Jojy George Koduvath

Abstract

• Admission is the best evidence of a claim.
• Sec. 58 of Evid. Act states – facts admitted need not be proved.
• Title will not pass by a mere admission.
• Title will not lose by an admission.

Introduction

In Shreedhar Govind Kamerkar v. Yesahwant Govind Kamerkar, 2006 (13) SCC 481, the Supreme Court has held as under:

• “Admission, as is well known, is the best proof of a claim. Section 58 of the Evidence Act states that the facts admitted need not be proved“.

In Avtar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, 2006-2 SCC 552, the Supreme Court has held-

• “Admission, it is well known, forms the best evidence. It may be that admission does not create any title, but the nature of the land can form subject-matter of admission”.

Admission by itself will Not Confer or Lose Title

In J. G. Sumam v. J. G. Vijayan, Thomas P. Joseph, J.(2013), Kerala High Court held that admission cannot confer or  extinguish title. Therefore, it was pointed out that merely because the plaintiff had claimed title and possession as per a deed would not precluded him from pleading that he got title and possession as per another  document

Admission by itself Cannot Confer Title to a property is well settled

Kerala High Court, in Kanhirakottil Mani v. Madhavi, 2017-1 KHC 854; 2017-2 KLT 585, it was observed as under:

• “Principle that an admission by itself cannot confer title to a property is well settled. Section 17 of the Evidence Act defines “admission” and Section 18 of the said Act deals with admission by party to proceeding or his agent. Section 21 of the Evidence Act speaks about proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf. Section 58 of the Evidence Act says that an admitted fact need not be proved. Although an admission is the best piece of evidence against the person making it, he can rebut the same. It is fundamental that admissions can be explained and proved to be erroneous.
• 28. Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rai (AIR 1966 SC 605) has considered inter alia the effect of admission by a party in respect of title. It is held that title cannot pass by a mere admission. Principle that an admission by itself cannot confer title to property has been laid down by this Court also.”

The proposition admission by itself cannot confer title is made forcefully in the following decisions of the Supreme Court of India.

• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012-8 SCC 148,
• Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577,
• Avtar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 552,
• Ambika Prasad Thakur v. Ram Ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 (title cannot pass by a mere admission).

It is pointed out in all these decisions that only on the basis of an admission no person can be declared as owner of immovable property, which is required to be proved by positive evidence by the person claiming his title.

Avtar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, 2006 (12) SCC 552

• “8. Admission, it is well know, forms the best evidence. It may be that admission does not create any title. But the nature of the land can form subject matter of admission.
• 9. Section 58 of the Evidence Act postulates that things admitted need not be proved.
• 10. It may be that in their Suit the respondents herein did not call for the records from the State or the local authorities to show that the land in question was a public street but keeping in view the fact that the appellants’ witnesses have admitted the said fact in their own Suit, we are of the opinion, the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court need not be interfered with.”

Burden on plaintiff to Prove Title; Weakness of defence would not enable a decree

The Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577, also held that although by an admission, title in immovable property cannot be created but an opinion can be formed in respect of the nature of the land, subject-matter of admission.

In Ram Chandra Sakharam Mahajan Vs. Damodar Trimbak, AIR 2007 SC 2577, it is observed –

• In a recovery on title suit, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish title.
• Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants.
• Weakness of defence to establish title, would not enable plaintiff to a decree.

The Apex Court held:

• “The suit is for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Obviously, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that title. No doubt in appreciating the case of title set up by the plaintiff, the Court is also entitled to consider the rival title set up by the defendants. But the weakness of the defence or the failure of the defendants to establish the title set up by them, would not enable the plaintiff to a decree. There cannot be any demur to these propositions.”
• “14. We find that the trial Court and the appellate Court were not justified in refusing the amendment of the plaint sought for by the plaintiff. No doubt there had been delay in seeking amendment but that delay could have been compensated by awarding costs to the contesting defendants 1 to 9. Therefore, we are satisfied that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff ought to have been allowed. We are inclined to allow the amendment sought for, since it would enable the Court to pin-pointedly consider the real dispute between the parties and would enable it to render a decision more satisfactorily to its conscience. We, therefore, allow the amendment as sought for by the plaintiff at a belated stage. The amendment will be carried out by the plaintiff in the trial Court within three months from this date as per the practice followed in the trial Court. Obviously defendants 1 to 9 would have an opportunity to file an additional written statement to the amended plaint. They will be entitled to file an additional written statement within a period of four months from the date of this judgment.”

Admission Contained in Pleadings and that in Evidentiary Admissions

An admission made by a party to a suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible against him.

In Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) the Kerala High Court held that admission contained in a plaint or written statement or in an affidavit or sworn deposition by a party in a previous litigation would be regarded as an admission in a subsequent action. It can be explained by the maker thereof, unless thereis no estoppel (Sec. 31, Evi. Act). Such an admission is a relevant fact. The courts can arrive at a decision on the basis of the admissions. See:

• Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai, (2007) 14 SCC 63 .
• Deb Prosanna v. Hari Kison, AIR 1937 Cal. 515 ,
• Chendikamba v. Viswanathamayya, AIR 1939 Mad 446 ,
• Lal Singh v. Guru Granth Sahib, AIR(38) 1951 Pep 101,  and
• Mst. Ulfat v. Zubaida Khatoon, AIR 1955 All. 361.

In Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) it is observed that Section 17 of the Evidence Act says that a document or a statement which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, is an admission. It was pointed out in this decisions as under:

• Admissions in pleadings are governed under Section 58 Evidence Act.
• Section 31 of the Evidence Act, says as to evidentiary admissions.
• There is distinction between the two.
• The evidentiary admissions are merely relevant and not conclusive unless they operate as estoppel.
• An admission by a party in a previous suit is admissible in evidence in a subsequent suit.
• The burden is upon the party making it to show that it was wrong on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so, though the party making the admission may give evidence to rebut this presumption.
• Unless and until that is satisfactorily done, the fact admitted must be taken to be established.
• This is true notwithstanding the fact that the statement which amounts to an admission was not put to the party making it, when that person came into the witness box.

The High Court further held as under in Ammini Tharakan v. Lilly Jacob (7 Oct 2013) –

• “Here, the plaintiff, who was a defendant in Lucy’s suit, had filed Ext.B10 written statement through her power of attorney holder and mother Martha. That written statement contained the clear stand that neither Lucy nor the plaintiff herein had any share in any of the assets forming the estate of late David Tharakan. This statement which amounts to an admission as to a particular state of affairs, has not been explained by the plaintiff either in the plaint or at any point of time in any manner worthy of being accepted as a rebuttal. While it is the law that admission does not confer title, what we treat as admissions here is demonstrative of the plaintiff’s animus in re inheritance to her father’s estate. We proceed to discuss that aspect further in the succeeding paragraph.”

False recital in a document as to pre-existing rights

False recital in a document as to pre-existing rights in a person (who had no such right) would not convey any right in the property to him. The Supreme Court, in Neelakantan Damodaran Namboothiri v. Velayudhan Pillai Narayana Pillai, AIR 1958 SC 832, it is held as under:

• “It is stated in exhibit A that, by reason of sarva-swadanam marriage, the appellants were entitled to all moveable and immovable properties belonging to Kopprathu Illom and therefore she was executing the release deed conferring all the rights and claims they have obtained over the Illom properties by the sarvaswadanam form of marriage. The document, therefore, in terms confirms the pre-existing rights of the appellants and as we hold that they had no pre-existing rights, the document did not convey any interest to them. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with cost.”
• Also: Sarojini v. Santha Trading Co., 1969 KHC 94 : 1969 KLT 412 : 1968 KLJ 475.

Mutation by itself will Not Confer or Extinguish Title

In Moideen v. Village Officer, 9 January, 2019(Alexander Thomas, J) Kerala High Court repeated the above view as under:

• “It is further made clear that grant of mutation, transfer of registry and acceptance of basic land tax by itself will not confer or extinguish title to the parties concerned as clarified in Rule 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules. Rule 16 of the Transfer Registry Rules envisages that summary enquiry and decision thereon envisaged under those rule is only an arrangement for fiscal purposes and does not affect the legal rights of any person in respect of the lands covered by the decisions in transfer of registry cases and the prescribed legal rights is always subject to adjudication by Civil Court and pattas will be revised from time to time in accordance with such judicial decisions. Accordingly, it is ordered that the grant of mutation, transfer of registry and acceptance of the basic land tax solely in the name of the petitioner will be subject to further revision due to any subsequent judicial verdicts as envisaged in Rule 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules and in case the 3rd respondent gets any verdicts in his favour in the said civil suit now pending before the Munsiff Court, Manjeri, then it will be open to him to seek revision of the mutation granted in favour of the petitioner, as envisaged in Rule 16 of the Transfer of Registry Rules.”

Petitioner to Prove claim (Lease); cannot rely Inconsistencies of Respondents

In OT Alexander v. State of Kerala, LAWS (KER) 2021-5. 23, High Court of Kerala (N. Nagaresh, J.) did not accept the argument of the petitioner in the Writ Petition, against the Government Order for resumption of the land, for the absence of materials to establish the lease of 1933 claimed by the Petitioner.  The prime contention of the petitioner was that the land was originally granted to the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner, under Ground Rent Patta by erstwhile Collector of South Malabar District during the British regime in 1933; and that Land assigned under Ground Rent Patta could not be resumed by the Government.

The petitioner claimed that the transferees of the original leasee sold their right to a bank. The Bank (State Bank of Travancore) sold the property to a Company in 1995. The petitioner purchased the property from the Company as per the Sale Deed of the year 2004. The petitioner has been paying property tax to the Cochin Corporation. The action for resumption of land by the District Collector was on the ground that the sale deed between SBT and the Company was illegal. Pointing out that the petitioner cannot base his claim on inconsistencies of the respondents, the High Court did not accept the arguments against the resumption of land by the Collector.

Admission as to Title in Pleadings Holds Good u/S. 58, Evid. Act

In Heeralal vs. Kalyan Mal, AIR 1988 SC 618, a suit for partition the defendants in their written statement admitted that some properties were joint. Thereafter amendment of written statement was sought claiming some to be their exclusive properties. On the basis of the said admission a preliminary decree could have been passed. The Supreme Court held that the defendants could not be allowed to amend their written statement.  

In Avtar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 552, the question arose whether the appellants had encroached upon a public street. The Trial and Appellate Court held that the land in question was part of a public street and encroached upon by the appellants. The aforesaid finding was approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that the appellants have themselves admitted that a part of the land in question was included in a public street. It was observed by the Supreme Court as under:

• “Admission, it is well known, forms the best evidence, it may be that admission does nor create any title, but the nature of the kind can form subject matter of admission. Section 58 of the Evidence Act postulates that things admitted need not be proved. It may be that in their Suit the respondents herein did not call for the records from the State or the local authorities to show that the land in question was a public street but keeping in view the fact that the appellants’ witnesses have admitted the said fact in their own Suit, we are of the opinion, the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court, need not be interfered with.”

Admission in pleading and admission in a document

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, (2008) 7 SCC 85, our Apex Court held as under:

• “14. An admission made in a pleading is not to be treated in the same manner as an admission in a document. An admission made by a party to the lis is admissible against him proprio vigore. ” (Quoted in: Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, AIR 2009  SC 2463; 2009-11 SCC 545)

See also: Ranganayakamma and Another v. K. S. Prakash, 2008 (9) SCALE 144.

Document ex-facie reveals no title – specific declaration as to invalidity not necessary

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.) 9.4.2024, held as under:

• “18. …. If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence. Chiruthey could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Her right, if any, would stem from the second deed of lease (Exhibit A-1). We are conscious of the fact that no claim was made before any forum for invalidating the deed dated 14th July 1910 (Exhibit A-20).”

By proving a deed, title of the executing person is not automatically confirmed

The Supreme Court held in Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki (Aniruddha Bose & Sudhanshu DhuliaJJ.) 9.4.2024, also held as under:

• “18. … It would be trite to repeat that even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person (in this case Chiruthey) does not automatically stand confirmed. ….. … But in absence of proper title over the subject property, that lease deed even if she was its sole lessor would not have had been legally valid or enforceable. If right, title or interest in certain property is sought conveyed by a person by an instrument who herself does not possess any such form of entitlement on the subject being conveyed, even with a subsisting deed of conveyance on such property, the grantee on her successors-in-interest will not have legal right to enforce the right the latter may have derived from such an instrument.”