Saji Koduvath.

Introduction.

It is trite law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts is not readily inferred in civil disputes. The normal rule, as laid down under Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure, is that the civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature, except the cognisance of which is either expressly or impliedly excluded.[1]

That is, unless by express mode or by necessary implication barred, civil courts’ jurisdiction permeates into every civil matter including that of the private associations and even clubs. When the affairs of such institutions, associations etc. are governed by statutes, the courts test the validity of their actions on the touch stone of such statutes. If such bodies are not directly governed by any statute but being administered under their own rules, bye laws etc., their impugned actions are tested in the light of those rules or bye laws. The courts enquire whether their acts were in conformity with those rules and bye laws, and following the principles of natural justice.[2]

2. Sources of Civil Court’s Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of a civil court to interfere with the internal affairs of associations is ‘rather limited’.[3] Courts get jurisdiction to interfere with the internal affairs of associations if there are cogent grounds such as acts without jurisdiction, acts in violation of the principles of natural justice, acts with malafides, etc. Beyond the general jurisdiction of courts to intervene and set right illegalities, the jurisdiction thereof is obtained by Courts from three sources:

• (i)   contract – on the premise that bye laws bind its members as a contract.[4]
• (ii) court is the protector of all charities[5] and
• (iii) formation of associations is, besides common law right and statutory right, a fundamental right[6] protected by our courts.

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

• 6. Suits By and Against Societies – Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion.
• Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.

3. Disputes be Redressed by the Mechanism Provided by the Rules

In Kowtha Suryanarayana Rao Vs. Patibandla Subrahmanyam[7]  it is held as follows:

• “It is a well established principle that, provided that the acts of the management are within the powers of the society itself any dispute between individual members of the society and those responsible for its management must be decided by the machinery provided by the rules and not in a Court of law. It is only when an act is ultra vires the society that a member is entitled to come to a Civil Court and have the act of the management which is ultra vires declared to be void.”

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD  Kaushik[8] it is observed that in matters of internal management of an association, the courts normally do not interfere, leaving it open to the association and its members to frame a particular bye-law, rule or regulation which may provide for eligibility and or qualification for the membership and/or providing for limitations/restrictions on the exercise of any right by and as a member of the said association.

It is further held in this decision that the Memorandum of Association is a contract amongst the members of the Society and that these are rules which govern internal control and management of the Society. The authority to frame, amend, vary and rescind such rules, undoubtedly, vests in the General Body of the Members of the Society. The power to amend the rules is implicit in the power to frame rules.

Other remedies must be exhausted

It is well settled legal proposition that once a person becomes a member of the association, such a person loses his individuality qua the association and he has no individual rights except those given to him by the rules and regulations and/or bye-laws of the association.Courts will not delve in the internal disputes of an association unless it is shown[9] that the aggrieved parties have worked out and exhausted their remedies[10] (but, failed to resolve disputes)under the bye laws, before:

• (a) the machinery or body (domestic tribunals)[11], if any,  provided in its bye laws,[12] or
• (b) the body or authority which has to take (expressly or impliedly) cognisance of the matter, under its bye laws, or
• (c) the authorities under the statute, if any, holds the field.[13]

In the following decisions the Supreme Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction:

• G. Veerappa Pillai vs. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192,
• Asst Collector of Central Excise vs. Dunlop India Ltd. AIR 1985 SC 330,
• Ramendra Kishore Biswas vs. State of Tripura, AIR 1999 SC 294,
• Shivgonda Anna Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 2281,
• C.A. Abraham vs. I.T.O. Kottayam and Others, AIR 1961 SC 609,
• Titaghur Paper Mills Co. vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603,
• H.B. Gandhi vs. M/s Gopinath and Sons, 1992 (Supp) 2 SCC 312,
• Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1999 SC 22,
• Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 74,
• Sheela Devi vs. Jaspal Singh, 1999 (1) SCC 209 and
• Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan, 2001 (6) SCC 569.

The general principle is that when the Act and the Rules made thereunder are silent on a particular aspect, we have to look for guidance into the broad scheme of the Act and the intention of the legislature.[14] This principle applies, with full vigor, to the bye laws of voluntary associations.

In the celebrated decision, TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria,[15] the Supreme Court held that a member of a Masonic lodge was bound to abide by the rules of the lodge, and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shouldbe expelled only in the manner provided by the rules;[16]and that the lodge was bound to act strictly according to the rules.[17]

• See also Chapter: Expulsion of Members & Officers’ Removal.

Dissent and Disagreement be Resolved under the Party Constitution

In the ‘floor test case’ (Maharashtra Assembly), Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (decided on May 11, 2023), the Supreme Court held as under: 

• “88. The political imbroglio in Maharashtra arose as a result of party differences within the Shiv Sena. However, the floor test cannot be used as a medium to resolve internal party disputes or intra party disputes. Dissent and disagreement within a political party must be resolved in accordance with the remedies prescribed under the party constitution, or through any other methods that the party chooses to opt for.”

4. Courts Interfere if Genuine Disputes or Manifest Illegality

If dispute arises among the members of the society as to the validity of the governing body of a society[18]the civil courts can adjudicate such matters. In DB Enterprise Vs. Juhu Chandan Co-Op Hsg. Ltd.[19] disputes arose among two groups of members of the society as to whether the Development Agreement has been validly entered into by the society on behalf of its members such as to bind them. Several members disputed that the agreement had not been validly entered into. Observing that it was impossible to accept that the agreement was against the interest of the members, to the question whether these disputes were genuine, the court considered the events elaborately that have transpired since initial proposal of the agreement, it was held that the society was bound by the Agreement.

But, in cases where a special forum is provided to settle disputes regarding management, as in Sec. 23 of the AP Societies Registration Act, 2001, the civil court jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred.[20]

The jurisdiction of courts’ interference in matters of associations is limited; and the decisions taken by the associations are respected.[21] A simple breach of any Rule will not give rise to a cause of action for a member.[22]  Courts will be slow to interfere with the decisions of the associations and the domestic tribunals,[23]including that in the election matters; because, the success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with.[24]

Generally, the Court will not:

• appreciate the evidence and record its own findings of fact.[25]
• act as a Court of Appeal.[26]
• interfere with finding of fact of a domestic tribunal on the ground of inadequacy or insufficiency of evidence.[27]
• interfere with finding of fact on the ground that different view could possibly be taken on the evidence available on the record.
• interfere with appreciation of the evidence on record and recorded the findings of fact of a domestic tribunal.[28]
• interfere with finding of guilt.[29]
• interfere with discharging duties by the elected office bearers of an Association.
• go into the truth of the allegations/charges.[30]
• interfere so long as the association acting within the power conferred on it under the Articles of Association.

The court will examine only:

• Whether jurisdictional error.
• Whether procedural errorin decision making process.[31]
• Whether the action is perverse,or based on no evidence or grounds.
• Whether the action is illegal.
• Whether the action is malafide or arbitrary exercise of power.

And, the Court will interfere if:

• action without jurisdiction.
• manifest illegality including violation of the principles of natural justice.[32]
• illegality of the act or omission goes to the root of the matter.[33]
• manifest perversity or something that shocks the conscience of the Court.
• malafide or arbitrary exercise of power.[34]
• without cogent and compelling grounds.
• the impugned acts are based on no evidence[35] i.e., where they are perverse[36] or based on conjectures or surmises.
• the alleged violation is so grave that it could not be condoned by the general body.[37]
• jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record committed by the domestic tribunal.[38]
• the impugned acts do not carry a reasonable degree of probability (but need not be so high as is required in a criminal case).[39]
• no reasonable or ordinary prudent man[40] would on given facts and circumstances come to the conclusion reached by the quasi-judicial authority on the basis of the evidence on record.[41]
• the impugned acts are made at the dictates of the superior authority.[42]
• in order to resolve stalemate,as both sides did not want an election to be conducted.[43]
• set right the illegalities and put the election process in motion in accordance with the Bye laws.[44]

When Injunction is granted by the Civil Courts

• Breach of  Obligation ‘existing in his (pff’s) favour’ (Sec. 38 (1) Sp. Relief Act). According to sec, 2 (a) Sp. Relief Act, “Obligation” includes every duty enforceable by law.
• Must be to enforce individual civil rights: Sec. 4 Sp. Relief Act; Sec. 9 CPC
• Plaintiff must have personal interest:  Sec. 41(j) Sp. Relief Act
• Discretion of the court:   Sec. 36 Sp. Relief Act.

5. Violation of the Principles of Natural Justice

               See notes below under the heading ‘Natural Justice’

6. Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act

Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act reads:

• “38. Perpetual injunction when granted. (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
• (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the Rules and provisions contained in Chapter II.
• (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely;
  • (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff;
  • (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion;
  • (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief;
  • (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

Under Sec. 38 of the Specific Relief Act the court is expressly authorised to grant injunctions to prevent breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff or where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff. The word obligation is defined in Sec. 3 of the Specific Relief Act in a wider sense to include ‘every duty enforceable by law’. The word trust is also used in a wider sense in this Act as seen from the definition clause.[45]

7. Instances When Court Interferes with Acts of Management of an Association

It is observed by the Supreme Court in Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Limited Vs. A. Nageswara Rao[46] as under:

• “It is no doubt the law that Courts will not, in general, intervene at the instance of shareholders in matters of internal administration, and will not interfere with the management of a company by its directors, so long as they are acting within the power conferred on them under the Articles of Association.”

In a properly instituted suit the Court interferes with the acts of management of a society or club when the acts are:

• (1) ultra virus or act without jurisdiction;[47]
• (2) fraud[48]
• (3) illegal[49]
• (4) in violation of the Rules oragainst statutory provisions,[50]
• (5)  rules/bye-laws not followed[51]
• (6) against an order having the force of law;[52]
• (7)  violation of the principles of natural justice[53]
• (8)  oppressive;[54]
• (9)   mismanagement[55]
• (10) mala fide, or not in good faith;[56]
• (11)  arbitrary,[57]
• (12) irrational,
• (13)  relevant factors were not considered
• (14) irrelevant factors were considered
• (15) decision, which no reasonable person would have taken.[58]
• (16) ensuring democratic set-up or will of the community.[59]
• (17) disciplinary action on trumpery charges.
• (18) disciplinary action: grounds/reasons unjustifiable.[60]
• (19) acts dishonestly[61]
• (20) acts under the provisions of the bye laws which are opposed to public policy or not reasonable.[62]
• (21)action not supported by any evidence[63] or based on conjectures or surmises[64]
• (22) evidence perverse[65]
• (23)exercise of discretionary power unreasonably[66]

8. When Courts Interfere with the Acts of a Domestic Tribunal:[67]

A domestic tribunal is free to evolve its own procedure.[68]In Ujjal Talukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley[69] the Calcutta High Court held that the court can set aside the decision of a domestic tribunal

• (A) when the tribunal oversteps the limits of its jurisdiction;
• (B) when it violates the principles of natural justice and
• (C) when it acts dishonestly,[70] actuated by bias, bad faith and the like.

In Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India,[71]our Apex Court held as under:

• “Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury Case[72]  that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was:
  • contrary to law, or
  • relevant factors were not considered, or
  • irrelevant factors were considered; or
  • the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken.”

9. Individual Wrongs and Internal Management

A suit for redressing individual wrongs done by a director of a company or a governing body member of a society cannot be considered as merely a matter concerned with internal management.[73]

10. Unfair Clause in a Contract is Amenable to Judicial Review

It is held in LIC of India Vs. Consumer Education & Research Centre[74] that an unfair and untenable or irrational clause in a contract is unjust and amenable to Judicial Review. In common law a party was relieved from such contract.

11. Rule Contrary to the Rules of Natural Justice, Void

While considering Section 2 (b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act (similar provision to Sec. 15 of the Societies Registration Act), the High Court of Karnataka (RP Sethi, G. Patri Basavana Goud JJ.), in Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies,[75] it is held that the Rule of the Society which declared a person would cease to be a member merely on his default to make the subscription, without even providing him an opportunity to show cause for not making the payment within a specified period appeared ‘to be very harsh’; and that ‘confiscatory and deprivatory provisions made, resulting in civil consequences, should not have been allowed’ to be incorporated in the bye laws.  The Division Bench struck down the impugned Rule it being contrary to the provisions of the Act. It is on the principle that rules of natural justice require that that no person can be condemned unheard.[76]

12. No Member can Question Bye Laws

The Constitution or bye-laws of a society is paramount;[77] and, it is the soul of the Society.[78]

Bye laws of a Society are made by the founding members of the society for regulating its affairs. The decisions of its general body bind the members.[79] Subject to the provisions of the Act, if any, applicable and the bye laws, the final authority[80] of every association vests in the general body of the members in general meeting, summoned in such manner as specified in their bye-laws.

In Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co-op. Societies (Urban)[81] it is held that when one joins a society his rights in the society are governed by the provisions of the statute and the bye laws. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporation aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye laws. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.

13. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ‘Rather Limited’: Principles

In U.P. Financial Corporation Vs. Naini Oxygen and Acetylene Gas[82] it is observed:

• “However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Corporation is an independent autonomous statutory body having its own constitution and rules to abide by, and functions and obligations to discharge. As such, in the discharge of its functions, it is free to act according to its own light.  The views it forms and the decisions it takes are on the basis of the reformation in its possession and the advice it receives and according to its own perspective and calculations. Unless its action is mala fide, even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however more prudent, commercial or business like it may be, for the decision of the Corporation. Hence, whatever the wisdom [or the lack of it] of the conduct of the Corporation, the same cannot be assailed for making the Corporation liable.”

In Prem Narain Tandon Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh[83] it is observed:

• “Universities are autonomous bodies and the Courts should be reluctant, as far as possible, to interfere with the internal administration of the University. There should be no occasion for any interference unless there is a palpable violation of law, which has occasioned injustice in a broad and general sense.”[84]

An association itself is the best custodian of its interests;[85] and its decisions are binding on all members unless displaced by appropriate remedy under law.[86] When an authority is vested with the power to take an action, it also includes the power to recall or revoke that action, subject of course to any restraint, regulation or bar imposed, expressly or by implication, by law.  Therefore, unless and until there is a law, rule or bye-law prohibiting a person or authority from doing a particular act, that person or authority if vested with the final authority to take any decision for managing its affairs said authority or person is competent to take any decision, revise, review or revoke any earlier decision taken by it.[87]

The jurisdiction of civil courts is ‘rather limited’[88] in the internal disputes of the associations of persons; and, they will not assume jurisdiction so long as they are or acting within the power conferred on them.[89]

Courts Interfere When Illegalities Go To the Root of the Matter

The courts set right abuses in the matters of associations.But, it will not ordinarily explore or interfere with internal matters of associations, unless there are cogent grounds; or illegalities that go to the root of the matter or ultra vires (Anand Prakash Vs. Assistant Registrar, AIR 1968 All 22), such as, acts without jurisdiction, malafides, acts in violation of the principles of natural justice etc.

In ShridharMisraVs.JaichandraVidyalankar[90] it is observed:  

• “Ordinarily, the civil court will not interfere with the internal management of a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act at the instance of some of the members of the Society. But this rule is subject to the following exceptions: 
• (1) Where the impugned action is ultra vires the Society;
• (2) the act complained of constitutes a fraud; and
• (3) where the impugned action is illegal.
• If a case falls under any of these exceptions, it is open to some of the members of the Society to file a suit in the civil court challenging the act done in the name of the Society.”

14. Forbearance – Principles

Forbearance (not absolute restraint[91]) of courts in internal matters of an association is based on the following principles:

1 . Autonomous bodies[92]

Autonomy indicates that the body is subordinate to none[93] though it may be working under administrative control of another body, such as a Ministry.[94]

A society is the best custodian of its interests.[95]

What is in the interest of the society is primarily for the society alone to decide and it is not for an outside agency to say.[96]

Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom to form associations or unions. Right to form an association enjoins with it a right to continue to be associated with it, as well as to ensure that only those persons are admitted to the association whom they voluntarily admitted.[97] It includes in itself the right of lawful functioning and administration, as autonomous[98] or self governing bodies (including one formed for the administration of a trust[99]). Such institutions are entitled to carry on its affairs without being interfered by external forces, unless it could be shown that the act complained of is null and void, or makes out a case of malafides.[100] Court will not interfere in the internal autonomy of educational institutions[101]or the acts of a Principal of a School (who is primarily responsible for maintenance of discipline[102]).

Article 43B of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall endeavour to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies.

When the administrators of an autonomous[103] body primarily responsible for maintenance of its internal discipline, whether it be a voluntary association, educational institution[104] or an industry, takes action against an erring member, student or employee, courts will not meddle with such actions or substitute its decision, however more prudent[105] it may be, unless there are fundamental vitiating circumstances, such as breach of the principles of natural justice, manifest perversity or something that shocks the conscience of the Court.

Our Apex Court, in Shyam Lal Yadev Vs. Kusum Dhawan,[106] it is expressed  that it would be strange jurisprudence which would paralyse autonomous bodies if courts could intervene on some ipse dixit to undo acts of internal management against employees especially when the power of the employer was made out.

2. Members’ rights merge in the rights of association: A person who forms an association or joins the society as a member, enters into a contract with the bye laws or regulations of the association. His rights merge in the rights of the society or association and are controlled by the Act and the bye-laws of the society or association.[107]

3. Rule of majority[108] is one of the basic principles of all voluntary associations, in our democratic set-up. And, therefore, courts will not interfere either with the lawful decisions of the associations or with its ‘policy matters’[109] and discretionary actions[110] exercised by the authorities under the powers given by the bylaws, expressly or impliedly. It is up to the members to propose amendments.[111] Company Court will not interfere with the commercial wisdom of the shareholders.[112]

4. Right of management includes right to resolve internal disputes: The right of management includes the right to resolve internal conflicts and disputes. Disputes between individual members of the society and those responsible for its management must be decided by the machinery provided by the rules and not in a Court of law.[113]

In Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma,[114] Sahai, J. observed: “… But, for purposes of enforcing discipline within a church religious body may constitute a tribunal to determine whether its rules have been violated by any other member or not and what will be the consequence of that violation. In such case the tribunals so constituted are not in any sense courts, they derive no authority from the statutes and they have no power of their own to enforce their sentence. Their decisions are given effect to by the courts as decision of the arbitrators whose jurisdiction rests entirely on the agreement of the parties.”

5.  A society cannot be left without a remedy; and Presupposed to have provisions to resolve disputes: The Constitution or bye-laws of a society is paramount,[115] and it is the soul of the Society.[116] The society cannot be left without a remedy for its internal administration, as law does not contemplate a vacuum.[117] The doctrine of necessity, a common law doctrine, is applied to tide over the situations where there are difficulties; and a solution has to be found out rather than allowing the problem to boil over.[118]  The members of an association are free to resolve their disputes internally under their bye laws; and the club/society or its domestic tribunal is entitled to decide all internal matters as it thinks right.[119] It is presupposed to have the provisions, expressly or impliedly, to resolve the internal disputes by themselves.[120]In proper cases,it can constitute a tribunal. An association is free to enforce discipline within the association, by itself; for,

• (a) an association is autonomous; and, in its very nature, formed under the principles of democracy and doctrines of collective wisdom, as miniature replica of a republic; and
• (b) the members are united on consensual basis;[121] and are voluntarily submitted themselves to the administration under the bye laws.

6. Scheme of the Bye Laws will Speak for Silences: When the Act and the Rules made thereunder are silent on a particular aspect, we have to look into the broad scheme[122] of the Act and the intention of the legislature for guidance.[123]The same principle can be applied to the bylaws and affairs of an association also.

7. Implied Bar: Rights created by Enacted Law or by Bylaws :The right to appoint and/or remove the directors of a company is created by the Companies Act; and these are the matters of internal management which itself provides machinery for the enforcement of such right. Therefore, the Civil Courts jurisdiction in such matters is impliedly barred.[124]  Same is the position in case of rights conferred by the bye laws applicable to an association.

8. Doctrines of Alternate/Special Remedy and  Equally Efficacious Remedy: Courts will not delve in the internal disputes of an association unless it is shown[125] that the aggrieved parties have worked out and exhausted[126] their remedies[127]  under the bye laws; ie. before domestic tribunals[128] or other authority.[129]

Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute alone must be availed of.[130] Right conferred by a rule is always subject to the qualifications prescribed and limitations imposed thereunder.[131] These principles apply to the rights and liabilities arise from the bye laws of a society also. Courts will not, ordinarily, interfere where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy available.[132]

9. Election–rights:  Not common law rights: The rights to vote, contest election etc. are neither fundamental nor common law rights. They are statutory rights regulated by the statutory provisions. Where a statute provides for election to an office and if it provides a machinery for determination of disputes arising out of election, the aggrieved person should pursue his remedy before the forum provided by the statute. It is not permissible to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts bypassing the machinery designated by the Act for adjudication of the election disputes. But exceptional or extraordinary circumstances may exist to justify bypassing the alternative remedies.[133]

10.  Court Interference Results Frustration: If the process of election is allowed to be freely interfered with by the courts, possibly no election will be completed without court’s order; and the basic purpose of having election and getting an elected body to run the Administration will be frustrated.[134]

11. Cannot stall the formation of the governing body: No member has a right to claim injunction so as to stall the formation of the governing body.[135]

12. Right of Ratification: A society cannot function otherwise than in accordance with its constitution. But, the Gen. Body can ratify a directory provision.[136] It is a recognised principle of law.[137] A simple breach of any Rule, especially when it is ‘technical’,[138]will not give rise to a cause of action for any member.  In other words, the alleged violation should be so grave that it could not be condoned or ratified by the general body,[139] or by a lawful correction; or there is manifest illegality, or act or omission that goes to the root of the matter.

13. Irregular Notice may be Ratified: In the nature and circumstances of a particular matter, an irregular notice may be ratified by the appropriate body at a subsequent meeting as observed in Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-Operative Societies.[140]

14. Sufficiency of Notice: When a question arose as to whether the provision in the Co-operative Rules that provides 15 clear days notice for moving a no-confidence motion was directory or mandatory, following the Supreme Court decision in Narasimhiah Vs. Singri Gowda[141] it was held in VA Jose Vs. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies[142] that the provision was only directory since the legislature had not provided any consequence that was to follow if 15 clear days notice had not been given and since the petitioner did not explain in what manner he was prejudiced for not getting 15 clear days notice. It was also held that the petitioner being participated in the disputed meeting, he had no right to challenge the invalidity in the notice for convening the meeting.

15. Success of a winning candidate cannot be lightly interfered: The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with; more so, when no fault of his.[143] If ultimately, the suit is dismissed, the court cannot compensate for granting a temporary injunction.[144]

Internal Management And Suit By Individual Members

As regards the internal management of the society, whether the society as such, and not its individual members, has to sue is considered in Ram Charan Agarwala Vs. Shridhar Misra.[145] It was held as under:

• “There have been a large number of cases both in India as also in England where courts has to consider whether a suit can be brought in respect of the internal management of a company otherwise than in the name of the company itself, by individual members thereof. There is good authority for the proposition that the case of society registered under the Act is similar to that of a club or a joint-stock company, (See A. S. Krishnan v. M. Sundaram, AIR 1941 Bom 312). A Full Bench of this Court in the case of 1947 All LJ 637 (AIR 1948 All 146) (supra), has held that the same principles apply to a club which applied to a joint-stock company. In the leading case on the subject Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, it was held that the normal rule is that the corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of some one whom the law has appointed to be its representative. Mozley v. Alston, (1847) 16 LJ Ch 217, is an authority for the proposition that ordinarily individual share-holders cannot sustain a Bill in their own names in respect of a matter common to all or relating to the internal management of the company. In the case of Mac Doughall v. Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, the Court held that it could not interfere in the internal management of a company and dismissed an action brought by one Share-holder on behalf of himself and all other share-holders excluding the Directors, against the Directors and the company complaining against certain matters decided at a meeting. To the same effect is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhajekar v. Shinkar, AIR 1934 Bom 243 and of the Madras High Court in Nagappa v. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831. The Bombay High Court took the same view in S. Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516, which was a case of a registered society. This general rule however has got an exception as pointed out in the Madras and Bombay cases referred to above. The exception is that a share-holder can bring an action even with regard to an internal management of a company if (1) the action of the majority is ultra vires the company; (2) where the act complained of constitutes a fraud on the minority; (3) where the action of the majority is illegal and (4) where a special resolution is required by the Article of the Company and the assent of the majority to such special resolution is obtained by a trick, or even where a Company authorised to do a particular thing only by a special resolution does it without a special resolution duly passed.”

15. In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

Though not specifically sought for in relief, in proper cases, Courts order election and appoint receivers.

The courts interfere and grant relief in a given situation[146]disregarding the technicalities. For example:

• (i)   where the issue was not properly expressed and it was of formal nature;[147]
• (ii) when a larger relief was prayed for and the claim for the same was not duly established but the evidence justified grant of smaller relief;[148]
• (iii) where the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage;[149] and
• (iv) to promote substantial justice; subject, of course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances where equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated – as procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process.[150]

Kerala High Court, in KP Muhammed  Vs.  M Abdurahiman,[151]  held that when there was no validly elected committee for the proper management of an association, the civil courts would have jurisdiction to order election of the committee even if it was not sought for by the parties.

16. Court Examines Reasons of Supersession of Societies

While dealing with CP and Berar Municipalities Act, it is held by the Full Bench in Municipal Commissioner, Kareli Vs. State of MP[152] that the Court has power to examine the sufficiency of reasons. It was observed:

• “In a democratic society it is of the essence that democratic institutions are allowed to function and not superseded on trumpery charges inadequately brought home or unreasonably accepted. The Courts will be vigilant to see that such over-reaching powers are kept within the four corners of the statute granting them. We think that the fact that a reasonable opportunity to show cause has been made a condition precedent to the exercise of the power and that reasons for the super-session have to be notified to the electorate shows that there is not to be a subjective appraisal but that the reasons must be sufficient under the Act and an objective test is indicated. The requirements of the law are not satisfied by accepting insufficient or inadequate reasons for super-session. We think that the Courts are at liberty to examine the reasons for this limited purpose in addition to the purposes which the learned Judges of the earlier Division Bench (Mangalmurti and Mudholkar JJ.) have already indicated in their order.”

17. Right of Parishioners to Sue against Third Parties

Gaspari Louis Vs. Rev. Fr. CP Gonsalves[153]was a case brought by the Vicar of a Roman Catholic church for arrears of rent due from the tenants of church property.It was observed by the Privy Council that this Church was part and parcel of the Universal Catholic Church and that its parishioners must be assumed to be bound by the Law of the Church, ie., the Canon Law.And, that if this Church had erected rules different from the rules of the Catholic Church in its temporal affairs (for administration by a body known as the junta composed of the heads of houses in the village), then those rules were to be proved in the same way that a custom would have to be proved in a Court of Law.

As per the Canon Law of the Catholic Church the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar.  But, in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[154]  it is found, the parish being by law a public juridic person, that the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were competent to represent the juridic person and that they were competent to initiate civil proceedings before a Civil Court with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church.  It is further held that by reading the Canon as a whole, the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary for initiation of such proceedings.

Parallel Administration within a Church, Not Allowable

Running parallel governance at the cost of Church by creating factionalism within the constituent parish churches is not permissible. It is settled proposition of law that when a mode is prescribed for doing a thing, it can be done only in that manner and not otherwise.[155]

18. Courts Act as Guardian, as Societies have No Right to Mismanage

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are not absolute

Our Apex Court in I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[156] while dealing with the affairs of the Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church, a large congregation registered themselves under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 which also carried on secular activities of running a large number of schools and hospitals, it is held as follows:

• “Keeping in view the interest of the general public, we see no reason as to why in a case of mismanagement of such charitable organisations, although run by minorities, the Court cannot oversee its functions. The Courts, indisputably, act as guardian of such societies. [See Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546.] Even otherwise, rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are not absolute and unfettered. The right to manage, it goes without saying, does not carry with it a right to mismanage.”

19. If Mismanagement, So. Regn. Act no bar for Court Interference

Section 25 of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act provides for an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society by the Registrar on his own motion or on the application of the majority of the members or on the complaint given by 1/3rd members of the society. The Act further gives power to the Registrar to issue notice for general body meeting of the society and require the governing body of the society to call a general meeting and to determine such matters as may be directed by him. The Registrar has the ancillary powers to summon any person and examine him.

Following Kodava Samaj, Bangalore Vs. District Registrar of Registration of Societies, Bangalore[157] it is held in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies[158] that under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act the Registrar has power to direct the society to hold an election, because an enquiry into the constitution and working of the registered society would include the enquiry into the propriety of continuation by a Working Committee and the need to elect a new committee if the existing working committee functions contrary to the bye-laws of the society. Section 25 (2) (c) should be read so as to include a power in the Registrar to direct the holding of the election to the general body if the occasion demands.

The regulatory powers as to registration of a Society vested with the Registrar do not confer any authority on the Registrar to interfere with the affairs, including the election process, of the Society. The scope of exercising power under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act is only to the limited extent of examining whether the list furnished is false or bogus. The above referred limited purpose is fulfilled the moment the list is furnished pursuant to an election. If the parties have any grievance against selection, they are free to approach the civil court.[159] When more than one return is filed, the Registrar has got the power to find out as to which one he should accept. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. Prima facie he has to satisfy as to which return is to be accepted. Such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final. The dispute can be taken up before a competent court as to who are the members of the governing body.[160]

Several State-Societies-Registration-Acts and Amendments to the Societies Registration Act provide for enquiry by Registrar into the constitution, working and financial conditions of the society. In D Dhanapal Vs. D David Livingstone[161] it is held that the suit filed for declaration that the plaintiff continues to be the Secretary of the Society is maintainable. Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act does not reveal any express bar to the Civil Courts. Section 36 is merely an enabling provision. If the aggrieved party approaches the Registrar or the Registrar acts on his own motion, then, it shall be lawful for the Registrar to conduct an enquiry and communicate the report of the enquiry. It does not mean to deem it as a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There must be at least some implication to show that the Civil Court cannot entertain such suits.

It may be true that the question of mismanagement of a society can be raised as a subject matter before the Registrar under Section 25 of the Karnataka So. Regn. Act; but, the members of the society who are aggrieved by those matters of mismanagement,redressal which are not expressly or impliedly provided for under the Actor for those matters for which precise provisions are lacking in the Act, can certainly maintain a suit.[162]

The Delhi High Court held in Premvati Vs. Bhagwati Devi,[163]that where shareholders complain of mismanagement or oppression and of acts prejudicial to the interest of the company or prejudicial to public interest, the civil court may entertain a suit by the shareholders and grant appropriate reliefs.

20. Service of Priest & Administration of an Institution – Secular Acts

The appointment and the service of the priest or Archaka are secular matters and not spiritual.Though the performance of the ritual ceremonies is an integral part of the religion, the person who performs the ceremonies is not a part of spiritual ceremonies itself. With respect to spiritual ceremonies right can be claimed but not with respect to the person who performs it or associates himself with the performance of spiritual ceremonies which is not a right under Article 25. This is a secular right.[164] Therefore the court can interfere in such affairs, if cogent grounds exist.

In Jamsheed Kanga Vs. Parsi Panchayath Funds and Properties[165] while dealing with Towers of Silence, the last resting place of the Parsis, it is held that though the performance of religious service, according to the tenets of the faith is an integral part of religious faith and belief, the service of the Priest is a secular act; and that the administration of a religious institution or an endowment made for religious purposes is a secular activity. Hence, it has been held that the Legislature is competent to enact a law regulating the administration and governance of a religious or charitable institution or endowment.

21. Interference in Religious Decisions: Church of North India Case

While considering the question whether unification of churches, registered under both Societies Registration Act and Bombay Public Trusts Act, was a religious decision falls under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution over which the courts have no jurisdiction, it has been observed by our Apex Court in Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai[166] that it was a well accepted principle that a society created under a statute must have conformed to its provisions and the courts would interfere in case of its violation.

22. Court Interference – Illegal Expulsion & Ex-communication

Expulsion from society visits a member with harsh adversities. The courts interfere with illegal Expulsions and Ex-communications.[167]

23. Court Interference in Faith Matters: PMA Metropolitan Case

It was contented in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma[168]that the various decisions,[169] would indicate that Explanation 1 to Section 9 CPC embraced questions relating to the religious faith, doctrine and belief; and saved only those suits where the right to property or to an office was contested. But Sahai, J. did not entertain the argument. Sahai, J. observed:

• “The jurisdiction of courts depends either on statute or on common law. The jurisdiction is always local and in absence of any statutory provision the cognisance of such dispute has to be taken either by a hierarchy of ecclesiastical courts established in the country where the religious institutions are situated or by a statutory law framed by the Parliament. Admittedly no law in respect of Christian Churches has been framed, therefore, there is no statutory law. Consequently any dispute in respect of religious office in respect of Christians is also cognisable by the civil court.”

24. Principles of Enforcing Decisions of Tribunals of Religious Bodies

While considering the question whether the ex-communication of the Catholicos by the Patriarch of Antioch was valid, in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma,[170]Sahai, J. observed as under:

•  “A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations. It is further settled that discipline of a church cannot affect any person except by express sanction of the civil power or by the voluntary submission of the particular person.

But, for purposes of enforcing discipline within a church religious body may constitute a tribunal to determine whether its rules have been violated by any other members or not and what will be the consequence of that violation. In such case the tribunals so constituted are not in any sense courts, they derive no authority from the statutes and they have no power of their own to enforce their sentence. Their decisions are given effect to by the courts as decision of the arbitrators whose jurisdiction rests entirely on the agreement of the parties.”

25. Church Disputes: Courts Inquire into the Laws

It is observed further in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma[171] as follows:

• “In Dame Henriette Brown Vs. Les Cure Et Marguilliers De L’oeuvre Et Fabrique De Notre Dame De Motrea,[172] the Privy Council while following the decision in Long[173] held that where a church was merely a private and voluntary religious society resting only upon a consensual basis courts of justice were still bound when due complaint was made that a member of the society was injured in any manner of a mixed spiritual and temporal character to inquire into the laws and rules of the tribunal or authority which inflicted the alleged injury and ascertain whether the act complained of was law and discipline of the church and whether the sentence was justifiably pronounced by a competent authority. The decision in Long has been followed in this country[174] in Anadrav Bhikajiphadke Vs. Shankar Daji Charya[175] where certain persons brought a suit that their right of worship in the sanctuary of a temple was being infringed, it was held that the right of exclusive worship of an idol at particular place set up by a caste was civil right.”

It is held further:

• “A Church is either Episcopal or congregational. It cannot be Episcopal in spiritual matters and congregational in temporal matters. …. That is the fundamental difference in congregational and Episcopal. In the former it vests in the parishioners. But in the latter, in endowment. …..”

A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves[176] held that, unlike the Church of England which was described as ‘established Church’, the Roman Catholic Church was described as a voluntary association in the English cases.[177]  The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its property and so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church the diocesan Bishop alone would have the right in both the spiritual and the temporal matters in respect of the church and its property.

In S Robert Vs. M Kanagappan[178] it is held:

• “Therefore we hold that once the church in question was constructed and consecrated by Arch Bishop of Trichy Diocese, the church and its properties would vest in the Pope and the fourth respondent, Arch Bishop as a delegate of the Pope, is entitled to the spiritual and temporal powers over the church and its properties. As already observed, though the church was constructed with the funds mostly provided by the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti village, when the church was consecrated according to the Roman Catholic rites, the church and its properties would vest in the fourth respondent.
• Can.1254 and 1257 make it clear that the Catholic Church has the inherent right, independently of any secular power to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal goods, in pursuit of its proper objectives and all temporal goods would be regulated by the Canons as well as by their own statutes. Sub-clause (2) of Can.1257 provides that unless it is otherwise expressly provided, temporal goods belonging to a private juridical person are regulated by its own statutes, not by these Canons. Sub-clause (2) of Can. 1257 deals only with the temporal goods belonging to a private juridical person, and a body of Roman Catholic public in the village are not private juridical persons within the meaning of Canon Law.
• It is, no doubt, true that it will be open to the church authorities and the Roman Catholic public of a particular village to regulate or to enter into an agreement with the villagers as to the mode of control over the church and its properties and in the absence of any agreement produced by the appellants herein, it must be held that the church and its properties vest only in the authority of the fourth respondent, viz., Arch Bishop of Trichy Diocese and the respondents 2 and 3 are the delegate of the Arch Bishop to exercise the spiritual and temporal powers over the church in question and its properties.
• ……. Therefore, on the basis of the law, particularly, the law governing the church in question, we hold that the church and its properties vest only in the fourth respondent herein and it is open to him to exercise his power through his delegates, namely, respondents 2 and 3. It is true that it would be open to the fourth respondent to authorise villagers to administer the secular affairs of the church, but the plaintiffs have not established that they were authorised by the fourth respondent to administer the secular affairs of the church and even if they were so authorised, they would exercise the power of administration as authorised agents of the fourth defendant and not de hors the authorisation. Equally, it would have been open to the villagers to form a trust to retain the administrative control over the church and its properties at the time of consecration of church subject to the grant of consent by the fourth respondent for retaining such a control.
• ….. It is, no doubt, true that it is open to the plaintiffs to show that notwithstanding the provisions of the Canon Law, the temporal affairs of the church are being governed by the custom of the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti village. If the custom is established, then, the Roman Catholic people of Vakkampatti village can claim right over the church and its properties by way of custom.”

A Division Bench of Madras High Court as early as in the year 1915, in Michel Pillai Vs. Rt. Rev. Bartle[179] held:

• “According to Canon Law a Roman Catholic Church becomes, as soon as it is consecrated, the property of the church authorities, irrespective of the fact that any particular worshipper or worshippers contributed to its construction.  The Bishop and other church authorities have the exclusive right to the internal management of the church, whether relating to secular or religious matters, such as accommodating the congregation inside the church and prescribing the part to be taken by the congregation in the services and the ceremonies.”[180]

In Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan,[181]  Kerala High Court, observing that the Catholic Church was a voluntary association governed under the Canon Law and that the properties of the church were vested with church authorities, it was held that the (parish)church was a legal person and that it was not a public trust to attract Sec. 92 CPC.

But, it may be pointed out that the courts in India, from early times, took the view that the religious institutions where public or a section of public worship, as of right, have the incidents of ‘public trust’.

26. Church Disputes: Court Inquires, Whether the Sentence Justifiable

Referring to Dame Henriette Brown Vs. Les Cure Et Marguilliers De L’oeuvre Et Fabrique De Notre Dame De Motrea,[182] and Long Vs. Bishop of Capetown,[183]it is observed in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma[184] that the courts of justice would inquire into the laws and rules of the tribunal or authority which inflicted the alleged injury and ascertain whether the act complained of was law and discipline of the church and whether the sentence was justifiably pronounced by a competent authority.

27. Court Cannot Determine Whether Bylaws Fair or Unfair.

The associations and clubs are at liberty to frame their bye laws and Rules.They may have different kinds of the posts, and may prescribe their own election process, so also the manner of holding the elections.[185]It is trite law that the courts will not interfere in the internal matters of an association, unless there are cogent grounds. In Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma,[186]Sahai, J. (minority) observed:

• “Before concluding it may be observed that while highlighting the relationship between Malankara Association and the Parish Churches, it was submitted by Mr Parasaran that the provisions in the Constitution permitting every church to send same number of representatives irrespective of the strength of churches was not very fair. May be. But this is a provision governing matters not only of administration of churches but of faith and religion. The Malankara Association is like the executive body of the Malankara Church to exercise control over religion and temporal matters. The court’s function is restricted to ensure its proper implementation and not to determine whether the provisions in the Constitution framed by the religious body was fair or unfair. Religion is not governed, necessarily, by logic. In any case, it is not in the domain of secular courts to substitute its own opinion of fairness.”

28. Court Interference for Ensuring Will of the Community

But, in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma Mathews, AIR 1996 SC 3121, (subsequent to AIR 1995 SC 2001) Jeevan Reddy and SC Sen, JJ. observed:

• “Inasmuch as the Malankara Association was vested with control over the religious and communal affairs of the entire Malankara Christian Community, it was held desirable and necessary that the Association must ‘truly and genuinely reflect the Will of the said community’. For ensuring it, it was observed: ‘Its composition must be so structured as to represent the entire spectrum of the community. A powerful body having control over both spiritual and communal affairs of the Malankara Church should be composed in a reasonable and fair manner. It was held that judged from the above angle, clause (68) of the 1934 Constitution cannot be said to be a fair one inasmuch as the said clause provided for representation Parish Churchwise. ….”

29. Court Interference for Ensuring Democratic Set-up in Associations

Right to form associations or unions is a Fundamental Right guaranteed by our Constitution.[187] A democratic set up in such associations or unions, subject to its bye laws, is envisioned in that right itself, if it is infringed Courts interfere to set-right abuses.

In Raju C Raphael Vs. Regency Club[188] the suit was filed for a declaration that the amendments brought into the bye-laws of the first defendant club, with respect to the subscription, were illegal, unsustainable and without any force. The trial court found that the amendments were passed unanimously by the members who attended the meeting and therefore, it was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to get an order of temporary injunction. The appellate court confirmed the order. It was challenged in the High Court in Writ Petition. The Kerala High Court taking note of the fact that more than ³/₄^th of the members of the club would not be able to exercise their franchise and considering the grievance of the petitioners that such an election would not result in a democratic set up in the club, the High Court, without interfering the concurrent findings of the fact, permitted all the members of the club, who pay the subscription in accordance with the amended bye-laws within a specified time, to exercise their votes in the election.

30. Mismanagement: Judged not by Result; but by Situation

The degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him; and the transactions of such managers would have to be judged not by the result, but by what might have been expected to be its results at the time they were entered into.[189]

31. Doctrine of ‘Conditions of Modern Life’

In KC Kappor Vs. Radhika Devi,[190] the Supreme Court has held that the expression “compelling necessity” (qua alienation of property held by a trustee-Kartha) must be interpreted with due regard to the ‘conditions of modern life’. Our Apex Court quoted with approval the Bombay decision, Nagindas Maneklal Vs. Mahomed Yusuf Mithcella.[191]

32. Principle of Non Interference: Rule of Majority

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw J., in Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India,[192] has held that the principle of non interference in internal management of clubs was evolved on the premise of such clubs being governed by the rule of majority. As a general rule, the courts will not interfere in matters of internal administration of a Company or a voluntary association. It is for the majority of shareholders or members to decide the manner in which the affairs of the company or the association are to be conducted. [193]

33. Judicial Review: Exceptions to Foss Vs. Harbottle

It was propounded in Foss Vs. Harbottle,[194] that a Civil Court would not interfere with the internal management of a company.  Following exceptions to this rule are laid down, with respect to the internal management of voluntary associations, in Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay[195], Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaichandra Vidyalankar[196] and Nagappa Chettiar Vs. The Madras Race Club.[197]

• (1) action ultra virus the society;
• (2) action constitutes a fraud ; and
• (3) action illegal.

In Sri Bhaben Chandra Pegu Vs. The State of Assam[198] the Division Bench considered the Rule with regard to the convening of a meeting of the governing body and pointed out that it was a statutory Rule and commission of act in violation of the Rules in passing an order or interfering in the management of the affairs of the college must be held to be void, unlawful and illegal, and was liable to be set aside and/or quashed.[199]

The power of the court to have judicial review over the decisions of a society is very limited. Civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with a suit by minority members on the ground of

• oppression and
• mismanagement.[200]

In AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundarum[201], it was held by Kania, J.  that the position of a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is like that of a club or a Joint Stock Company. In order to redress a wrong done to the Company, action should prima facie be brought by the Company itself. But where the persons against whom the relief is sought themselves hold and control the majority of the shares of the Company and will not permit an action to be brought in the name of the Company, the share-holders complaining can bring an action in their own names.

34. Court Interference: Fraud and Coercion

A decision taken playing fraud on the minority would not bind the society or club. The majority does not have any right to coerce the minority also.[202]

35. Court Interference: TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria

In TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria[203] the Supreme Court has pointed out the powers of Courts to interfere in the affairs of a society as under:

• “The jurisdiction of a Civil Court is rather limited; it cannot
  • obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such a body;
  • it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body
    • acts without jurisdiction or
    • does not act in good faith or
    • acts in violation of the principles of natural justice…”

36. Court Interference: Myurdhwaj Co-op. Group Hosg. Society Case

While dealing with the issue regarding allotment to members by a Housing Co-operative Society, the Supreme Court, held in Myurdhwaj Co-op. Group Housing Society Vs. Presiding Officer, Delhi Co-op. Tribunal[204] that the courts would not interfere with the discretionary affairs of a society except when it was

• arbitrary,
• irrational,
• mala fide,
• against any statutory provision or
• against order having the force of law.

37. When Court Sets Aside Decision of Domestic Tribunal

A domestic tribunal is free to evolve its own procedure. It is held in Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar[205] as under:

• “It is not the province and the function of this Court to lay down either the time or the mode and manner in which autonomous and high-powered bodies like the Syndicate of the appellant-University are entitled to conduct their business in the meetings. They are equally masters of their own procedure and unless there is an infraction of the clear statutory rules in carrying out their duties and in conforming to the procedure prescribed by law, this Court would be ill-advised to render any gratuitous advice to them in their autonomous field in dealing and disposing of their business.”

In Ujjal Talukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley[206] following principle has been laid down by the Calcutta High Court:

• “A domestic tribunal cannot do anything it likes, throwing everything to the winds. But the jurisdiction of the Court is of a very limited character. Generally speaking, the court can set aside the decision of a domestic tribunal on one of the three basic considerations set out below:
• A. When the tribunal oversteps the limits of its jurisdiction.
• B. When it violates the principles of natural justice.
• C. When it acts dishonestly,[207] actuated by bias, bad faith and the like.”

Lord Denning, Master of Rolls, in the Court of Appeal in England observed, in the matter of a non-statutory domestic tribunal, as under:[208]

• “Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as of right to be legally represented, much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not interfere….”

Quoting Lord Denning our Supreme Court observed in J K Aggarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation[209] as under:

• “The right of representation by a lawyer may not in all cases be held to be a part of natural justice”.

38. Scope of Judicial Review: Wednesbury-Principle

In Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India,[210] our Apex Court held as under:

• “Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case[211] that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was
  • contrary to law, or
  • relevant factors were not considered, or
  • irrelevant factors were considered; or
  • the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken.”

39. Court Does Not Sit in Appeal

It is trite law that the Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiry officer. The Supreme Court in the celebrated decision, TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria,[212]  it is held that jurisdiction of courts to interfere in cases involving expulsion of a member from the organisation is extremely limited, and the Court’s enquiry is confined to find out whether the decision making is within the four corners of the rules, and the Courts cannot sit in appeal over the decisions of the organisation.[213]

It is held by our Apex Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar[214] as under:     

• “We are at any rate not sitting in appeal against the findings of a Domestic Tribunal set up to enquire into the allegations of misconduct levelled against a team official of a participating team. We are not, therefore, reappraising the material that has been assembled by the Probe Committee and relied upon to support its finding. The finding is by no means without basis or perverse to call for our interference with the same.”

40. Ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction – General Principles

Following principles as to ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction are important[215].

• Firstly, bar of jurisdiction of a Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of Civil Court requires strict interpretation.
• Secondly, the court would normally lean in favour of a construction, which would uphold the retention of jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
• Thirdly, the burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is ousted.

41. Natural Justice: Rules and Subsidiary Rules

Formerly, only two rules were recognised:

• Nemo debet esse judex propria causa
• Audi alteram partem

Subsequently, more subsidiary rules were recognised, such as:

• Without bias
• Right to reasons.

If principles of natural justice are not adumbrated in the rules, it is read into the same.[216] In the absence of suffering any disqualification by a member of a society by virtue of its rules and regulations, the court cannot add any further qualification.

See Chapter: Expulsion of Members.

42. Natural Justice: Commonsense Justice

Whether an order in violation of natural justice is bad or not is depended on facts and circumstances of each case.[217] Its essence is good consciousness in a given situation; nothing more but nothing less.[218]

In Keshav Mills Co Ltd. Vs. Union of India[219]our Supreme Court held:

• “We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of Natural Justice cannot be put into a straight-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of Natural Justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably..”

In Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Election Commissioner[220] our Apex Court expounded the purport of natural justice following the principles laid down in AK Kraipak Vs. Union of India[221] as under:

• “The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years.     In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely:  (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George Vs. University of Kerala (AIR 1969 SC 198) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.”

The Supreme Court, in Uma Nath Pandey Vs. State of UP,[222]further explained the of principles of natural justice as follows:

• “7. The crucial question that remains to be adjudicated is whether principles of natural justice have been violated and if so, to what extent any prejudice has been caused, it may be noted at this juncture that in some cases it has been observed that where grant of opportunity in terms of principles of natural justice do not improve the situation, ‘useless formality theory’ can be pressed into service.
• 8. Natural justice is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
• 9. The expressions ‘natural justice’ and ‘legal justice do not present a watertight classification, It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence.
• 10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences; is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party indeterminately of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the ‘Magna Carta’. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to ‘vocate, interrogate and adjudicate’. In the celebrated case of Cooper Vs. Wandsworth Board of Works the principle was thus stated: ‘(E)ven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defense. “Adam” (says God), “Where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of, the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?”

Violation of the Principles of Natural Justice

Our Apex Court, in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K S Gandhi[223] observed that the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a straight jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law; and that whether omission to record reasons by a domestic tribunal vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order/decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances. In this decision, following the ratio in Ghazanfar Rashid v. Board, H.S. and I. Edn., U.P[224]  Full Bench, it is observed that, though it is open to the High Court to interfere with the order of the quasi judicial authority if it is not supported by any evidence or if the order as passed in contravention of the statutory provisions of the law or in violation of the principles of natural justice, the court has no jurisdiction to quash the order merely on the ground that the evidence available on record is insufficient or inadequate or on the ground that different view could possibly be taken on the evidence available on the record. Court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic tribunal. Authority’s appreciation of the problem must be respected.

In All Saints High School Hyderabad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh[225] our Apex Court held pointed out that the decision of a domestic tribunal can be interfered with if there is want of good faith or when there is victimisation or when the management has been guilty of basic error or violation of principles of natural justice or when the material findings are completely baseless or perverse.[226]

If Per Se Illegal, Question of Natural Justice Does Not Arise

In State of MP Vs. Shyama Pardhi, the Supreme Court while considering the appointment of a person in government service who had not possessed the prerequisite qualification and it was found to be in breach of the statutory rules, it was held that the question of violation of the principles of natural justice did not arise.[227]

43. Society Can Function Only In Accordance With Constitution

• But the Gen. Body Can Ratify Violation of a Directory Provision
• Bye laws and Doctrine of Factum Valet

The principle of ratification is a recognised principle of law and can be safely invoked by the societies, in appropriate cases.[228]

It is held in Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh[229]:

• “Rule of Law demands and dictates that the people follow the Law. The Constitution, whether of the State or of a Society registered under the Societies Act, is paramount. As people are to follow the Law in a State, so the members of a Society are duty-bound to follow the Constitution of the Society. After all, the Constitution is the soul of the Society. The Society, therefore, cannot function in contravention of its Constitution.
• To permit the Society to function in violation of its Constitution is to encourage illegal actions and omissions. The Court cannot be a party to an illegal action. In fact, one of the functions of the judiciary is to ensure that people adhere to the Constitution and the statutory laws. … In case the action of the Sabha is contrary to the tenor and spirit of its Constitution, the said action cannot be sustained by a Court of law.
• The doctrine of factum valet is applicable to cure the violation of a directory provision or a mere matter of form but does not cure the violation of the fundamental principles or the essence of the transaction.”

44. Society or Entire-Members Should be Parties to the Litigation

Acts of a society that are in violation of law and against the basic principles of its foundation, natural justice, etc. can be challenged in a court of law. But, if it relates to an unregistered society or an unincorporated club, its entire members should be made parties to such actions. For this matter, Order 1 Rule 8 CPC can be invoked. A registered society is expressly authorised  to sue or be sued invoking the provisions under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act; and Order 1 Rule 8 CPC need not be invoked.

Kania, J., in A.S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram,[230] observed as under:

• “In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. The only grievance in respect of the disputed acts can be of the society, it is not open to the plaintiff, without ascertaining the wishes of the society, to file a suit on behalf of himself and all other except the defendants. The reason for that conclusion is obvious. Even if the Court decides in favour of the plaintiff, the society can call meeting of its members tomorrow, confirm the act of the defendants and confirm their position as members of the managing committee, thus rendering the decision of the Court a nullity. … In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society.”

But it may be noted that the observations of Kania, J. that ‘the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society’ are to be taken as a suit filed under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act in view of Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi;[231] Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India;[232] Tata Vs. Tata.[233]In these decisions it has been held that a society is not a legal person.

45. Whether the Societies Registration Act Overrides the BPTA

Our Apex Court, in Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti[234] it is held:

• “… The argument that as per Article 254 of the Constitution, the Societies Registration Act overrides the BPTA or that the Societies Registration Act and BPTA are in conflict, does not stand either, since both the statutes are not in conflict with each other. On the contrary, they are in consonance with each other regarding the administration and regulation of public and religious trusts.”

46. Final Authority, General Body

Bye laws of a Society are made by the founding members of the society for regulating its affairs. All members of the society are bound by it.[235] The decisions of its general body also bind the members.[236] Subject to the provisions in the Act, if any, applicable and the bye laws, the final authority[237] of every society and club shall vest in the general body of the members in general meeting, summoned in such manner as may be specified in the bye-laws.

But, it is not open for the majority of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded.[238]

47. Court will Interfere to Prevent Gross Breach of Trust

In Piercy Vs. S. Mills and Co. Ltd.[239] their Lordships observed:

• “I cannot look upon the Directors otherwise than as trustees for a public Company, and I must judge of the propriety of their conduct in this matter on the ordinary principle applicable to cases of trustee and cestuique trust. If shares are issued with indecent haste and scramble … ….for a different purpose, I have no doubt that the Court will interfere to prevent so gross a breach of trust.
• If they were issued with the immediate object of controlling the holders of greater number of shares in the Company and of obtaining the necessary statutory majority for passing a special resolution, then it will not be valid or bona fide exercise of power.”[240]

48. Duty of Director Board to Obtain Views of the General Body

In AM Prakasan Vs. State of Kerala[241] it is held that Sec. 27 of the Kerala Co-op. Societies Act provides that the General Body is the final authority of a society subject to the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the bye laws; and that the Director Board of a Co-operative Society has a duty to place before the General Body and apprise them, the situation of waiving the huge amount of interest in a loan transaction, releasing security property and the fact that there is a likelihood of suffering any loss; and ascertain the views and opinion of the General Body on the same.

In Dipankar Dey Vs. State of Assam[242]  the writ petition, as regards the timing of a school, was disposed of directing the authorities, particularly, the President of the managing committee to convene a meeting of the general body (which is the supreme body) within a period of 6 weeks and the decision that may be adopted in the said general body meeting would hold the field.

49. General Principles in Company Law Apply

With respect to the individual membership rights of members of societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, the general principles governing the right of suit of an individual share holder or a member of the company would apply.[243] Legal status of society registered under the Societies Registration Act is similar to that a club or a joint sector company.[244]Following are recognised by Courts as individual membership rights in a company.[245]

• Right to vote,
• right to stand as a candidate for election as a director and
• set-right illegal acts.

50. Sec. 9 of the CPC – Exclusion Not Readily Inferred

Sec. 9 CPC reads:

• “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. The courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
•   Explanation 1.- A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.
•   Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place. “

Under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Civil Courts have got jurisdiction to entertain suits of civil nature unless the same is expressly or impliedly barred by statute.[246] An exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court cannot be readily inferred. But in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the appellate authority is empowered to determine by the Companies Act or any other law for the time being in force the Civil Courts would not  have jurisdiction to entertain such suit[247] by virtue of implied bar.

51. Sec. 9 of the CPC – Supreme Court Decisions:

Dhulabhai Case

Often questions come before the courts: whether the Civil Courts have jurisdiction in matters of a society with respect to decisions taken by internal tribunals of the societies, conduct of elections, convening of meetings, violation of bye laws, etc. In the landmark decision, Dhulabhai Vs. State of M.P.,[248] guidelines were given by the Supreme Court in respect of matters which could be tried by the Civil Courts. It reads as under:

• “(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
• (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.
• (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals.
• (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
• (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.
• (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
• (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.”

Premier Automobiles Limited vs. Kamalakar Shantharam Wadke[249]

In this judgment, the Supreme Court set out the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute as under:

• “(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court.
• (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.
• (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.
• (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chap. V.A. then the remedy for its enforcement is either S.33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.”

The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. Krishnakanth.[250]

The seven principles evolved in this case read as follows:

• (1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e. where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
• (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act.
• (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which can be called sister enactments; to Industrial Disputes Act and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open.
• (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.
• (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly i.e. without the requirement of a reference by the Government in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.
• (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to statutory provisions. Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein.
• (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute-resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. Krishna Kant[251]

The legal position summarized read as under:

• “(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, I.e. where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
• (2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act.
• (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which can be called “sister enactments” to Industrial Disputes Act and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open.
• (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.
• (5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly i.e. without the requirement of a reference by the Government in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.
• (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to “statutory provisions.” Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein.
• (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute-resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.”

Writ and Civil  Court jurisdiction

Disputes as to the internal management of a society are to be raised by way of civil suit and they cannot be made the subject matter of a writ petition.[252] The Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhailal Bhai[253] it was pointed out that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterated in following decisions:

• N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422,
• Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, AIR 1965 SC 1321,
• Siliguri Municipality  vs. Amalendu Das, AIR 1984 SC 653,
• S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, AIR 1988 SC 616,
• R.S.R.T.C. vs. Krishna Kant, AIR 1995 SC 1715,
• Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, AIR 2000 SC 2573,
• A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, 2000 (7) SCC 695
• L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of AP, 2001 (6) SCC 634,
• Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami vs. St. of Mahstra., 2001 (8) SCC 509,
• Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, 2002 (7) SCC 484 and
• GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. IT Officer, 2003 (1) SCC 72,

52. Sec. 9 of the CPC: Civil Courts Jurisdiction, Impliedly Barred

Section 9 of the C.P.C. says that courts to try all suits unless their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred, unless such exclusion must either be expressed or clearly implied,[254] is a trite law. It is held by our Apex Court in Ram Kumar Bhargava Vs. Union of India[255] as under:

• “Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil courts jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become a concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence.”

In Justice G. P. Singh’s (former Chief Justice, M. P. High court) “Principles of Statutory Interpretation”[256] it is stated:

• “As laid down by Willes, J. and affirmed by high authorities -there are three classes of cases in which a liability might be established, founded upon statute. One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular from the remedy; there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it – The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.”[257]

In Bal Mukund Bairwa,[258] it has been explained that if the infringement of the Standing Orders is alleged, the civil court’s jurisdiction may be held to be barred but if the suit is based on the violation of principles of common law or constitutional provisions or on other grounds, the civil court’s jurisdiction may not be held to be barred.

The legal position that Standing Orders have no statutory force and are not in the nature of delegated/subordinate legislation is clearly stated in Krishna Kant.[259] In this case it was stated that the certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 were statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to ‘statutory provisions’ and any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated therein.

53. William Williamson Kerr in ‘Law of Injunction’

Regarding the power of a Civil Court to grant injunction William Williamson Kerr, in Sixth Edition of Law of Injunction, has pointed out as follows:

• “Where parties contribute funds which are laid out on property which all enjoy in common, such as clubs, societies, associations, etc., the members of which have agreed to bind themselves by certain rules, they are bound by their rules, and the court will not interfere, except in cases of breach of trust or oppression:
• (a) The jurisdiction of the Court in such cases is founded on the common interest of every member in the property of the club, society, etc., and on the common right of every member to require that the rules to which he has subscribed shall be properly carried out;
• (b) But although in the case of an ordinarily constituted club, in which members have rights of property, a member whose rights have been interfered with by the committee is entitled to ask the Court to consider whether the rules of the club have been observed, whether anything has been done which is contrary to natural justice, and whether the decision complained of has been come to bona fide.”

Kerr further pointed out that in such a situation the court has a duty to see that the proceedings were conducted on the common principles of ordinary justice. If a meeting is called irregularly or if it is not summoned with proper notice the court can interfere in such a situation[260].

54. Ouster of Jurisdiction of Courts under the Companies Act

Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 (Sec. 10 of Companies Act, 1956) deals with jurisdiction of courts. It reads:

• ‘No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, by the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal.’

It is clear that the civil court jurisdiction is ousted only with respect to matters ‘empowered to determine by or under this Act’.

55. No Power to Registrar to Direct Fresh Election; It is with Civil Court[261]

It is also held in CMS Evangelical Suvi David Vs. District Registrar[262] that the power under Sub-Section (9) of Section 36 cannot be stretched to a power on the Registrar to direct the registered society to hold fresh election. A direction to hold fresh election would amount to indirectly setting aside the earlier election and such power is not conferred on the Registrar under any of the provisions of the Act.

So long as the election is not declared invalid in the manner known to law, no direction for fresh election could be ordered. Validity of the election could very well be decided only by the competent Civil Court as the parties are entitled to let in their evidence to sustain their respective claims. If the Registrar satisfies himself as to the particulars furnished in Form VII as correct, he should enter the names in the register maintained for that purpose. In the event he does not satisfy as to the particulars and thereby does not accept Form VII, he has to issue a direction relegating the parties to approach the civil Court for appropriate orders.

56. District Courts’ Jurisdiction in Societies Registration Act, Limited

First proviso of Sec. 13, Societies Registration Act, 1880, lays down that in the event of any dispute arising among the governing body or the members of the society while in its dissolution, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the principal court of original civil jurisdiction of the district in which the chief building of the society is situate; and the court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite.

57. Special Forum: Limited Jurisdiction

Several State (Societies Registration) Acts/Amendmentsprovide for a special forum – District Court – as the forum to entertain and try suits or applications for certain specific matters as to the administration of the societies. If limited jurisdiction alone is conferred to such forum, it follows as a matter of law that the forum has been prohibited from granting any other relief.[263]

The bye laws bind its members as a contract.[264] Therefore, breach of contractual obligations, both express and implied, with respect to matters arising from the byelaws of a Society, give rise to a cause of action in civil court. When a special statute (Societies Registration Act) provides for a special remedy, it has to be adhered to.  If such special remedy or extraordinary[265] jurisdiction[266] isan enabling provision, limited to specified  reliefs[267]and provides for a summary remedy,it cannot be said that civil court jurisdiction for claiming regular reliefs is ousted.[268]In any case, the aggrieved persons will not be left without any remedy at all, in respect of matters which are not specifically provided for in these provisions as it will brought-in arbitrary and inequitable results.[269]In BalawwaVs.Hasanabi[270] it is held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted only in respect of such reliefs as could be granted by the Special Tribunal under the Special Statute (Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961); but in other respects the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not ousted.

If the enabling provisions provide for a summary remedyalone and they do not derogate expressly or impliedly[271] the authority of the general statute, jurisdiction under the general statute cannot be taken as ousted.[272]

Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001

Sec. 23 of the AP Societies Registration Act, 2001 states as follows:

• “23. Dispute regarding management: In the event of any dispute arising among the committee or the members of the society, any member of the society may proceed with the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or may file an application in the District Court concerned and the said court shall after necessary inquiry pass such order as it may deem fit.”

It is held by AP High Court[273] that the right to move the District Court under Section 23 of the Act was an effective remedy provided by the statute.

Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act

Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act reads as under:

• “36. Power of Registrar to inquire into the affairs of registered society:
•        (1) The Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of a majority of the members of the committee of a registered society or on the application of not less than one third of the members of that registered society, or if so moved by the District Collector, hold, or direct some person authorised by the Registrar by order in writing in this behalf to hold an inquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of that registered society.
•        (2) An application to the Registrar under sub-section (1) shall be supported by such evidence as the Registrar may require for the purpose of showing that the applicants have good reason for applying for an inquiry.
•        (3) The Registrar may require the applicants under sub-section (1) to furnish uch security as he thinks fit for the costs of the proposed inquiry, before the inquiry is held…………..”

This Section provides for enquiry into the affairs of registered societybythe Registrar. If the aggrieved party approaches the Registrar or the Registrar acts on his own motion, then, it shall be lawful for the Registrar to conduct an enquiry and communicate the report of the enquiry. It is merely an enabling provision. It does not mean to deem it as a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There must be at least some implication to show that the Civil Court cannot entertain such suits.[274]

Section 25 of the TC Literary Scientific and Charitable So.Regn. Act, 1955

S. 25(1) of the Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 reads as under:

• “25. Application to Court for dissolution, framing a scheme, etc: – (1) When an application is made by the State Government or ten percent of the members on the rolls of a society to the District Court within the jurisdiction of which the Society is registered, the court may, after enquiry and on being satisfied that it is just and equitable, pass any of the following orders:-
• (a) removing the existing governing body and appointing a fresh governing body; or
• (b) framing a scheme for the better and efficient management of the society; or
• (c) dissolving the society.”

It is obvious that Section 25 of the Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955, which provides for the three remedies enumerated in this section through the District Court (on an application ‘made by the State Government or ten percent of the members’), serves only as an enabling provision; because, sans this enabling provision, one or more members of the society have to adopt the regular or ordinary legal recourse (ie. invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court) for redressal when an action of the society is ultra virus the society or constitutes a fraud or illegality.[275] This section is confined to matters expressly stated therein. Nothing is there in this section which either expressly or impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of a civil court, particularly in matters relating to convening of General Body or conducting of elections.[276]

ParayakaduNalukulangaraDevaswom Vs. PadmanabhanHarshas[277] was a suit instituted by a member of a society praying for issuing an injunction restraining the defendants from convening the General Body meeting of the society on the ground that it was illegal and opposed to the provisions of the bye-law, and also for issuance of a commission to convene the general body in accordance with the provisions of the bye-law of the society.  The Kerala High Court negatived the contention of the defendants that the suit was barred in view of Sec. 25 of the Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 and that the District Court alone had got jurisdiction to entertain a suit. The Court, observing that the question of jurisdiction had to be primarily determined (at the time of considering the maintainability of the suit) with reference to the allegations and averments in the plaint, pointed out that it had been alleged in the plaint that the defendants had convened a General Body in violation of the provisions in the bye-laws and in fraud of the right of the members of the Society.

The remedy available to one or more members is not barred, for providing an enabling remedy in the special statute ‘on an application made by ten percent of the members’.

But, subsequently, in Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Vs. Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Ekopana Samithi[278] it is observed (obitor) that a declaration that the election to the governing body of the Society, which was holding the office, as null and void, in effect and substance, amounted to the removal of the existing governing body; and that such a declaration could be prayed for, only by invoking S. 25 of the Act, and not by filing a suit in the ordinary civil court. The Court observed that the Act has created new rights and liabilities as far as societies registered thereunder are concerned; and that S. 25 provided a specific forum for granting the reliefs enumerated in Clause (a), (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 25. The stipulation that the aforesaid reliefs can be sought for only in the manner specifically mentioned therein will not affect the exclusive nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the District Court. The exclusion of jurisdiction as above can be inferred not only from the fact that the District Court which is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction of the district concerned is specified for conducting the enquiry and granting the reliefs on its satisfaction but also from the fact that the right of appeal under S. 27 of the Act is conferred on the High Court. However, since that Legislature has enumerated the nature and kinds of disputes which are to be enquired into and the reliefs that could be sought for, it admits no doubt that other kinds of disputes are outside the purview of the District Court exercising power under S. 25 of the Act. The question that immediately arises is which other forum the aggrieved person should approach for reliefs not covered by S. 25. The answer is S. 9 of the C. P. C. Hence, in respect of all other matters involving disputes of a civil nature, it is competent for the ordinary civil courts to entertain, try and dispose of the suits.

Societies Registration Act as amended by State of U.P.

Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act as amended by State of U.P. reads as under:

• “25(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the registrar or by a least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office -bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit:
• Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied –
• (a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer; or
• (b) that the nomination of an candidate has been improperly rejected; or
• (c) that the result of the election in so far it concerns such office bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non -compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
• Explanation I. – …………….. ………… …
• Explanation II. – ………………… ……..
• Explanation III. –  ……………. ………..

Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act as amended by State of U.P. endows the ‘prescribed authority’ with the right to hear and decide in a summary manner disputes in respect of the election or continuance in office of office-bearers of societies.

But, when disputed questions of fact are involved, summary proceedings under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 will not be a bar for seeking remedy before the Civil Court as the summary proceedings under Section 25 is not an efficacious remedy.[279]

Cooperative Societies Acts

Co-operative Societies Acts provide that disputes touching the business of a society shall be referred to the Registrar for arbitration. But, it does not encompass dispute arising out of a disciplinary proceeding between such society and its officers and servants; and therefore, in the absence of such provision for compulsory arbitration of such dispute the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred.[280]

58. Legality of Meeting not be Adjudicated by Ednl. Authorities

Where there is no express exclusion, the Civil Courts examine the remedies and the Scheme of the Act to find out the intendment of the legislature, as to implied exclusion, in a proper case. In any event, the legality or correctness of the meeting held and the decisions taken by the society are not matters to be adjudicated upon by the appellate authorities constituted under the Educational Act and the Rules.[281].

59. Suit to Declare Plaintiff Continues as Secretary: Maintainable

Several State-Societies-Registration-Acts and Amendments to the Societies Registration Act provide for enquiry by Registrar into the constitution, working and financial conditions of the society. In D DhanapalVs. D David Livingstone[282] it is held that the suit filed for declaration that the plaintiff continues to be the Secretary of the Society is maintainable.

60. Whether Writ Petition Maintainable Against Societies

The main concern as to maintainability ofa writ is whether the society discharges public duty or not.Availability of alternative remedy may not operate as absolute bar against the exercise of the writ jurisdiction.[283]Various decisions of our Apex Court also say that a society is not ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and thusnot amenable to writ jurisdiction. [284]

It is also pointed out that availability of efficacious statutory remedy bars writ jurisdiction.[285]

The Supreme Court held that the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) is an ‘authority’ for the purpose of issuance of Writs[286] by the courts.  The BCCI is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and it came to be a deemed society by virtue of Section 4 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975.

Our Apex Court appraised that, as a member of ICC, it represented the country in the international fora; it exercised enormous public functions; and it had the authority to select players, umpires and officials to represent the country in the international fora. The Writ Petitions against Co-operative Societies are maintainable in certain circumstances. When the action complained in the Writ Petition is of any statutory violation on the part of the Co-operative Society, a Writ Petition will lie.

In Sand Carriers Owners Union Vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta,[287] it had been held:

• “Unincorporated associations are not legal persons and as such, writ petitions are not maintainable. An association could be formed to protect the interest of consumers, tenants or other groups with the common interest but such group cannot move writ application. No aspect of the representative law has been changing more rapidly than the law governing standing and the standing barrier has been substantially lowered in recent years, but on the basis of the law relating to standing as in England or in America as also in India, it can be held without any difficulty that the writ petition at the instance of an association is not maintainable where the association itself is not affected by any order. The members of such association may be affected by common order and may have common grievance, but for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the members, writ petition at the instance of such association is not maintainable. The door of the writ Court could be made open at the instance of persons or authorities under the aforesaid four categories and to hold that every Tom, Dick and Harry can move the writ application would render the standing requirement meaningless and would introduce a procedure which is not judicially recognised.”

The action of the Co-operative Society, if falls in a public domain or breach of the public duty is complained of, writ may also lie. However, in the absence of breach of any statutory duty or public duty, a Writ Petition cannot be entertained against a Co-operative Society.[288]

In Supriyo Basu Vs. WB Housing Board[289] it has been held by our Apex Court that it is undisputed that a Co-operative Society is constituted on agreement between members thereof who had agreed to abide by the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Rules framed thereunder or the bye-laws framed by the Society. The Society is undisputedly not a department of the State and is also not a creature of a statute but merely governed by a statute. Only if it is established that the mandatory provision of a Statute has been violated, a writ petition could be maintainable. In the facts of Satwati Deswal Vs. State of Hariyana[290] it was held by our Apex Court that the Writ Petition was maintainable even though alternate remedy was available.

61. Court Interference on PIL:

Take-over and Appointment of Administrator by Court: When No Action was taken by Authorities

In a Public Interest Litigation in Sanjay Gupta Vs. State of M.P.[291] it was pleaded that due to irregularities and mismanagement of the society the future of near about 1200 students who were getting education in the college and schools run by a Society was in dark. The petitioner prayed to takeover the society and to appoint an administrator. The Court found that in spite of the adverse reports, no action had been taken by the authorities. Observing that the right to receive proper education is a part and parcel of Article 21 of the Constitution and considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal[292] it was held that a writ petition in the shape of PIL was maintainable.

The Court appointed the Additional Collector, Gwalior as Administrator of the Society and gave directions for election and investigation in regard to financial irregularities in the light of Sec. 32 and 33 of the M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973.

62. Disciplinary Action: Termination of Service

The jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the case of contract of service is only to grant damages if there is a wrongful termination of service; and the civil court has no power to interdict the disciplinary proceedings. The Civil Court cannot order reinstatement or enforcing the contractual service. It cannot grant the relief of injunction restraining the Management from taking the action, more so when the proposed action is only an enquiry into the conduct of the employee.[293] The Civil Court has no right to enforce the contract of personnel service and the well recognised exceptions are noticed by the Supreme Court in Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi.[294]

• “From the two decisions of this Court referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personnel service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognised exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding
• (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311.
• (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals.
• (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute. “

63. Fiduciary Position of Governing Body Members

Directors of a company stand in a fiduciary[295] position and they are legally bound to exercise their powers for the company’s benefit. They have to protect the interest of the company and its shareholders. They cannot take part in any resolution under which they gain any benefit. If interested directors take part in such transactions there would be an irregularity and it renders the resolutions voidable at the instance of the company.[296] The term ‘fiduciary’ as an adjective means ‘in the nature of a trust, having the characteristics of a trust, analogues to a trust; relating to or founded upon a trust or confidence’. Mere confidence[297] also cannot result in a fiduciary relationship.

The term ‘fiduciary’ as an adjective means ‘in the nature of a trust, having the characteristics of a trust, analogues to a trust; relating to or founded upon a trust or confidence’. ‘Fiduciary relationship’ invariably involves dominion over property which is wholly lacking in the case of a contract of suretyship or guarantee, that the surety has not received anything nor has he been given dominion with money or property and that he has no liability to account. There is no fiduciary capacity involving liability to account in relation to another. Mere confidence also cannot result in a fiduciary relationship.[298]

Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘fiduciary relationship’ as:

• “A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other on matters within the scope of the relationship.fiduciary relationships – such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-client – require the highest duty of care. fiduciary relationships usually arise in one of four situations : (1) when one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result gains superiority or influence over the first, (2) when one person assumes control and responsibility over another, (3) when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship, or (4) when there is a specific relationship that has traditionally been recognised as involving fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and a client or a stockbroker and a customer.”

64. Law Does not Permit Transfer of Trust

Court Cannot Sanction Drastic Amendment to Trust

Trust is a confidential relationship which involves a special duty of loyalty to the purpose or object of the trust.  There is no principle of law or precedent which permits transfer of trust in favour of another body of persons.[299]

It is not open for the majority of the members of an association to alter the basic or fundamental principles upon which it is founded, unless such a power is specifically reserved. This principle in Milligan Vs. Mitchel,[300]Atttorney General Vs. Anderson[301] and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[302] is referred to in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao.[303] Court cannot sanction any drastic amendment which would destroy the basic purpose for which the trust was created.It is held that no deviation from the object of the trust would be allowed; and the properties would not be allowed to be sold to the members of their community for whose benefit the trust is created and the properties were acquired.[304]

65. Duty of Courts as Ultimate Protector of All Charities

Court has Jurisdiction to Enforce Trusts

In AA Gopalakrishnan Vs. Cochin Devaswom Board[305] while adverting to the need for protecting the properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, our Apex Court observed that it isalso the duty of Courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation.[306]In Doongarsee Shyamji Vs. Tribhuvan Das[307] it was pointed out that where the Shebait of a temple has done something which is obviously adverse to the interest of the institution the court would allow a disinterested third party to file a suit, provided such a suit is filed in the interest of the foundation or the deity, as the case may be.[308]

As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[309] It is the guardian of the public charitable trust/institution.[310] Court has jurisdiction to enforce trusts.[311]In Subramannaiya Vs. Abbinava[312]  it was observed by the Privy Council (Wadsworth, J.) that it was the duty of the court to protect the trust property from misappropriation and diversion from the objects to which it was dedicated. It was observed: 

• “It is the duty of the court to protect the trust property from misappropriation and diversion from the objects to which it was dedicated. When the trust property is without a legal guardian, owing to any defects in the machinery for the appointment of a trustee or owning to unwillingness of the legal trustee to act, it would be a monstrous thing if any honest person recognised as being in charge of the institution and actually controlling its affairs in the interest of the trust should not be entitled, in the absence of any one with a better title, to take these actions which are necessary to safeguard the interests of the trust”.

66. Non-convening of the Meetings and Acquiescence

Non-convening of Annual General Meetings is a serious allegation against the office-bearers of a Society.  But in proper cases courts can invoke doctrine of acquiescence.

In TJ Thomas Vs. CS Joseph[313] reliefs were claimed under the provisions of the Companies Act read with 3 and 4 of the Kerala Non-Trading Companies Act, 1961 alleging, inter alia, that the respondents were not convening the Annual General Meetings regularly. The prayers were rejected because it had come out in evidence that the non-convening of the meetings was due to the inaction on the part of petitioners; that the petitioners, if they were really interested in the affairs of the Sangam, should have taken appropriate steps at the appropriate time and seen that the Annual General Meetings were convened without fail; and that the conduct of the petitioners in this regard would show that they had without demur, acquiesced in the various activities of the respondents.

67. Fiduciary Relationship Will Not be Allowed to be Varied

Though, generally, the Indian Trusts Act applies to private trusts, the principles in Sec. 46 and 47 of the Indian Trusts Act (a trustee cannot renounce or delegate duties) are applied to various affairs of fiduciary relationship,[314] by our Courts, as they contain the common law principles of the universal rules of equity, justice and good conscience upheld by the English judges.

In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. BansiDhar[315]  it is held by VR Krishna Iyer J. as under:

•  “But while these provisions (of Indian Trusts Act)  proprio vigore do not apply, certainly there is a common area of legal principles which covers all trusts, private and public, and merely because they find a place in the Trusts Act, they cannot become ‘untouchable’ where Public Trusts are involved. Case must certainly be exercised not to import by analogy what is not germane to the general law of trusts, but we need have no inhibitions in administering the law by invoking the universal rules of equity and good conscience upheld by the English Judges, though also sanctified by the statute relating to private trusts. The Courts below have drawn inspiration from Section 83 of the Trusts Act and we are not inclined to find fault with them on that score because the provision merely reflects a rule of good conscience and of general application.”[316]

Sec. 46 and 47 of the Indian Trusts Act read:

• S. 46: A trustee who has accepted the trust cannot afterwards renounce it except (a) with the permission of a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, or (b) if the beneficiary is competent to contract, with his consent, or (c) by virtue of a special power in the instrument of trust.
• S. 47: A trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co-trustee or to a stranger, unless (a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the delegation is in the regular course of business or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d) the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation.

Sec. 46 and 47 of the Indian Trusts Act make it clear: a fiduciary relationship and duties[317] attached thereto should not be allowed  to  be  unilaterally  terminated  or  varied,  as  it would  be against the interests of society in general.These principles would apply with equal force to servants and, in fact, to anybody who has entered on another’s property in a fiduciary capacity [318]

68. Governing Body Not to Benefit

It is the duty of the trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. He is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit or to violate his duty to the beneficiaries.[319] Trustee has to act gratuitously unless sanctioned in the trust deed.[320]Section 32 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 which provides that the trustee is entitled to get reimbursement out of the trust property all expenses properly incurred in relation to the execution of the trust property and for preservation of the trust property is a principle of the English law of Trusts which has been incorporated in the Indian Trusts Act. Such principles are applied to public trusts also. 

The same is the position in case of governing body members of a society also.[321]

69. S. 88, Trusts Act Encompass Societies and Clubs Also

Section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act expressly refers to director of a company ‘or other person’. It reads as under:

•  “88. Where a trustee, executor, partner, agent, director of a company, legal adviser, or other person bound in a fiduciary character to protect the interests of another person, avails himself of his character, and gains for himself any pecuniary advantage or,
• where any person so bound enters into dealings under circumstances in which his own interests are, or may be, adverse to those of such other person, and thereby gains for himself a pecuniary advantage, he must hold for the benefit of such other person the advantage so gained.”

It is legitimate to comprehend that the words ‘or other person’ in Sec. 88 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 encompass the governing bodies of societies and clubs also.

70. Liability of So: No Personal Liability on Members & Gov. Body

Someswara Swamy Vari Devastanam Vs. Dasam Suryanarayana[322] it is held as under:

• “The wording of the above Section (Sec. 8) is clearly indicating that whenever there is a decree against the society, the members of the society cannot be made liable for the payment of debt due from the society and the decree cannot be enforced against the members of the society in their individual capacity.
• In Swami Satchitanand Vs. The 2nd Addl. Income-tax Officer, Kozhikode, AIR 1964 Kerala 118, the Kerala High Court held that a society registered under Societies Registration Act is a legal entity. It is capable of suing and being sued as such. A tax imposed on a Society, though it has been styled as an ‘Association of persons’ is still a tax on the society and not on its members. It is not possible, therefore, to say that the tax imposed on a Society is a tax imposed on the members of the Society. In K. C. Thomas Vs. R. L. Gadeock, AIR 1970 Patna 163, a division bench of Patna High Court while considering the scope of Section 8 of the Societies Registration Act, held that a registered Society can sue and be sued in its own name, can own its own property and can employ its own servants. Any person agreeing to serve under the Society or in any of its institutions must be deemed to hold the post under the Society. A society registered under the Act may not be a body corporate, quite distinct from its members.
• In Chanumolu Anil Kumar Vs. Vasu Cotton and Ginning Mills, 1989 (2) APLJ 196. It is laid down that in the suit against a Company and is Directors, which is decreed, in the absence of any fraud or other allegations, the decree cannot be executed against the Directors. It is open to the executing Court to construe the decree as a decree against the Company alone and not against the Directors.
• In the case covered by the above decision, the Directors were also shown as defendants describing them in their capacities in their Companies and the decree directs the defendants to pay the decree amount. The Court held that such a decree cannot be considered as a personal decree and a decree cannot be passed against the Directors and such decree would be a nullity. In Devuri Appala Raju Vs. KolliRamayamma, 1983 (1) ALT 420, a Single Bench of this Court held that a decree passed against the personal property of the legal representatives in violation of Section 52 CPC is a nullity and therefore in executable.
• Section 8 of the Act which imposes a bar for imposing liability on the members of the society and the decree passed against the members of the society in their individual capacity is a nullity. The decree passed against the office bearers of the society cannot be up held as the decree against them in their personal capacity.”

Arrears of sales tax due from a society registered under the Societies Registration Act could not be recovered personally from an ex-president of the society.[323] Merely because of a person having been its president for some time will not be liable for payment of the dues of a Co-Operative Society.[324]

A company has a legal personality of its own, distinct from its members, and, therefore, in the absence of a contract, or a statutory provision, making the director personally liable for the dues of the company, he cannot be proceeded against for realisation of those dues.[325]

 In K. Paramasivam Pillai Vs. Board of Revenue,[326] the Madras High Court held that sales tax assessed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, on a canteen attached to a recreation club of members of the gazetted and non-gazetted staff of the Tirunelveli Collectorate was not realisable personally from the honorary secretary of the canteen, since the liability was not personal to him.

In Nalin Behari Roy Vs. Bisweswar Bhattacharjya[327] it is observed that for the mere fact that the society was not a registered one, it would not entitle a person to recover the loans from the office bearer, personally.

Liability of Directors and Trustees on Accout of Ultra Vires Acts

In re: Bennett (1892),[328] the Articles of Association of the company provided that no dividend or bonus should be payable except out of profits. No profits were made by the company; but the directors paid interest to the shareholders out of the capital of the company. The Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the court of the first instance, held that the payment of interest out of the capital was ultra vires. Lindley, L.J. observed:

• “As soon as the conclusion is arrived at that the company’s money has been applied by the directors for purposes which the company cannot sanction, it follows that the directors are liable to replace the money, however honestly they may have acted.”[329]

71. Liability of Director Board Members u/s 138, N.I. Act

See Chapter: Management of Societies and Clubs.

72. Granting Temporary Injunction

Stultifying the functioning of the associations and its governing body, normally courts will not grant temporary injunctions. The courts will always consider the balance of convenience in a pragmatic way and probe whether granting temporary injunction prejudicial and detrimental to the interests of the institution.[330]

73. Effect of Failure to File Documents U/S 4 or of Becoming Defunct

Non-renewal does not infer, society is defunct

Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[331] In the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers. The courts cannot set aside such elections on the sole ground that certain statutory provisions have not been complied with by it.[332]

74. Court’s Jurisdiction in Expulsion of a Member from a Political Party

See Chapter: Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

75. Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

See Chapter: Expulsion of Members & Removal of Office-Bearers

76. No Civil Suit Where Statutory Authorities Have Jurisdiction

The dismissal of the suit was upheld by our Apex Court in Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai[333] holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction where bar is imposed in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities (under BPT Act) have the requisite jurisdiction. It is observed that in such a case, if only a question arises which is outside the purview of the Act or in relation to a matter unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. It is also pointed out in this decision that a society created under a statute must conform to its provisions and the courts would interfere in case of its violation.[334]

77. Plea of Malafide or Fraud Requires Strict Proof

The Supreme Court in JN Chaudhary Vs. State of Hariyana, [335]reiterated the law and held that where a collective decision was taken by majority of the General Body of a Co-operative Society, then the same could not be ignored and bypassed at the instance of handful of members. When the decision was taken by majority in terms of the Rule, it could not be overruled by minority even on the ground of malafide or fraud unless it was established through strict proof of evidence. It was further observed that it was a well known dictum that mala fide was always easy to allege but difficult to prove as the same cannot be held as proved relying on assumption, speculation and suspicion.

With respect to ‘malafides’ the Supreme Court has laid down as follows in Ratnagiri Gas and Power Vs. RDS Projects[336]:

•  “The law casts a heavy burden on the person alleging malafides to prove the same on the basis of facts that are either admitted or satisfactorily established and/or logical inferences deductible from the same. This is particularly so when the petitioner alleges malice in fact in which event it is obligatory for the person making any such allegation to furnish particulars that would prove malafides on the part of the decision maker. Vague and general allegations unsupported by the requisite particulars do not provide a sound basis for the Court to conduct an inquiry into their veracity. As and when allegations of malafides are made, the persons against whom the same are levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings to enable them to answer the charge. In absence of the person concerned as a party in his/her individual capacity it will neither be fair nor proper to record a finding that malice in fact had vitiated the action taken by the authority concerned. A judicial pronouncement declaring an action to be malafide is a serious indictment of the person concerned that can lead to adverse civil consequences against him. Courts have, therefore, to be slow in drawing conclusions when it comes to holding allegations of malafides to be proved and only in cases where based on the material placed before the Court or facts that are admitted leading to inevitable inferences supporting the charge of mala fides that the Court should record a finding in the process ensuring that while it does so, it also bars the person who was likely to be affected by such a finding. …… Between `malice in fact’ and `malice in law’ there is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any system of jurisprudence. The person who inflicts a wrong or in injury upon any person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind. He is taken to know the flaw and can only act within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of `malice in law’, although, so far as the state of his mind was concerned he acted ignorantly, and in that sense innocently. `Malice in fact’ is a different thing. It means an actual malicious intention on the part of the person who has done the wrongful act.
• …… It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. Mala fide exercise of power does not imply any moral turpitude. It means exercise of statutory power for “purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended. “ It means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority to disregard the rights of others, where intent is manifested by its injurious acts. Passing an order for unauthorised purpose constitutes malice in law. (See: Addl. Distt. Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs. Shivkant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207 : Union of India thr. Govt. of Pandicherry Vs. V. Ramakrishnan, (2005) 8 SCC 394 :(AIR 2005 SC 4295; 2005 AIR SCW 5147); and Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, AIR 2010 SC 3745).”

78. Tribunals are not Bound by Technical Rules

Domestic tribunals are not bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure as are applicable to Courts means not only on direct evidence but also on probabilities and circumstantial evidence. There is no scope for importing the principles of criminal trial while considering the probative value of probabilities and circumstantial evidence by a domestic tribunal.The enquiry held by domestic tribunals must be fair and the delinquent must be given adequate opportunity to defend themselves and holding such enquiries, the tribunal must follow the rules of natural justice. If not supported by any evidence, the Court may be justified to quash the order or open to the High Court to interfere with the order of the quasi judicial authority. [337] A domestic tribunal is free to evolve its own procedure.[338]

79. Complaint only if personally affected:

Courts will entertain a complaint on election-matter, and interfere, only if the person who complaints is personally affected.[339] He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote.

Locus Standi of an Individual Member to Challenge Election

In Tej Bahadur vs Shri Narendra Modi, AIR 2021 SC 217,  the Apex Court considered the question of the validity of the appellant’s nomination since that had a direct bearing on the question whether he had a right to question the election. After finding that the appellant was not a duly nominated candidate, it is held as under:

• “We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, V.R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for this Court held that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing.”

A member of a Society does not have the right to challenge Election unless his rights are personally affected by the impugned action. An individual member cannot challenge an order finalising a voter list. He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote. (Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99.   Referred to: Ram Pyare Lal Vs. State of U.P. 2015-3 ADJ 577;  Also See: Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262)

The Apex Court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh, AIR 1980 SC 1612:

• A voter could challenge the election.
• Merely because he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There is no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case.
• A voter could come to the High Court even earlier before the election was held. But merely because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any laches and must be non-suited only on that account.

In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba Inter College, Varanasi Vs. Regional Committee, Pancham Mandal (2007-7 ADJ 414; 2007-3 All LR 14; MANU/UP/2165/2007)  it was held that a group of members of the General Body (and not by a rival committee of management) had no locus standi to challenge the result of the elections (Referred to in Satya Narain Tripathi Vs. State of U P: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 ALLLR 698).

There were divergent views, in UP, on the right of an individual member to file a writ petition. In certain cases (Dr. P.P. Rastogi v. Meerut University, Meerut, 1997-1 UPLBEC 415; Smt. Vimla Devi v. The Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, 1997-3 ESC 1807; Bhagwan Kaushik v. State of U.P., 2006-2 UPLBEC 1372; Amanullah Khan v. State of U.P. , 2009-75 All LR 29) it was held that an individual member had no right to file the writ petition. The other set of decisions (Kamla Kant Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008-7 ADJ 601; Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut, 1999-1 UPLBEC 170; Ratan Kumar Solanki v. State of U.P., 2010-1 ADJ 262) observed that the writ petition could be maintained, subject to the existence of efficacious alternative remedy, when there was a breach of right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which was a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, or there was a breach of the Statute. Both the divergent views had been considered by a Division Bench in Committee of Management, Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar v. State of U.P. (2011-2 ADJ 65). The Division Bench observed as under:

•  “There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management….. It is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of Committee of Management depends on facts of each case…..” (See: Laxman Singh Vs. State of UP, ADJ 2014-9 242, AWC 2014-5 4382, LBESR 2014-3 415)

80. Manner of Holding the Election, Within Powers of the Associations:

The associations and clubs are within their powers to decide their Bye laws and Rules, under which they may have different kinds of the posts prescribing different kinds of election process, and the manner of holding the election.[340]

81. General Law of Contracts and Companies Act

Bye laws bind its members as a contract.[341] In TAK Mohideen Pichai Taraganar Vs. Tinnevelly Mills Co.[342] it was held that the general right of suit cannot be considered to have been taken away merely because of some ‘regulatory’ provisions.

 Relying on this decision, it is held in Avanthi Explosives P. Ltd. Vs. Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupathi[343] that the general law of contracts is the basis of the rights of parties and that the Companies Act merely ‘regulates’ these rights and does not create any new right or remedy. Unless there is an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court, by words express or implied, the suit is maintainable, and no such exclusion has been held existing by the courts in respect of individual rights.

82. Validity of Election: Jurisdiction with Courts; Not with Registrar.

            Though Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 empowers the Registrar, either of his own motion or on the Application of a majority of the members of the committee of management or on the Application, of not less than one third of the members of the Society to hold an enquiry into the Constitution, working and financial condition of a registered Society, it is held in S. Thamil Arasan President of Chennai Vyasarpadi Nadar Nagar Progressive Association Chennai Vs. R. Narayanan[344] that the Registrar is not competent to enquire into the validity of an election, while performing a mere ministerial function; the jurisdiction is vested with the Courts.

83. If Violation of Bye laws Court Sets Right the Illegalities

In V. Arulkumar Vs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association[345] it is held that the court has to necessarily see as to whether the conduct of elections was in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association. If the same was in total violation of the Bye laws of the Association the court was certainly empowered to set right the illegalities and put the election process in motion to be performed in accordance with the Bye laws. Therefore it was held that the suit was maintainable.

84. In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

In K.P. Muhammed Vs. M. Abdurahiman[346] both sides did not want an election to be conducted; and both were aiming at the administration or control of the Society, and for that purpose they were not so eager or anxious to have an election conducted in the manner suggested by the Court. The Kerala High Court, in order to resolve stalemate, ordered election and appointed Receivers to manage its affairs.

85. Ordinarily, Courts will not Interfere with Election Process

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik, (2011) 13 SCC 774,  our Apex Court held:

“Since 1952 this Court has authoritatively laid down that once election process has started the courts should not ordinarily interferewith the said process by way of granting injunction.”

In Jagan Nath Vs. Jaswant Singh, (1954) SCR 892 (Also See: Jayanta Samal Vs. Kulamani Behera: 2004 13 SCC 552), it is observed: 

“… It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law.”

Remedies with respect to the disputes as to elections will have to be sought for after elections are over. This time-honoured principle is emphasised in the following decisions also.

• Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath, AIR  2016 SC 1094.
• N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64
• Nanhoo Mal and Others Vs. Hira Mal, (1976) 3 SCC 211
• Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commr., AIR 1978 SC 851.
• Boddula Krishnaiah Vs. State Elec. Commissioner, A.P., AIR 1996 SC 1595
• Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 3982; Followed in Ahmednagar Zilla SDV P Sangh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 1 SCC 133.   
• Anugrah Narain Singh Vs. State of U.P., (1996) 6 SCC 303
• Election Commissioner of India Vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 2000 SC 2977
• Abdulla Khan Vs. State of Orissa, 2008 (Supp.) O.L.R. 251
• Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa, 2015-3 Ker LT 299.
• Medical Council of India Vs. Regar/Returning Officer, TN, AIR 2014 Mad 34
• Avtar Singh Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Mgmnt. Comtee, (2006) 8 SCC 487. 
• C. Subrahmanyam Vs. K. Ramanjaneyullu, (1998) 8 SCC 703.
• Ashok Kumar Jain Vs. Neetu Kathoria, (2004) 12 SCC 73 (Also see: Harcharan Singh Vs. Mohinder Singh: AIR 1968  SC 1500; Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner: AIR 1978  SC 851; Jyoti Basu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR  1982  SC  983; Harikrishna Lal Vs. Bau Lal Marandi: 2003-8 SCC 613; Shyamdeo Pd. Singh Vs. Naval Kishore Yadav: 2000-8 SCC 46; Election Commission of India Vs. Ashok Kumar : AIR 2000 SC 2977).
• K.K. Shrivastava Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, AIR 1977 SC 1703.

It is observed in Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath (AIR  2016 SC 1094: Referred: Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer: AIR 1952 SC 64;  Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2001 (8) SCC 509; Nanhoo Mal and others Vs. Hira Mal: 1976 (3) SCC 211) while considering election to Dental Council of India under Section 3 (a) of the Dentists Act, 1948:

“So far as the issue with regard to eligibility of Respondent no.1 for contesting the election is concerned, though prima facie it appears that Respondent No.1 could contest the election, we do not propose to go into the said issue because, in our opinion, as per the settled law, the High Court should not have interfered with the election after the process of election had commenced. The judgments referred to herein above clearly show the settled position of law to the effect that whenever the process of election starts, normally courts should not interfere with the process of election for the simple reason that if the process of election is interfered with by the courts, possibly no election would be completed without court ‘s order. Very often, for frivolous reasons candidates or others approach the courts and by virtue of interim orders passed by courts, the election is delayed or cancelled and in such a case the basic purpose of having election and getting an elected body to run the administration is frustrated. For the aforestated reasons, this Court has taken a view that all disputes with regard to election should be dealt with only after completion of the election.”

In K.K. Shrivastava Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, AIR 1977 SC 1703, with respect to election to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Advocates Act our Apex Court held:

“Where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms.” See also: Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa:  2015-3 Ker LT 299.

86. Standard of Proof in Election Matters:

The election of a returned candidate will not be set aside unless there are cogent and convincing reasons (Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. Ashutosh Agnihotri: AIR 2011 SC 760). In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. The court proceedings on election disputes are akin to criminal proceedings (Md. Majid Hussain Vs. Md. Aqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: Tanaji Ramchandra Nimhan Vs. Swati Vinayak Nimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218). It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, 1995-5 SCC 347, that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the standard of proof required is, generally speaking, that in a criminal trial (Also see: Md. Majid Hussain Vs. Md Aqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, Tanaji Ramchandra Nimhan Vs. Swati Vinayak Nimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218). The onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

It is pointed out in Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal, [1966]3 SCR 623 (Referred to in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879), that the rules applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases would not apply to civil cases. The ordinary rules governing civil cases of balance of probabilities will continue to apply. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election.

Courts Sparingly Exercise Jurisdiction – Must be cogent and compelling grounds.

The decision taken by the concerned authority during the course of election is not open to judicial review except on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power (Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194). Courts will not interfere with discharging duties by the elected office bearers of an organisation, without cogent and compelling grounds. A simple breach of any Rule will not give rise to a cause of action for any member unless there is manifest illegality, or act or omission that goes to the root of the matter.  In other words, the alleged violation should be so grave that it could not be condoned by the general body (See: A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: A. I. R. 1941 Bom. 312; Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;   Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516 ; NagappaVs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831).

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[1]      MP Electricity Board, Jabalpur Vs. M/s. Vijaya Timber: AIR 1997 SC 2364.

[2]      Capt. D.K. Giri Vs. Secunderabad Club: AIR 2018 AP 48; Arunachal Pradesh Congs. Committee Vs. KalikhoPul: AIR 2015 Gauhati 179.

[3]      TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144

[4]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458; Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commr. of IT, Kolhapur: AIR 2004 SC 4716; Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973. Zoroastrian Co-op. Hsing. Society Ltd. Vs. Dist. Regr, Co-op. Societies: AIR 2005 SC 2306; State Bank of India Staff Association Vs. Mohindra Bhattacharyya:  AIR 1991 Cal 378; BCCI Vs. Netaji Cricket Club: AIR 2005 SC 592.

[5]      C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa: 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar 14: Thenappa Chattier Vs. Kuruppan Chhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915. Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastotate: AIR 2007 SC 1337

[6]      A P Dairy Development Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298; DharamDuttVs. Union of India: AIR 2004 SC 1295.

[7]      AIR 1940 Mad 902.

[8]    (2011) 13 SCC 774

[9]      Madras Gymkhana Club Vs. KC Sukumar: 2010-1 CTC 199.

[10]    A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan: 2000 (7) SCC 695: AIR 2000 SC 3032; Superintending Engineer Periyar Electricity Distribution Circle Erode Vs. Pavathal: 2002-2 CTC 544; 2002-1 Mad LJ 515. G. Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP Arya Vysya Mahasabha  Vs. Mutyapu Sudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227; Umesh Shivappa Ambi Vs. Angadi Shekara Basappa: (1998) 4 SCC 529: AIR 1999 SC 1566; Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (2006) 8 SCC 487; Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh: AIR  2006 SC 52; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer1952 SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64

[11]    Ujjal TalukdarVs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224. Rashmi Bala Saxena Vs. Jiwaji University Gwalior: AIR  1989 MP 181

[12]    Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774

[13]    G. Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP Arya Vysya Mahasabha  Vs. Mutyapu Sudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227.

[14]    V.VirupakshappaVsDangadiHanumanthappa: AIR 1978  Kar 131

[15]    AIR 1963 SC 1144.             

[16]    See also: Capt. DK Giri Vs. Secunderabad Club: AIR 2018 AP 48; M. Sekar Vs. The Tamil Nadu State Council of the CPI: 2015-7 MLJ 689.

[17]    Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Asson. of Bihar: AIR  2015 SC 3194;         D. Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Educational Society : AIR 2007 SC 1794

[18]   SM Zaheer Alam Teachers Training College Vs. State of Bihar: AIR  2015 Pat 124

[19]   2009-5 BCR 776

[20]   See Notes under: ‘Special Forum: Limited Jurisdiction’

[21]    Maharashtra State Board of S and H Secondary Edn. Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879;         Ravipreet Singh Vs. National Rifle Association of India: ILR 2013-23 Dlh 743.

[22]    Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra: AIR 1959 All 598; Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay; AIR 1946 Bom 516 ; Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831.

[23]    Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and H S Edn Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879, (agreed with ratio in Ghazanfar Rashid Vs. Board, H.S. & I. Edn., U.P: AIR 1970 All 209)

[24]    Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. AshutoshAgnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760. Referred to in:Ashok Vs. Rajendra Bhausaheb Mulak: 2012-12 SCC 27;  Ravinder Kumar Rawal Vs. V.K. Sood: ILR 2011-2  P&H 704.See also: Jagan NathVs. Jaswant Singh (1954) SCR 892. Jayanta Samal Vs. Kulamani Behera: 2004-13 SCC 552

[25]    State of West Bengal Vs. A.K. Shaw: AIR 1990 SC 2205: Relied on in Dharamraj Vs. Chhitan: 2006 12 SCC 349

[26]    Sterling Computers Limited Vs. M/s. M & N Publications: [(1993) 1 SCC 445]; Administrative Law, Prof. Wade Referred to. Union of India Vs. SB Vohra: AIR 2004 SC 1402 Mukunda Bore Vs. Bangshidhar Buragoha: AIR 1980 SC 1524.

[27]    Mukunda Bore Vs. Bangshidhar Buragohain: AIR 1980 SC 1524; Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan 1964 (5) SCR 64

[28]    State of West Bengal Vs. A.K. Shaw :AIR 1990 SC 2205

[29]    Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police: AIR 1999 SC 677

[30]    Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. Radhakrishna Moorthy: (1995) 1 SCC 332.

[31]    Transport Commissioner, Madras Vs. A. Radhakrishna Moorthy: (1995) 1 SCC 332.

[32]    TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: AIR 1963 SC 1144; Ujjal Talukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley AIR 1969 Cal 224; All India Hockey Federation Vs. Indian Olympic Association, 1994 55 DLT 607; Ashok Kumar Vs. SBI Officers Association, 2013-201 DLT 433. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and HS Edn. Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879

[33]    ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598; Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516 ; Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831. N Thippanna Vs. State of Karnataka: 1982-2 Kant LJ 313; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828;Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeeth Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612; Relied on in N Thippanna Vs. State of Karnataka:1982-2 Kant LJ 313; Devassy Vs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446.

[34]    Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India [(2006) 2 SCC 1; See also: UjjalTalukdarVs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224.  All Saints High School Hyderabad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh: AIR  1980 SC 1042; See as to labour dispute: Management of Travancore Knitting Co Tiruppur Coimbatore Vs. K Muthuswamy: AIR  1962 Mad 398; Regional Manager, UPSRTC., Etawah Vs. HotiLal AIR 2003 SC 1462; Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank Vs. Munna Lal Jain AIR 2005 SC 584.

[35]    Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police: AIR 1999 SC 677

[36]    Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. Radhakrishna Moorthy: (1995) 1 SCC 332.

[37]    AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312

[38]    Mukunda Bore Vs. Bangshidhar Buragohain AIR 1980 SC 1524

[39]    Miller Vs. Minister of Pensions: [1947] All E L R 372 (Denning J.) Referred to in Maharashtra State Board Secondary and H S Edn Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879 . Also see: Ravipreet Singh Vs. National Rifle Association of India: ILR 2013-23 Dlh 743

[40]    Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police: AIR 1999 SC 677

[41]    State of West Bengal Vs. A.K. Shaw: AIR 1990 SC 2205

[42]    Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police: AIR 1999 SC 677

[43]    K.P. Muhammed Vs. M. Abdurahiman:  LAWS (KER)-2013-3-137

[44]    V. Arulkumar Vs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association: 2015-5 CTC 17

[45]    Rotopacking Materials Industry Vs. Ravider Kumar Chopra: 2003(6) BCR 6; Sm. Parul Bala Roy Vs. Srinibash Chowmal: AIR 1952 Cal 364; Arun Kumar MitraSekh Sajahan Vs. Gorachand Saheb Sekh: AIR 2005 Cal 178.

[46]    AIR 1956 SC 213

[47]    TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144. Kalyan Kumar Dutta Gupta Vs. B.M. Verma: AIR 1995 Cal. 140 (DB); Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India: ILR 2009-19 Dlh 216; Lila Parulekar Vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.: AIR 2005 SC 4074;  Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439; Sri Bhaben Chandra Pegu Vs. The State of Assam:1998 (1) GLR 38; UjjalTalukdarVs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224. Mukunda Bore Vs. Bangshidhar Buragohain: AIR 1980 SC 1524.

[48]    Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay AIR 1946 Bom 516, ShridharMisra Vs. JaichandraVidyalankar AIR 1959 All 598 ; NagappaChettiar Vs. The Madras Race Club AIR 1951 Mad 831; Sardar Kanwaldeep Singh Vs. AR Firms, Societies and Chits, Faizabad: AIR 1994 All 161; S. Krishnaswamy Vs. South India Film Chamber of Commerce:  AIR 1969 Mad 42; AS Krishnan Vs.M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312. Sri Bhaben Chandra Pegu Vs. The State of Assam [1998 (1) GLR 38]; Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. AR Co-operative Societies: AIR 1962 All 439.

[49]    Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs.A R Co-op Societies: AIR1962 All 439.

[50]    Sri Bhaben Chandra Pegu Vs. The State of Assam:1998 (1) GLR 38. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and HS Edn. Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879

[51]    Kalyan Kumar Dutta Gupta Vs. B.M. Verma: AIR 1995 Cal. 140 (DB). Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India: ILR 2009-19 Dlh 216.

[52]    Myurdhwaj Co-op. Group Hous. Society Vs. PO, Delhi Co-op. Tribunal: AIR 1998 SC 2410.         

[53]    TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: AIR 1963 SC 1144; UjjalTalukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley AIR 1969 Cal 224; All India Hockey Federation Vs. Indian Olympic Association, 1994 55 DLT 607; Ashok Kumar Vs. SBI Officers Association, 2013-201 DLT 433. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and HS Edn. Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879

[54]    NK Mohapatra Vs. State: AIR  1994Ori 301.

[55]    CDS Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd. Vs. BPL Communication: (2004) 121 Com Cas 374;  Marikar Motors Vs. M.I. Ravikumar : [1982] 52 Com Cas 362 (Ker); Pradip Kumar Sarkar Vs. Luxmi Tea Co. Ltd. [1990] 67 Com Cas 491 (Cal.); The appeal from this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court in Luxmi Tea Co. Ltd. Vs. Pradip Kumar Sarkar, [1990] 67 Com Cas 518 (SC); Premvati Vs Bhagwati Devi, ILR 2007-16 Dlh 1514.

[56]    TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: AIR 1963 SC 1144; Myurdhwaj Co-op. Group Housing Society Vs. Presiding Officer: AIR  1998 SC 2410; Ujjal Talukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley AIR 1969 Cal 224; All India Hockey Federation Vs. Indian Olympic Association, 1994-55 DLT 607; Ashok Kumar Vs. SBI Officers Association, 2013-201 DLT 433.

[57]    Myurdhwaj Co-op. Group Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer:  AIR 1998 SC 2410.

[58]    Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India: AIR  2006 SC 980 (Wednesbury-Principle considered).Dharamraj Vs. Chhitan: 2006 -12 SCC 349; Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police: AIR 1999 SC 677; Workmen of Firestone Tyre Rubber Co  Vs. Management,Sheikh: AIR 1973 SC 1227;

[59]    PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma:  AIR 1995 SC 2001

[60]    PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma:  AIR 1995 SC 2001

[61]    UjjalTalukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224; Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, Tagore Law Lectures: Page: 411.

[62]    Alty Vs. Farrell: (1896) 1 QB 638; Kruse Vs. Johnson: (1898) 2 QB 91, Scott Vs. Pilliner: (1904) 2 KB 855, Repton School Governors Vs. Repton Rural District Council: (1918) 2 KB 133; Chester Vs. Bateson: (1920) 1 KB 829; Attorney General Vs. Denhy: 1925 Ch 596: All referred to in: Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[63]    Transport Commissioner, Madras Vs. A. RadhakrishnaMoorthy: (1995) 1 SCC 332; Dharamraj Vs. Chhitan: 2006 -12 SCC 349. Workmen of Firestone Tyre Rubber Co  Vs. Management:Sheikh: AIR 1973 SC 1227

[64]    DharamrajVs.Chhitan: 2006 -12 SCC 349. Workmen of Firestone Tyre Rubber Co  Vs. Management:Sheikh: AIR 1973 SC 1227

[65]    Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. RadhakrishnaMoorthy (1995) 1 SCC 332

[66]    Gaurav A Jain Vs. MP University of Agriculture and Technology: AIR  2004 Raj 247

[67]    UjjalTalukdarVs.Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224.

[68]    Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 P & H 21; State of Haryana Vs. Ram Chander: AIR 1976 P & H 381; Sarup Singh Vs. State of Punjab: 1990-1 LLJ 285. Board of High School and Intermediate Edn. Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta: AIR 1962 SC 1110 (Local Government Board Vs. Alridge, 1915 AC 120 referred to); Ramesh Kapur Vs. Punjab University, AIR 1965 Punj 120; TriambakPatiTripathi Vs. The Board of H S and Intermediate Edn.:  AIR 1973 All 1; BansiLal Gera Vs. University Of Delhi: 1968-4 DLT 353; University of Madras Vs. Nagalingam : AIR 1965 Mad 107. See as to statutory Tribunal: AnnamalaiVs. R. DoraiswamyMudaliar: 1982 ACJ 371. Sasidharan Vs. State of Kerala: 1980 KerLT  671.

[69]    AIR 1969 Cal 224

[70]    Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, Tagore Law Lectures: Page: 411.

[71]    AIR  2006 SC 980

[72]    Associated Provincial Picture Houses Vs. WednesburyCorpn. per Lord Greene, MR: (1948) 1 KB 223

[73]    R.  Prakasam Vs. SreeNarayana Dharma ParipalanaYogam [1980] 50 Com Cas 611 (Ker); Avanthi Explosives Vs. Principal Sub. Judge Tirupathi 1987- 62 Comp. Cases 301.

[74]    (1995) 5 SCC 482; AC Muthiah Vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India: (2011) 6 SCC 617; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD  Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774.

[75]    ILR 1997 Kar 3127

[76]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585.

[77]    Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh (2007-4 Raj LW 3547). See also: Lila Parulekar Vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.: (2005) 11 SCC 73: AIR 2005 SC 4074;  Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs. Addl. Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439.

[78]    Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.

[79]    TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144; Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. Phiroz H. Anita, AIR 1939 Bom 35;  Lennox Arthur Patrick O Reilly  Vs. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens, AIR 1949 PC 313; JN ChaudharyVs. State of Haryana: (2014) 11 SCC 249.

[80]    Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Registrar of Societies: ILR 2012-22 Del 1031; GirishMulchand Mehta Vs. Mahesh S. Mehta. 2010 (1) Bom. C.R 31

[81]    (2005) 5 SCC 632: AIR 2005 SC 2306. Same view in State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society: AIR 1997 SC 1413.

[82]    (1995) 2 SCC 754

[83]    AIR 1960 All 205

[84]    Quoted in Kanwal Krishen Dhar Vs. University of J & K: AIR  1969  J & K 108. Rabindra Nath Ghosal Vs. University of Calcutta:  AIR  1992 Cal 207; Shamsuddin Ahmed Vs. Charu Chandra Biswas: AIR 1934 Cal 621;  Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Vs. Dharam Singh: AIR 1981 Del  157.

[85]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvanagar Sahakari Griha (2000) 9 SCC 295;         Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[86]    Manav CGHS Limited Vs. PO Delhi Cooperation Tribunal: 2002-100 DLT 428 

[87]    Manav CGHS Limited Vs. PO Delhi Cooperation Tribunal: 2002-100 DLT 428 

[88]    Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC  1144.

[89]    Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Vs. A. NagesnwaraRao: AIR 1956 SC 213.

[90]    AIR 1959 All 598.

[91]    K K Jain Vs. Federation of Indian Export Organisations: AIR  2002 Del 408; GegongApang Vs. SanjoyTassar: AIR  2001 Gau 1; SardarKanwaldeep Singh Vs. Asst Registrar Firms, Faizabad: AIR 1994 All 161.

[92]    Thalapalam Service Co Operative Ltd Vs. Union of India: AIR 2010 Ker  6. Appeal Judgment: Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 (16) SCC 82; 2013 AIR (SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683; Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar: AIR 2015 SC 3194; Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union Vs. Delhi Admn: AIR  1992 SC 789. ChamanLal Vs. State of Punjab: AIR  2014 SC 3640; A C   Vs. Board of Control for Cricket In India: 2011 AIR (SCW)  3770; KendriyaVidyalayaSangathan Vs. LV Subramanyeswara:  2007 AIR (SCW)  3228; Vipulbhai M. ChaudharyVs. Gujarat Coop. Milk Marketing Federation: AIR 2015 SC 1960.

[93]    Renu Vs. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari : AIR 2014 SC 2175

[94]    T.M. Sampath Vs. Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources: 2015 AIR-SCW 998; Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I Vs. Union of India: AIR 2013 (SC-CIV) 2571)

[95]    Manav CGHS Limited Vs. PO Delhi Cooperation Tribunal: 2002-100 DLT 428.  

[96]    State of Maharashtra Vs. KarvanagarSahakariGriha (2000) 9 SCC 295; Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[97]    The Hindi SahityaSammelanVs.Jagdish Swamp, AIR 1971 SC 966.

[98]    Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union Vs. Tata Memorial Centre: AIR 2010 SC 2943; Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 (16) SCC 82: 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR(SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683.  Palam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 (16) SCC 82: 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR(SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683.

[99]    Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union Vs. Tata Memorial Centre: AIR 2010 SC 2943

[100]   Parekh SaloneeKishorbhai Minor Vs. Gujarat Secondary Edn. Board: AIR  1998Guj 55.

[101]   Keshab Chandra Vs. Inspector of Schools AIR 1953 All 623:  Ranvir Singh Vs. Dist Inspector of Schools Allahabad AIR 1954 All 636

[102]   Keshab Chandra Vs. Inspector of Schools, AIR 1953 All 623;

Ranvir Singh Vs. Dist Inspector of Schools Allahabad: AIR 1954 All 636.

[103]   KowthaSuryanarayanaRao Vs. PatibandlaSubrahmanyam: AIR 1940 Mad 902.

[104]   Keshab Chandra Vs. Inspector of Schools, AIR 1953 All 623

Ranvir Singh Vs. Dist Inspector of Schools Allahabad: AIR 1954 All 636

Gajadhar Prasad Misra Vs. VC of The University of Allahabad: AIR 1966 All 477

Board of High School and Intermediate Edn. Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110

P Senthil Vs. Principal: 2003 Mad 326.

[105]   U.P. Financial Corporation VsNaini Oxygen and Acetylene Gas: (1995) 2 SCC 754

[106]   AIR  1979 SC 1247

[107]   Ravipreet Singh Vs. National Rifle Association of India: ILR 2013-23 Dlh 743. Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co-op. Societies [(2005) 5 SCC 632] 

        State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Co-op. Society AIR 1997  SC  1413. Ravipreet Singh Vs. National Rifle Association of India: ILR 2013-23 Dlh 743.

[108]   Jhajharia Bros. Vs. Sholapur S. W. Co. : AIR 1941 Cal 174;

Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India : ILR 2009-19 Dlh216;

Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439;

Rajeev SaumitraVs. Neetu Singh: 2016-198 Comp Cases 359.

[109]   SooraramPratap Reddy Vs. District Collector :(2008) 9 SCC 552.

[110]   State of H.P.  Vs. Rajesh ChanderSood: 2016-9 JT 439;

Commissioner of Income Tax Kerala Vs. L W Russel: AIR 1965 SC 49.

[111]   K.P. Haridas  Vs.  K. Vijayan: LAWS(KER) 2014-11-176

[112]   Miheer H. Mafatlal Vs. Mafatlal Industries Ltd.: AIR 1997  SC 506

[113]   KowthaSuryanarayanaRao Vs. PatibandlaSubrahmanyam: AIR 1940 Mad  902

[114]   AIR 1995 SC 2001

[115]   Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547;

Lila Parulekar Vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.: (2005) 11 SCC 73: AIR 2005 SC 4074; 

Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439.

[116]   Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547.

[117]   Lalit Kumar Modi Vs. Board of Control for Cricket:  2011 AIR-SCW 5919: 2011-10 SCC 106

[118]   Lalit Kumar Modi Vs. Board of Control for Cricket:  2011 AIR-SCW 5919: 2011-10 SCC 106

[119]   TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum: 1963 AIR SC 1144

[120]   Ranvir Singh Vs. Dist Inspector of Schools Allahabad: AIR 1954 All 636.

[121]   A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298;

DharamDuttVs. Union of India: (2004) 1 SCC 712: AIR 2004 SC 1295.

KowthaSuryanarayanaRao Vs. PatibandlaSubrahmanyam: AIR 1940 Mad 902; 

Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. Dist. Regtr. Co-op. Societies:  AIR 2005 SC 2306;

State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd: AIR 1997  SC  1413;

Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[122]   See: Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR  1998 Ker 332;

        Government of NCT of Delhi Vs. Union of India: 2018 8 SCC 501.

[123]   V.VirupakshappaVsDangadiHanumanthappa: AIR 1978  Kar 131

[124]   Khetan Industries Private Limited Vs. ManjuRavindrapasadKhetan: AIR  1995 Bom 43

[125]   Madras Gymkhana Club Vs. KC Sukumar: 2010-1 CTC 199.

[126]   See: A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan: 2000 (7) SCC 695: AIR 2000 SC 3032; Supntdg. Engineer Periyar Electricity Vs. Pavathal: 2002-2 CTC 544; 2002-1 Mad LJ 515.

G. BalaSubrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264;

A.P. AryaVysyaMahasabha  Vs. MutyapuSudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227;

UmeshShivappaAmbi Vs. AngadiShekaraBasappa: (1998) 4 SCC 529: AIR 1999 SC 1566;

Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (2006) 8 SCC 487;

Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;

NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer1952 SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64

[127]   Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath AIR  2016 SC 1094

        S.T. Muthusami Vs. K. Natarajan AIR 1988 SC 616

        Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh [(2005) 8 SCC 383: AIR  2006 SC 52].

[128]   Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774

UjjalTalukdarVs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224.

RashmiBalaSaxena Vs. Jiwaji University Gwalior: AIR  1989 MP 181;

Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. Phiroz H. Anita; AIR 1939 Bom 35;

        Lennox Arthur Patrick O’ Reilly Vs. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens: AIR 1949 PC 313.

[129]   G. BalaSubrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264;

        AP AryaVysyaMahasabha  Vs. MutyapuSudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227               

[130]   N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer : AIR 1952 SC 64

        Quoted in Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh GurudwaraManagt.Committee(2006) 8 SCC 487.        

[131]   Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774.

        N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer AIR 1952 SC 64;

        Quoted in Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh GurudwaraManagtComtee. (2006) 8 SCC 487

[132]   UmeshShivappaAmbi Vs. AngadiShekaraBasappa: AIR 1999 SC 1566;

Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (2006) 8 SCC 487.

Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh: AIR  2006 SC 52; 

Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;

NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer1952 SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64

[133]   Gujarat University Vs. N.U. Rajguru:  AIR 1988 SC 66;

See also: Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR 1998 Ker 332;

Ram Shankar Chaudhary Vs. Rama Shankar Singh: 1978 JLJ  401; 

JyotiBasuVs. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983.

[134]   Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. ViswanathAIR  2016 SC 1094.

Ponnuswami vs. Returning Officer: AIR 1952 SC 64; 

ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami (MoingiriMaharaj) SahakariDugdhaUtpadakSanstha vs. State of Maharashtra 2001 (8) SCC 509 and  Nanhoo Mal Vs. Hira Mal and others 1976 (3) SCC 211 referred to.

[135]   Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774.

[136]   AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312

        See also: ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;

        SatyavartSidhantalankarVs.AryaSamaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516 ;

        NagappaVs.Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831.

[137]   See: AS Krishnan Vs. M Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312 T.R.

See also: ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra: AIR 1959 All 598;

TR Bhavani Shankar Joshi Vs. GordhandasJamnadas: AIR 1943 PC 66;

Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Vs. The Union of India: AIR 1973 SC 2389;

Punjabrao Vs. VM Molkar:1974, Mh.L.J. 428;

SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516 ;

Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831.

ShamraoMadhavraoBodhankar Vs. Suresh ShamraoBodhankar: 1986-2 BCR 650.

            TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria: AIR 1963 SC 1144

        Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547

[138]   See: Claude Lila ParulekarVs. Sakal Papers: AIR 2005 SC 4074.

[139]   A.S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312.

[140]   AIR1962 All 439: Shackleton on “Meetings, Law and Practice” quoted.

[141]   AIR 1966 SC 330

[142]   ILR 2007 (1) Ker 10

[143]   Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. AshutoshAgnihotri (AIR 2011 SC 760) Followed in Ravinder Kumar Rawal Vs. V.K. Sood: ILR 2011-2  P&H 704.

[144]   Saheed Sporting Club Vs. Kalyan Ray Choudhury : 2008 CLT Supp 338. AIR 1963 All 518 referred to.

[145] AIR 1962 All 610

[146]   UP State Brassware Corporation Ltd. Vs. UdaiNarainPandey: AIR 2006 SC 586

[147]   Manugobinda Vs. BrajabanduMisra – AIR 1986 Orissa 281

[148]   Lavu Sri Krishna Rao Vs. Dr. MoturiNagendraRao: AIR 2007 A P 25

[149]   Rameshwar Vs. Jot Ram:  AIR 1976 SC 49

[150]   PasupuletiVenkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders:  AIR 1975 SC 1409.

[151] LAWS(KER) 2013 3 137

[152]   AIR 1958 MadhPra 323 (FB)

[153]   47 IndCas 941: 1918 35 MLJ 407.

[154]   2013(4) Ker LT 283

[155]   Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[156]   AIR 2007 SC 1337: 2006-11 SCC 624:  2007  AIR (SCW)  1512

[157]   ILR1993 Kar 2715

[158]   2006-4 AIR Kar R 218: 2006-4 Kant LJ 526    

[159]   Christ Church Mcconaghy School Society, Lucknow Vs. Registrar Firms, Societies And Chits, Lucknow: 2015-5 ADJ 472

[160]   C M Z Musliar Vs. Aboobacker: 1998-1 Ker LT–136: ILR 1998-2 Ker 76

[161]   2003-3 Mad LJ 668.

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs.ManjetiLaxmiKanthaRao: AIR 2000 SC 2220;

PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma:  AIR 1995 SC 2001 relied on.

[162]   Ram Vs. Murlidhar: 2008-2 Kant LJ 141; 2008 AIHC 1391

[163] ILR 2007-16 Dlh 1514

[164] AS NarayanaDeekshituluVs.. State of AP:  (1996) 9 SCC 548; Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[165]   2011 (3) Mh LJ 966.

Referred to: Raja Bira Kishore Deb Vs. The State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1501;

PannalalBansilalPittiVs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 2 SCC 498;

A.S. NarayanaDeekshituluVs. State of A P: (1996) 9 SCC 548.

[166]   AIR 2005 SC 2544;

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; 

RatilalPanachand Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388.

[167]   See Chapter: Expulsion of Members

[168]   AIR 1995 SC 2001

[169]   SardarSyednaTaharSaifuddinSaheb Vs. The State of Bombay, 1962 Supp. 2 SCR 496;

Uqamsingh&Mishramal Vs. Kesrimal  1971(2) SCR 836;

ThiruvenkataRamanujaPeddaJiyyangarluValu Vs. PrathivathiBhayankaramVenkatacharlu: AIR 1947 PC 53;

M. AppadoraiAyyangarVs. P.B. Annanqarachariar. AIR 1939 Mad. 102;

Kattalai Michael Pillai&Ors. Vs. J.M. Barthe, AIR 1917 Mad. 431; 

E.C. Kent Vs. E.E.L. Kent. AIR 1926 Madras 59

Sri SinnaRamanuja Jeer. Vs. Sri RangaRamanujaJeer 1962 (2) SCR 509.

[170]   Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[171]   AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[172]   1874-75 (6) PC 157

[173]   Long Vs. Bishop of Capetown: (1863) 1 Moore PC (NS) 411

[174]   1863 (1) Moore PCC (NS) 411

[175]   ILR 7 Bom 323

[176]   35 Mad LJ 407; Referred to in S. Robert Vs. M. Kanagappan: 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[177]   Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town(1863) 1 Moo. PC(NS) 411;

        Merriman Vs. Williams(1882) L.R.7 A.C.484

[178]   (2003)2 MLJ 254

[179]   ILR 39 Mad. 1056

[180]   Quoted in S Robert Vs. M Kanagappan: 2003-2 Mad LJ 254.

[181]   2016(2) Ker LT 791

[182]   1874-75 (6) PC 157

[183]   Long Vs. Bishop of Capetown: 1863 (1) Moore PCC NS 411

[184]   AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[185]   Ravipreet Singh Vs. National Rifle Association of India: ILR 2013-23 Dlh 743.

[186]   AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[187]   Article 19(1)(c)

[188]   LAWS(KER)-2011-2-223

[189]   JagatNarainVs. Mathura Das AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).

Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad KhetanVs.LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[190]   AIR 1981 SC 2128.

[191]   AIR 1922 Bom 122.

[192]   ILR 2009-19Dlh216

[193]   Starlight Real Estate (Ascot) Mauritius Vs. Jagrati Trade Services: 2016-195 Com Cas 434

[194]   (1843) 67 ER 189; 1843-2 Hare 467

[195]   AIR 1946 Bom 516

[196]   AIR 1959 All 598

[197]   AIR 1951 Mad 831

SardarKanwaldeep Singh Vs. Asst. Regtr. Firms, Societies: AIR 1994 All 161;

S. Krishnaswamy Vs. South India Film Chamber of Commerce:  AIR 1969 Mad 42;

AS Krishnan Vs.M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom 312.

[198]   1998 (1) GLR 38

[199]   See also: Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs. Addl. Regtr. Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439.

[200]   See rulings under company-law: CDS Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd. Vs. BPL Communication Pvt. Ltd. (2004) 121 Com Cas 374; 

Marikar Motors Vs. M.I. Ravikumar : [1982] 52 Comp Cases 362 (Ker);

Pradip Kumar Sarkar Vs. Luxmi Tea Co. Ltd. [1990] 67 Comp Cases 491 (Cal.);

The appeal from this decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court in Luxmi Tea Co. Vs. Pradip Kumar Sarkar, [1990] 67 Comp Cases 518 (SC) 

[201]   AIR 1941 Bom 312

[202]   See: Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs. Addl. Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439

[203]   AIR 1963 SC 1144; See also UjjalTalukdar Vs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224;

All India Wokey s Hockey Federation Vs. Indian Olympic Association: 1994 55 DLT 607; Ashok Kumar Vs. SBI Officers Association: 2013-201 DLT 433.

[204]   (1998) 6 SCC 39                                                          

[205]   AIR 1977 Pj&Hr 21

[206]   AIR 1969 Cal 224; Referred to in  GegongApang Vs. SanjoyTassar: AIR  2001 Gau 1

[207]   Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, Tagore Law Lectures: Page:411.

[208]   Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. Vs. Football Association (1971 Chancery Div. 591)

[209]   AIR 1991 SC 1221.

[210]   (2006) 2 SCC 1: AIR  2006 SC 980.

[211]   Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Vs. WednesburyCorpn. per Lord Greene, M.R. :(1948) 1 KB 223;

See also: Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 11.

[212]   AIR 1963 SC 1144

[213]   See also: All India Hockey Federation Vs. Indian Olympic Association: (1994) 55 DLT 607

Ashok Kumar Vs. SBI Officers Association, (2013) 201 DLT 433.

Meghal Homes Vs. NiwasGirni K KSamiti: AIR   2007 SC 3079;

CaptKailashNath Harsh Vs. D C Patel : AIR 1999 Bom 133.

[214]   AIR  2015 SC 3194.

[215]   Dwarka Prasad Agarwal Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal: AIR 2003 SC  2696

[216]   S.P. Malhotra Vs. Punjab National Bank: AIR 2013 SC 3739; 

Manohar Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2013 SC 681;

Punjab National Bank Vs. KunjBehariMisra: AIR 1998 SC 2713;

Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra : AIR 1999 SC 3734;

State Bank of India Vs. K.P. Narayanan Kutty: AIR 2003 SC 1100;

JA Naiksatam Vs. P and SM, High Court of Bombay: AIR 2005 SC 1218;

P.D. Agrawal Vs. State Bank of India : AIR 2006 SC 2064;

Ranjit Singh Vs. Union of India : AIR 2006 SC 3685;

Canara Bank Vs. ShriDebasis Das : AIR 2003 SC 2041; 

KanwarNutwar Singh Vs. Director of Enforcement: 2010 AIR (SCW) 6427.

[217]   Ex Armymen’s Protection Service Vs. Union of India: AIR 2014 SC 1376;

A.S. Motors Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union Of India:   2013 AIR (SCW) 3830;

MuhammedYunus Khan Vs. State of UP: 2010-10 Scale 2867.      

[218]   U P State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Musai Ram:1999-3 SCC 372.

[219]   AIR 1973  SC 389

[220]   (1978) 1 SCC 405

[221]   AIR 1970 SC 150

[222]   (2009) 12 SCC 40

[223]   1991 AIR-SCW 879

[224]   AIR 1970 All 209

[225]   AIR  1980 SC 1042

[226]   See as to labour dispute: Management of Travancore Knitting Co Tiruppur Coimbatore Vs. K Muthuswamy: AIR  1962 Mad 398;

Regional Manager, U.P.S.R. T.C. Etawah v. HotiLal AIR 2003 SC 1462

DamohPannaSagar Rural Regional Bank Vs. MunnaLal Jain AIR 2005 SC 584;

[227]            AIR 1996 SC 2219.

     Followed in Mohd.SartajVs. State of UP: AIR 2006 SC 3492.

[228]   AS Krishnan Vs. M Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312

T.R. Bhavani Shankar Joshi Vs. GordhandasJamnadas: AIR 1943 PC 66;

Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Vs. The Union of India: AIR 1973 SC 2389;

Punjabrao Vs. VM Molkar1974: Mh.L.J. 428;

ShamraoMadhavraoBodhankar Vs. Suresh Shamrao Bodhankar:1986-2 BCR 650.

[229]   2007-4 Raj LW 3547.

See also: Kania, J., in A.S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom. 312.

[230]   AIR 1941 Bom. 312

[231]   AIR 1962 SC 458

[232]   AIR 2003 SC 3397

[233]   AIR 2010 SC 2943

[234]   2013 AIR (SCW)  5782; (2013) 15  SCC 394

[235]   BCCI Vs. Netaji Cricket Club AIR 2005 SC 592.

[236]   TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, 1963 AIR SC 1144;

        Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. Phiroz H. Anita, AIR 1939 Bom 35; 

        Lennox Arthur Patrick O Reilly  Vs. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens, AIR 1949 PC 313;

        J.N. ChaudharyVs. State of Haryana, (2014) 11 SCC 249.

[237]   Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Registrar of Societies: ILR 2012-22 Del 1031;

        GirishMulchand Mehta Vs. Mahesh S. Mehta. 2010 (1) Bom. C.R 31

[238]   PrasannaVenkitesaRaoVs.SrinivasaRao: AIR 1931 Mad. 12.

[239]   (1920) 1 Ch. 77

[240]   Quoted in Kalinga Tubes Ltd Vs. Shanti Prasad Jain: AIR  1963Ori 189.

[241]   2016-3 KHC 670

[242]   2010-5 GauLJ 294, 2010 4 GauLT 905

[243]   SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516; 

        ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;

CL Joseph Vs. Jos AIR 1965 Ker 68;

Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan AIR 1959 Ker  254. 

[244]   A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: AIR 1941 Bom 312

[245]   NagappaChettiar Vs. Madras Race Club : AIR 1951 Mad 831.

[246]   Rajasthan SRTC Vs. BalMukundBairawa (2009) 4 SCC 299;

Rajasthan SRTC Vs. Krishna Kant (1995) 5 SCC 75;

SantoshPoddarVs. KamalkumarPoddar 1992 (3) Bom.C.R.  310,

Dwarka Prasad Agarwal Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal: AIR 2003 SCC  2696,

CDS Financial Services (Mauritius) Vs. BPL Communication: (2004) 121   Com. Cas  374;

V.N. Bhajekar Vs. K.M. Shinkar (1934) 36 Bom LR  483;

ClaudeLilaParulekar Vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. (2005) 11 SCC  73: AIR 2005 SC 4074;

SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. The AryaSamaj (1945) 48 Bom LR  341;

Sangramsinh P. GaekwadVs. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (2005) 123 Com. Cas. (SC) 566;

Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan AIR 1959 Kerala  254;

Maharaja Exports Vs. Apparels Exports (1986) 60 Com. Cas. 353;

Berar Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. GajananGopalrao Dixit (1972) 42 Bom LR 48;

Sarat Chandra Chakravarti Vs. T. Chandra Chatterjee AIR 1924 Calcutta 982;

Ram Kumar Bhargava Vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 752

[247]   M/s Ammonia Supplies Corpn. Vs. M/s. Modern Plastic Containers AIR 1998 SC 3153 ;

Canara Bank Vs. Nuclear Power Corporation Of India Ltd. 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 81 ;

Suguna Poultry Farm Ltd. Vs. Arul Mariamman Textiles: AIR 2005 Mad 72;

R. Prakasam Vs. SreeNarayana Dharma ParipalanaYogam: 1980 (50) Com. Cas 611;

Khetan Industries Vs. ManjuRavindraprasad AIR 1995 Bombay 43,

LIC Vs. Escorts: (1986) 1 SCC 264,

Kishore Y. Patil Vs. Patel Engineering: AIR 1992 Bom 114,

G.S. Bali Vs. Babulal Jain: 2000 (2) WLN Rajn 13;

R. R. RajendraMenonVs. Cochin Stock Exchange: (1990) 69 Comp. Cases 256.

[248]   AIR 1969 SC 78 ; See also Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs.KamlekarShantaramWadke  (1976) 1 SCC 496: AIR 1975 SC 2238,

Munshi ram Vs.Municipal Committee, Chheharta AIR 1976 SC 1250,

JitendraNathBiswasVs.M/s. Empire of India &Ceylone Tea Co. (1989) 3 SCC 582:  AIR 1990 SC 255 

SaraswathiVs.Lachanna  (1994) 1 SCC 611.

[249] AIR 1975 SC 2238

[250] (1995) 5 SCC 75

[251] (1995) 5 SCC 75 : AIR 1995 SC 1715

[252] Dinesh Kumar Vs. Registrar of Societies: ILR 2011 – 21 Del – 3080.

[253] AIR 1964 SC 1006

[254]   RadhaKishan Vs. Ludhiyana Municipality: AIR 1963 SC 1547; 

Maharaja Exports Vs. Apparels Exports: (1986) 60 Comp. Cases 353 (Delhi);

Dwarka Prasad Agarwal Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal: (2003)117Comp Cas206 (SC);

CDS Mauritius Vs. BPL Communications (2004) 121 CompCas 375.

KavitaTrehanVs.Balsara Hygiene Products: (1994) 5 SCC 380) ;

RajendraMenon Vs.  Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd. (Vol. 69 Com  Cas  256 (Kerala)) ; Dr. T.M. Paul Vs. City Hospital (Pvt.) Limited (Vol.97 Com  Cases  216 (Kerala)) :

South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of MP: AIR 1998 SC 3153

[255]   Ram Kumar Bhargava Vs. Union of India: AIR 1988 SC 752

[256]   Seventh Edition: page 531

[257]   See also: Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. KamlekarShantaramWadke: AIR 1975 SC 2238,

Munshi Ram Vs. Municipal Committee, Chheharta: AIR 1976 SC 1250;

JitendraNathBiswas Vs. M/s. Empire of India Ceylone Tea: AIR 1990 SC 255;

SaraswathiVs.Lachanna:  (1994)1 SCC 611.

[258] 2009 AIR SCW 2566

[259] AIR 1995 SC 1715

[260]   See: GegongApang Vs. SanjoyTassar 2003-1 Gau LR 309.

[261]   See Chapter: EFFECT OF REGISTRATION & INCORPORATION

[262]   2005-2 Mad LJ 335

[263]   Official Trustee, WB Vs. SachindraNathChatterjee: AIR 1969 SC 823;

Rukmini Devi TodiVs. Official Liquidator: 2000-3 Cal LT 158.

[264]   Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College Vs. State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458;

SiddheshwarSahkariSakharKarkhanaVs.Commr. of IT, Kolhapur: AIR 2004 SC 4716;

Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301;

Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973.

Zoroastrian Co-op. Hsing. Society Ltd. Vs. Dist. Regr, Co-op. Societies: AIR 2005 SC 2306;

State Bank of India Staff Association Vs. Mohindra Bhattacharyya:  AIR 1991 Cal 378;

BCCI Vs. Netaji Cricket Club: AIR 2005 SC 592.

[265]   Iridum India Telecom Vs. Motorola, AIR 2005  SC 514

[266]   See: Shyam Sunder Agarwal And Company Vs. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 1321;

Ram KirpalMisir Vs. Bhagwati Saran Misir: AIR 1949 All 318;

JagarnathSahu Vs. SrikantDube: AIR  1949 All 589;

SatyapramodaThirthaswamulavaru : AIR 1982 AP 24.

[267]   See: PS Santhappan Vs. Andhra Bank: AIR 2004 SC 5251;

Iridum India Telecom Vs. Motorola: AIR 2005  SC 514.

[268]   See: United Bank of India Vs. Achintya Kumar Lahiri: 2007-66 All LR 246, 2007-1 ARC 453.

Dwark  Prasad Agarwal Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwala: AIR 2003 SC 2696;

R. Prakasam Vs. SreeNaryana Dharma ParipalanaYogam: (1980) 50 Comp. Cases 611(Ker);

RR RajendraMenonVs. Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd.: (1990) 69 Comp. Cases 256.

[269]   Firm of IlluriSubbayyaChetty Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1984 SC 322;

Antony Vs. Thandiyode Plantations: 1995 (2) KLT 512; 

Dhulabhai Vs. State of M. P. : AIR 1969 SC 78;

R. PrakasamVs. SreeNarayana Dharma ParipalanaYogam: (1980) 50 Comp. Cases 611(Ker).

[270]   (2000) 9 SCC 272. Referred to in R Ravindra Reddy Vs. H Ramaiah Reddy: AIR 2010 SC 991; ThimmappaRai Vs. RamannaRai: 2007 AIR (SCW) 3271

[271]   Sec. 41 of the Specific Relief Act applies to these matters.

[272]   RR RajendraMenonVs. Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd.: (1990) 69 Comp. Cases 256.

        See also: Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311;

Jagdish Singh Vs. Heeralal: AIR 2014  SC 371;

D Dhanapal Vs. D David Livingstone: 2003-3 Mad LJ 668; 

Koh I Noor Tabacco Vs. Presiding Officer Second Labour Court: AIR 1986 Bom 340;

Indian Bank Vs. ABS Marine Products Pvt Ltd: AIR  2006 SC 1899;

State Trading Corpn. Vs. Govt of People Republic of Bangladesh: ILR 1997–1 Del  229;

Kanhaiya Vs. Lllabai: ILR  1971 MP 165. 

[273]   AmbatiRamaiah Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh: 2012 -5 ALT 383;

All India SC, ST Railway Employees Association Vs. E. Venkateswarlu: 2003(3) ALT 674;

C. BabuRao Vs. District Registrar: 2010(1) ALD 452

[274]   D DhanapalVs. D David Livingstone: 2003-3 Mad LJ 668. 

[275]   See:  SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay AIR 1946 Bom 516,

ShridharMisra Vs. JaichandraVidyalankar AIR 1959 All 598 

NagappaChettiar Vs. The Madras Race Club AIR 1951 Mad 831;

SardarKanwaldeep Singh Vs. Asst. Regr. Firms, Societies and Chits: AIR 1994 All 161;

S. Krishnaswamy Vs. South India Film Chamber of Commerce:  AIR 1969 Mad 42;

A. S. Krishnan Vs.M. Sundaram: A. I. R. 1941 Bom. 312.

Sri Bhaben Chandra Pegu Vs. The State of Assam [1998 (1) GLR 38]

Raja HimanshuDhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439.

[276]   ParayakaduNalukulangaraDevaswom Vs. PadmanabhanHarshas: 1983 Ker LJ 232:  ILR  1983-2 Ker 732: 1983 Ker LT 803.                

[277]   1983 Ker LJ 232:  ILR  1983 2 Ker 732: 1983 Ker LT 803

[278]   2004-1 Ker LT 756, 2004 KHC 122

[279]   NagriPrachariniSabha Vs. V^thAddl Dist. and Sess. Judge, Varanasi: 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36

[280] U P Cooperative Cane Union Federation Vs. Liladhar: AIR1981 SC 152.

[281]   K. Nanu Vs. C.H. KunhikrishnaKurup: 2013 Ker LJ 769

[282]   2003-3 Mad LJ 668.

        Also see: State of AP Vs.   ManjetiLaxmiKanthaRao: AIR 2000 SC 2220;

        PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma:  AIR 1995 SC 2001 relied on.

[283]Janet Jeyapaul Vs. SRM University: 2015 (16) SCC 530,

Unni Krishnan  J P Vs. State of A.P:1993 (1) SCC 645,

Rajkumar v. Director of Education: 2016 (6) SCC 541,

Zee Telefilms Ltd.   Vs. U.O.I: 2005 (4) SCC 649,

Marwari BalikaVidyalaya Vs. AshaShrivastava: 2019 SCC online SC 408,

Mariamma Roy vs. Indian Bank: 2009 (16) SCC 187,

SatwatiDeswal Vs. State of Haryana: 2010 (1) SCC 126,

Maharashtra Chess Association Vs. U.O.I   :2019 SCC Online SC 932  

AnoopJaiswal Vs. Government of India: 1984 (2) SCC 369

Lachoo Memorial College Vs. Mridul Kumar Mathur: LAWS(RAJ) 2021 2 2.

[284]Pradeep Kumar BiswasVs. Indn. Insti. Cheml. Biology: (2002) 5 SCC 111,

Telefilms Ltd Vs. UOI : (2005) 4 SCC 649 

K.K. SaksenaVsICID : (2015) 4 SCC 670.

[285]Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab: (2012) 12 SCC 331,

CIT Vs. ChhabilDassAgarwal : (2014) 1 SCC 603,

Assistant Collector of Central Excise Vs. Dunlop: (1985) 1 SCC 260,

Bharat BhushanSonaji Vs. Abdul Khalik: (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 593,

Public Service Tribunal Bar Assn. Vs. State of U.P.: (2003) 4 SCC 104

State of UP Vs. Sandeep Kumar Balmiki : (2009) 17 SCC 555

Lachoo Memorial College Vs. Mridul Kumar Mathur: LAWS(RAJ) 2021 2 2.

[286]   Zee Telefilms Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649;

        Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club: AIR 2005   SC 592.

        Board of Control For Cricket in India Vs. Cricket Association of Bihar: AIR  2015 SC 3194.

[287]   AIR 1990 Cal. 176

[288]   Association of Milma Officers’, Thiruvananthapuram Vs State of Kerala: AIR 2015 Ker 137

[289]   AIR 2005 SC  4187.

        Madhya Pradesh RajyaSahakari Bank MaryaditVs. State of MP: AIR 2007 SC 540.

[290]   AIR 2009 SC 2956

[291] 2014-2 MPLJ 520

[292]   (2010) 3 SCC 402

[293] Palakole Co Op Sugars Ltd Vs. P N Raju: 1988-2 ALT 460, 1988-2 APLJ 433

[294] AIR 1970 SC 1244. Quoted in Palakole Co Op Sugars Ltd Vs. P N Raju: 1988-2 ALT 460, 1988-2 APLJ 433

[295]   See: BijiPothen Vs. Thankamma John: 2012(3) Ker LT 658

[296]   NarayandasShreeramSomaniVs.Sangli Bank Ltd. AIR 1966 SC 170;

Seth Mohan Lal   Vs. Grain Chambers Ltd.,  Muzaffarnagar: AIR 1968 SC 772;

        Shackleton on the Law and Practice of meetings, 7th edition (1983), Page 230.

[297]   See: BijiPothen Vs. Thankamma John: 2012(3) Ker LT 658;

        Arti Devi Vs. Central Information Commissioner: 2012-10-ADJ 491.

[298]   See: BijiPothen Vs. Thankamma John: 2012(3) Ker LT 658:

[299]   Abdul Kayua Vs. Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309:

        Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain: ILR 1982-1 Del 11.

[300]   40 ER 852

[301]   (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[302]   (1904) AC 515.

[303]   AIR 1931 Mad. 12

[304]   PragjiSavjiVajaVs.ChhotalalNarsidasParmar: AIR 2014-3 Bom R 211: 2013-6 BCR 72.

[305]   AIR 2007 SC  3162

[306]   It is referred to in Mandal Revenue Officer Vs. GoundlaVenkaiah: AIR 2010 SC 744

[307]   AIR 1947 All 375

[308]   Refered to in  Lal Vs. Thakur RadhaBallabhji: AIR 1961 All 73

[309]   C ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296:

        Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14;

        Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915

[310]   ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh : ILR 2009-19 Dlh 265]

        Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915;

        I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337

[311]   CK Rajan Vs. GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee: AIR 1994 Ker 179 [Appeal Judgment: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546];

        C  ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296;

        Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915 ;

        ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;

        I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337;

        Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309;

        SubramoniaPillaiChellamPillai Vs. SubramoniaPillaiChathanPillai: AIR 1953 TC 198; 

        M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[312]   AIR  1940 Mad. 617.

Quoted in Sankaranarayanan Vs. ShriPoovananatha: AIR  1949 Mad.721

Sobhanadreswara Rice Mill Co. Vs. BrahmachariBavaji Mutt : AIR  1973 AP 292;

        Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. L.Rs of PremDass: 2009-3-RCR (CIVIL) 133.

[313]   ILR 1988-1 Ker 429

[314]   Bonnerji Vs. Sitanath 49 IA 46:

        referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[315]   AIR 1974 SC 1084

[316]   See also: H E H The Nizams Pilgrimage Money Trust Hyderabad Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad:  AIR 2000 SC 1802;

        Kishore Joo Vs. GumanBehariJooDeo: AIR  1978 All 1.

        Bonnerji Vs. Sitanath 49 IA 46:

        Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11;

Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai : AIR 1963 SC 309.

Shivramdas Vs. B V Nerukar, AIR 1937 Bom 374,

Rambabu Vs. Committee of Rameshwar, (1899) 1 Bom LR 667;

NathiriMenon Vs. Gopalan Nair, AIR 1916 Mad 692.

[317]   Bonnerji Vs. Sitanath 49 IA 46:

        Referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[318]   BalramChunnilalVs.DurgalalShivnarain: AIR1968 MP 81.

[319]   Scott on Trusts Vol. II Sec. 170. The leading case on the subject is KenchVs. Gandford (1726) (White and Tudor Leading Cases in Equity page 693) referred to in Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain ILR 1982- 1 Del 11.

[320]   See: Kishore Joo Vs. GumanBehariJooDeo: AIR  1978 All 1.

[321]   See: B D Wadhwa Vs. HardayalDevgun: ILR 1973-2 – Del  678.

[322]   AIR 2004 AP 223

[323]   State of Punjab v. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315 (P & H)

[324]   Baby Mathew Vs. Agricultural Income Tax Officer:1994-207 ITR 967

[325]   T.K. Jacob v. Divisional Forest Officer [1993] 2 KLJ 915:

        Referred to in Baby Mathew Vs. Agricultural IT Officer: 1994-207 ITR 967.

        See also: Punalur Paper Mills Ltd. v. District Collector: [1985] KLT 758

[326]   [1963] 14 STC 972 (Mad)

[327]   AIR  1961 Cal 393

[328] [1892] 1 Ch 154

Referred to in BholanathKundu Vs. Official Liquidator, BholanathKundu : 1987-61 CC 10.

[329] Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Rajmata Saheb Chowhanji: AIR 1978 SC 1447.

[330]   J K Choudhury Vs. Hem Chandra: AIR 1956 Assm 82;

S Krishnaswamy Vs. South India Film Chamber of Commerce: AIR   1969 Mad 42.

[331]   Committee of Management  Vs. Commr, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.

[332]   See: Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate: AIR 2007 SC 1337

[333]   AIR 2005 SC 2544.

[334]   See also: The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri LakshmindraThirthawamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; and RatilalPanachand Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388.

[335]   AIR 2014 SC 2018

[336]   AIR 2013 SC 200

[337]   Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and HS EdnVs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879, agreed with the ratio in Ghazanfar Rashid Vs. Board, H.S. AIR 1970 All 209. 

[338]   Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 Pj&Hr 21

[339]   Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99. Referred to: Ram PyareLal Vs. State of U.P. 2015 3 ADJ 577;

Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secretary to Government, UP: AIR 1951 All 1;

Dr. P.P. Rastogi Vs. Meerut University, 1997 1 UPLBEC 415;

Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262

[340]   Ravipreet Singh Vs. National Rifle Association of India: ILR 2013-23 Dlh 743.

[341]   Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College Vs. State of Delhi: AIR 1962 SC 458;

SiddheshwarSahkariSakharKarkhanaVs.Commr. of IT, Kolhapur: AIR 2004 SC 4716;

Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301;

Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973.

Zoroastrian Co-op. Hsing. Society Ltd. Vs. Dist. Regr, Co-op. Societies: AIR 2005 SC 2306;

State Bank of India Staff Association Vs. Mohindra Bhattacharyya:  AIR 1991 Cal 378;

BCCI Vs. Netaji Cricket Club: AIR 2005 SC 592.

[342]   AIR 1928 Mad 571

[343]   1987-62 CC 301; APLJ 1985 3 219

[344] 2005 (1) CTC 399 : 2005 (2) MLJ 102. Referred to in TheniMelapettai Hindu NadarkalUravinmuraiVs. The District Registrar: 2007 6 MLJ 1528.

[345]   2015-5 CTC 17

[346]   LAWS (KER)-2013-3-137

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