution Benches earlier that the rule prohibiting Government Servants from striking was valid as there was no fundamental right to strike.

7. Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State

In this celebrated decision[27] our Apex Court upheld the right of State Legislature to enact The Tibia College Act, 1952 with respect to the management of a registered society. The enactment was necessitated when the College had been mismanaged and struggle ensued between the trustees. 

8. Take-Over: Enactment Struck Down

As Failed to Make Provision for Restoration of Elected Body

In Asom Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti Vs. State of Assam,[28] the impugned Act was enacted to meet a contingency for taking over of the management of the Prachar Samiti, temporarily. However, it failed to make any provision for the restoration of the elected body in due course. Not only were new members introduced into the Samiti, no norms were laid down for nominating the government nominees (who could be any one), and the elected members were kept away from the control of the Samiti. On the facts of the case and the implications of the provisions contained in the impugned enactment, the Court concluded that the right of association was virtually taken away; and in the name of temporary control and management on the affairs of the society, what was done was a permanent deprivation. In response to a query raised by the Court it had been stated by the State that the State had no desire to restore the Samiti. The impugned legislative provision was, therefore, struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.

9. Parliament Cannot Infringe Constitutional Rights:  Damyati’s Case

The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act considered in Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India,[29] compulsorily altered the composition of the Sammelan, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Our Apex Court held that the Act was a breach of the ‘right to form association’; because, it violated the composite right of forming an association and the right to continue it as the original members desired. The Parliament had enacted the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act under which outsiders were permitted to become members of the Sammelan, without the volition of the original members.

It was held that the Parliament cannot alter the composition of the society itself. The members, who voluntarily formed the Association, cannot be compelled to act in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had no say. The Constitution confers an association and its members the right to refuse membership to those who are not acceptable to the existing body of members.

The alteration in the composition of the Association itself clearly interferes with the right to continue to function as members of the Association which was voluntarily formed by the original founders.

The Court held further:

  • “The right to form an association, in our opinion, necessarily implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the Association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the voluntary Association without any opinion being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association”.[30]

10. Damyanti’s Case Distinguished in Subsequent Cases

Damyanti’s case is distinguished in several cases, including the following cases, pointing out that the Government had, in that case, interfered in the management of the Society:

  • Rajasthan Cricket Association case;[31]
  • Delhi Police, NKG Sangh case;[32]  
  • Bhandara Distt. Central Co-op Societies case;[33] and 
  • Dharam Dutt’s case.[34]

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab,[35] Damyanti’s case was distinguished on the ground that it was a case where an unregistered society was, by statute, converted into a registered society which bore no resemblance whatever to the original society; and that the new members could be admitted in large numbers so as to reduce the original members to an insignificant minority. In State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd[36] it was pointed out that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, considered in Damyati’s case, was violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, as it stood then.

The composition of the society itself was transformed by the Act and the voluntary nature of the association of the members who formed the original society was totally destroyed. And, it contravened the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(l)(f).[37]

11. Authorities Required To Record Reasons

It has been held in Km. Neelima Misra Vs. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal[38] and S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India[39] that an administrative order which involves civil consequences must give reasons. S.N. Mukherjee’s case it was observed:

  • “For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision”.

In Union of India Vs. E.G. Nambudiri[40] it is observed:

  • “Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered legal for absence of reasons. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records. Reasons are not necessary to be communicated to the Government servant. If the statutory rules require communication of reasons, the same must be, communicated but in the absence of any such provision absence of communication of reasons does not affect the validity of the order”.

12. Take-Over: Bad, Where No Provision in the Acts Concerned

In IIT College of Engineering Vs. State of HP[41] our Apex Court did not approve the take-over of the management of an unaided private college by the Administrator as there was no provision in the AICTE Act or the H.P. Education Act or the University Act authorizing such an action. The Court observed that the imposition of an Administrator to take over the reins of administration for an indefinite period[42] would undoubtedly amount to interference with the right of administering and managing a private educational institution which is now recognised to be a part of the fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) as held by this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka.

13. Co-operative Societies – Created by Statute

Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[43]

14. A Member Cannot Assail Statutory Interference:

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab[44] it is held, distinguishing Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India, [45] as under:

  • “In the cases before us we are concerned with Co-operative societies which from the inception are governed by statute. They are created by statute, they are controlled by statute and so, there can be no objection to statutory interference with their composition on the ground of contravention of the individual right of freedom of association.”[46]

Our Apex Court further held that once a person becomes a member of a Co-operative Society, he loses his individuality qua the Society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the bye laws. This view has also been approved in State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd.[47] wherein our Apex Court has held that no individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.

15. Take-over and Appointment of Administrator: Allowed Prayer

For No Action by Authorities, in spite of Mismanagement.

In a Public Interest Litigation in Sanjay Gupta Vs. State of M.P.[48] it was pleaded that due to irregularities and mismanagement of the society the future of near about 1200 students who were getting education in the college and schools run by a Society was in dark. The petitioner prayed to takeover the society and to appoint an administrator. The Court found that in spite of the adverse reports, no action had been taken by the authorities. Observing that the right to receive proper education is a part and parcel of Article 21 of the Constitution and considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal[49] it was held that a writ petition in the shape of PIL was maintainable.

The Court appointed the Additional Collector, Gwalior as Administrator of the Society and gave directions for election and investigation in regard to financial irregularities in the light of Sec. 32 and 33 of the M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973.

16. Take-over: Balance Between Institutional and Public Interest

In Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India[50] the impugned legislation was held to be a reasonable legislation enacted in the interest of the general public and to govern an institution of national importance, and therefore, it was found to be valid.

It is held in this decision:

  • “The new body takes over the activities of the pre-existing society by running the Institution which too is known as ICWA. So far as the society ICWA is concerned, it has been left intact, untouched and un-interfered with. There is no tampering with the membership or the governing body of the society. The society is still free to carry on its other activities. No membership of the old society has been dropped. No new member has been forced or thrust upon the society. The impugned legislation nominates members who will be members of the council, the new body corporate, different from the society. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation is to take-over an institution of national importance and an individual activity which would fall outside the purview of these Articles.”

Gandhi Harijan Ucchar Madhyamik Vidyalay Vs. Director of Education,[51] arose when the management of a school was taken over under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, after issuing show cause notice, pointing out confrontation between the management of the school and a section of the teaching staff as also .the conflict between the management of the school and the authorities. It was observed that taking over of management of the school would involve a conflict between individual or institutional interest on the one hand, and public interest, which is sought to be served by the takeover, on the other. There is the imperative need to balance the two requirements. It was observed:

  • “While it is not possible to put the conditions which may justify a takeover of a management in the strait-jacket of a judicially evolved definition, there could be no doubt that the takeover of a management of an institution would, ordinarily, be resorted to where other measures to deal with the affairs of an institution complained of, have failed to achieve the desired result.”

17. Take Over Management of Property, for a limited period:

In SP Mittal Vs. Union of India,[52] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court held, inter alia, that assuming but not holding that the Society or Auroville were a religious denomination, the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act,  which took over the management of Auroville, for a limited period, was not hit by Article 25 or 26. It did not curtail the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate one’s own religion. It was observed in this case that ‘the right of management in matters of religion of a religious denomination’ under Article 26(b) was not taken away by this enactment; what was taken away was the right of management of the property of Auroville which was a secular matter. So also the Act did not curtail the right of any section of citizens to conserve its own language, script or culture conferred by Article 29. An activity, secular in nature, though assumed to be of the Society or the organization to be of religious denomination, did not adversely affect the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate one’s own religion. The Constitution Bench has drawn a distinction between such activities of the institution which would necessarily fall within the purview of Articles 25, 26 or 29.

It is observed: The disciples and devoted followers of Sri Aurobindo formed the Aurobindo Society in Calcutta and got it registered as a Society with the object of preaching and propagating the ideals and teachings of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother. The Society for its Auroville project received grants and subventions from UNESCO and also from the Government of India. However, after the death of the Mother, complaints started pouring in with the Central Government which, on enquiry, revealed mismanagement of the affairs of the Society, misuse of the funds thereof and diversion of the funds meant for Auroville to other purposes. There was in-fighting between the groups of members and the situation went out of control. The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1980, was promulgated followed by an Act, whereby the management of Auroville was taken over, though for a limited period. The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged on the ground that Articles 25, 26 29 and 30 and also Article 14 were infringed; and that the Parliament had no legislative competence to enact the said Act.

18. Admission of New Members: State Cannot Compel

What is in the interest of the society is primarily for the society alone to decide and it is not for an outside agency to say.[53]

The bye laws of a Society or a Club prescribe the qualifications of the Members to be admitted. They are in the nature of contract between the members. Therefore the right of admission of new members also remains at the will and option of the members.[54] The State or an enactment cannot compel admission of members, contrary to the bye laws of a Society.[55]

It is held in A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy[56] as under:

  • “It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. This doctrine of arbitrariness is not restricted only to executive actions, but also applies to legislature. Thus, a party has to satisfy that the action was reasonable, not done in unreasonable manner or capriciously or at pleasure without adequate determining principle, rational, and has been done according to reason or judgment, and certainly does not depend on the will alone. However, the action of legislature, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary. There must be a case of substantive unreasonableness in the statute itself for declaring the act ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution …. The constitutional right to freely associate with others encompasses associational ties designed to further the social, legal and economic benefits of the members of the association. By statutory interventions, the State is not permitted to change the fundamental character of the association or alter the composition of the society itself. The significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified on the basis of any interest of the Government. …  However, when the association gets registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, it is governed by the provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder.”

It held further: 

  • “Importing the fiction to the extent that the societies registered under the Act 1995, could be deemed to have been registered under the Act 1964 tantamount to forcing the members of the society to act under compulsion/direction of the State rather than on their free will. Such a provision is violative of the very first basic principles of cooperatives. More so, the Act is vitiated by non-application of mind and irrelevant and extraneous considerations.”

19. Action of Legislature: If Violative of Article 14, Arbitrary

When the association/society has an option/choice to get it registered under a particular (Co-operative Societies’) statute, [57] if there are more than one statute operating in the field, the State cannot force the association/society to get itself registered under a statute for which the association/society has not applied. If the State does so, it will ‘violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India’.  It is not permissible in law to do something indirectly, if it is not permissible to be done directly.’[58]

20. Formation of Associations Is Different From Running Business

The right of the citizens to form the association is different from running the business by that association. Therefore, right of individuals to form a society has to be understood in a completely different context. A fundamental right to form the association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business. [59]  After an Association has been formed and the right under Art. 19(1)(c) has been exercised by the members forming it, they have no right to claim that its activities must also be permitted to be carried on in the manner they desire.[60]

In TK Rangarajan Vs State of Tamil Nadu[61] the Supreme Court has held that the right to form an association does not carry with it the right to strike work.

21.  Escheat

If a club or society is defunct and no one claims that the club or society functions, the principles and law on escheat allows the vesting of property in Government. But in case of dispute, the onus will be heavy on the State to make out a case of escheat or bona vacantia. Though only a few members of the society  have shown any interest in matters pertaining to the society for 36 years or so, it might  still not be presumed that the society was defunct that would warrant dissolution under the So. Rgn. Act.[62]


[1]      Darius Rutton Kavasmaneck Vs. Gharda Chemicals: 2014 AIR (SCW) 6441, 2015-188 Comp. Cases 291

[2]      AIR 2004 SC 4504 

[3]      2013 (16) SCC 82: 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683

[4]      AIR  2004 SC 1295

[5]      AIR 1983 SC 1

[6]      AIR 1988 SC 1136

[7]      AIR 1985 SC 973

[8]      AIR 1976 SC  340

[9]      AIR 1962 SC 171

[10]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[11]    AIR 1952 SC 196

[12]    See Chapter: Vesting of Property.

[13]    AIR 1958 AP 773

[14]    Quoted in: Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. H Narasimhaiah: AIR 1991 Kar 392.

[15]    62 Bom LR 790

[16]    AIR1988 Mad 27

[17]    Thalapalam Service Co Operative Ltd Vs. Union of India: AIR 2010 Ker  6.         Appeal Judgment: Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 (16) SCC 82; 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR (SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683.

[18]    See Chapter: Effect of Registration & Incorporation

[19]    See: Tika Ramji’s case: AIR 1956 SC 676;          P. Balakotaiash’s case: AIR 1958 SC 232; All India Bank Employees’ case: AIR 1962 SC 171;           Balmer Lawrie Workers Union’s case: AIR 1985 SC 311;          Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973.

[20]    P K Dash, Advocate Vs. Bar Council of Delhi: AIR 2016 Del 135.

[21]    By virtue of Article 12.

[22]    The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic And Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; S.P. Mittal vs. UOI: AIR 1983 SC 1.

[23]    P K Dash, Advocate Vs. Bar Council of Delhi: AIR 2016 Del 135; Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973. Also see: L.N. Mishra Institute of Econ.Development Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1988 SC 1136; Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR  2004 SC 1295:  S.P. Mittal Vs. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1: Gandhi Harijan Ucchar Madhyamik Vidyalay Vs. Director of Education:  AIR  1977 Del 240.

[24]    AIR  1988 SC 1136

[25]    AIR 2004 SC 1295. It followed SP Mittal V. Union of India: AIR 1983 SC 1.

[26]    AIR 1963 SC 812

[27]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[28]    AIR 1989 SC 2126.

[29]    AIR 1971 SC 966.

[30]    Quoted in A P Dairy Development Corpn Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[31]    Rajasthan Cricket Association Vs. State of Rajasthan:   AIR 2005 Raj 144.

[32]    Delhi Police Non Gazetted Karmachari Sangh Vs. Union Of India: AIR 1987 SC 379

[33]    AIR 1993 SC 59

[34]    Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR  2004 SC 1295

[35]    AIR  1985 SC 973.         See also: Sumangalam Hous. Soty Vs. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat: AIR  2007 SC 671;        Zoroastrian Co Operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar: AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[36]    AIR 1997 SC 1413

[37]    See also: L.N. Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna Vs. State of Bihar:  AIR 1988 SC 1136.

[38]    AIR  1990 SC 1402

[39]    AIR  1990 SC 1984

[40]    AIR 1991 SC 1216

[41]    (2003) 7 SCC 73)

[42]    See also: Shri Rangaswami Vs. The Sagar Textile Mills:AIR 1977 SC 1516;         State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jogendra Singh:  AIR 1963 SC 1618.

[43]    A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298

[44]    AIR 1985 SC 973

[45]    AIR 1971 SC 966.

[46]    Quoted in Sumangalam Co-op Housing Society Ltd Vs. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat: AIR  2007 SC 671;         State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413;         Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR 2005  SC  2306.

[47]    AIR 1997  SC  1413:         Followed in Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co-op. Societies AIR 2005  SC  2306;        Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;        Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[48]    2014-2 MPLJ 520

[49]    (2010) 3 SCC 402

[50]    AIR  2004 SC 1295

[51]    AIR  1977 Del 240

[52]    AIR 1983 SC 1.

[53]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvanagar Sahakari Griha (2000) 9 SCC 295;        Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[54]    Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966;        Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973

[55]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[56]    AIR 2011 SC 3298

[57]    A P Dairy Development Corn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[58]    See: Sant Lal Gupta Vs. Modern Co-op. Group Housing Society: JT 2010 (11) SC 273

[59]    Tata Engineering & Locomotives Vs. The State of Bihar:  AIR 1965 SC 40;        AP Dairy Devlopnt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[60]    Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966

[61]    AIR 2003 SC 3033

[62]    Mrigan Maity Vs. Daridra Bandhab Bhandar: 2011-4 Cal LT.



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