Snippet #345

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Part I

Legal Persons

‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons.

Salmond reads:

“Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system, however, are of comparatively few types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons, and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations.”(Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., Page 305).

Though the legal personality of an unregistered association may not be a matter in dispute, the legal status of registered associations under Societies Registration Act remained as a potential question for quite long time.

Part II

Idol as Representing “Pious Purpose” of Donor Is the Juristic Person

The Supreme Court, in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, concluded the rationale of conferring legal personality to Idol as under:

“123. The recognition of the Hindu Idol as a legal or ‘juristic’ person is therefore based on two premises employed by courts. The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense (absent the creation of a trust-sic). The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose. So conceived, the Hindu Idol is a legal person. The property endowed to the pious purpose is owned by the Idol as a legal person in an ideal sense. The reason why the court created such legal fictions was to provide a comprehensible legal framework to protect the properties dedicated to the pious purpose from external threats as well as internal maladministration. Where the pious purpose necessitated a public trust for the benefit of all devotees, conferring legal personality allowed courts to protect the pious purpose for the benefit of the devotees.”

Idol is the Embodiment of Pious Purpose

Relying mainly upon one of the oldest decisions in this subject, Manohar Ganesh Tambekar Vs. Lakhmiram (1887), ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247, our Apex Court held in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that juristic personality could not be conferred upon Ram Janmabhumi. It is held as under:

“138. …The decision (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar Vs. Lakhmiram) clarifies that an Idol as a juridical person is the ‘ideal embodiment’ of a pious or benevolent idea. The status of a juristic person was conferred on the Idol as an entity which encompasses the purpose itself in which capacity the properties and offerings vest. The observations in this case affirm the position that juridical personality was conferred on the pious purpose and the property endowed or accumulated did not itself become a juristic entity. It is not the property endowed which is a juridical person – it is the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious purpose which is recognised as a juristic person, in whom the property stands vested.”

Intention of Founder stand Constant and Definite

A temple is founded on dedication of property and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency. (It stands contradistinct to the worship of Muslims in a mosque and of Christians in a church.)

Courts Recognises ‘Legal Personality’ to Idol to Give Effect to the Dedication

The Supreme Court observed in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case: 2020-1 SCC 1) that courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu Idol to give effect to the dedication of the founder of the endowment. The ‘recognition of juristic personality’ was ‘devised by the courts to give legal effect to the Hindu practice of dedicating property for a religious or ‘pious’ purpose’. When the founder was not alive and the shebait was not the owner of the lands, the courts (and through them, the State) give effect to the original dedication conferring the legal personality to the idol. The legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to (a) protect the endowment against mal-administration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol,and (b) protect the interests of devotees. It was also found that legal rights entitled to by the idol was not dependent on the existence of an express trust.

Doctrine on ‘Merger’ – ‘Entity of the Idol’ Is Linked With ‘Pious Purpose’

It is pointed out in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that, as established in earlier decisions, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law; and it is not correct that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. Juristic personality of an Idol stands connected to the ‘pious purpose’ of the founder. Therefore, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked with the ‘pious purpose’.

It is obvious that the Court brings-forth the doctrine of “merger” based on the following well accepted jurisprudential notions:

Legal entity of an idol is conceived only in an ideal sense.
The idol is chosen as the centre for legal relations.
Idol is the embodiment of the pious purpose of its founder.
A material object that represents a ‘purpose’ can be a legal person.

The Supreme Court, in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:

“6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
…The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea:
- “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”

Beneficiaries of Endowments Are Not Idols but Worshippers

The Supreme Court, in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya case: 2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (1957): AIR 1957 SC 133:

“6. …The true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v Ram Lal Maitra (1910) it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a ‘sentient being‘, and that the dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment of the owner of his dominion over them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J at p. 138 that “the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected” and that “the dedication to a deity” may be “a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”

Destruction of Idol Does Not Affect Legal Personality

Our Apex Court, explained in M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) further as under:

“127. … In the case of Hindu idols, legal personality is not conferred on the idol simpliciter but on the underlying pious purpose of the continued worship of the deity as incarnated in the idol. Where the legal personality is conferred on the purpose of a deity’s continued worship, moving or destroying the idol does not affect its legal personality. The legal personality vests in the purpose of continued worship of the idol as recognised by the court. It is for the protection of the continued worship that the law recognises this purpose and seeks to protect it by the conferral of juristic personality.”

Part III

Sri Guru Granth Sahib – Accepted as a Juristic Person

Guru Granth Sahib revered in a Gurudwara, has been held to be a juristic person by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421. The Apex Court explained that it was not necessary to equate Guru Granth Sahib with an Idol, for declaring it to be a juristic person. When belief and faith of two religions are different, there is no question of equating one with the other. In this case the Apex Court held that Guru Granth Sahib possessed all the qualities to be recognised as a Juristic Person; and observed that holding otherwise would be giving ‘too restrictive a meaning to a ‘juristic person’ and that would erase the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it’.

In Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee it was observed further that ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ was the nucleus of any Gurudwara; and that without ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ the Gurudwara was only a building, and that therefore, ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ could be regarded as a juristic person. One of the reasons based on which Guru Grandh Sahib was not treated as a juristic person by the High Court was that if Guru Grandh Sahib was regarded as a juristic person, every copy of the same should also be regarded as a juristic person. In this context the Apex Court observed that an Idol became a juristic person only when it was consecrated and installed in a public place for the public at large. In other words, the emphasis was on the ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ for the benefit of the public at large.

It is held in Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Amritsar v. Shri Som Nath Dass (AIR 2000 SC 1421) as under:

“There may be an endowment for a pious or religious purpose. It may be for an idol, mosque, church etc.. Such endowed property has to be used for that purpose. The installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a Hindu denoting any god is merely a mode through which his faith and belief is satisfied. This has led to the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.
In Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar & Ors, AIR 1957 SC 137, this Court held:
- In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha Vs. Ram Lal Maitra, ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these and other text that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a sentient being, and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for the purpoe of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed. Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155. In Hindu Relgious Endowments Board V. Veeraraghavacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:
- As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust.
In Som Prakash Rekhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., 1981 (1) SCC 449, this Court held that a legal person is any entity other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. It was stated: Let us be clear that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is a reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personalityis one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by the law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.
This Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held that the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is a juristic person and approved the observation of West J. in the following passage made in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247;
- The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of property vested in the Corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical persons called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception or morality. A trust is not required for the purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical person symbolised or personified in the idol. {Emphasis supplied} Thus, a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required under English Law.
In fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the crucial point. In Pritam Dass Mahant Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1984 (2) SCC 600, with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was held:
- From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh gurdwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:
- They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib. This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
- xx xx
- he holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After giving his followers a central place of worship, Hari-Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book. So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own. Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide. Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity. Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.”

The Supreme Court held as under:

“Thus, we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a Juristic Person.”

Part IV

Mosque and Juristic Personality

Muslims worship the God Almighty. It is difficult to pin-point a tangible-nucleus or a core-element for a Mosque (as in the case of Gurugrantha Sahib in a Gurudwara or an Idol in a temple) so as to clinch the legal personality upon (See: Shriomani Gurudwara Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421).

For Muslims, worship in accordance with the tenets is important. (It stands contradistinct to dedication and worship in a temple. A temple is founded on dedication of property, and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.)

In ‘Law of Endowments (Hindu and Mohammedan)’ by A. Ghosh Quoted in: Mahmood Hussain Vs. State Of UP: 2018-10 ADJ 249; 2018-128 All LR 71 with respect to ‘Mosque’as under:

“A Mosque does not belong to any particular sect; for once it is built and consecrated, any reservation for people of a particular locality or sect is void, and persons not belonging to that locality or sect are entitled to worship in it, whether or not any particular sect had contributed towards the site or the building of the Mosque and had been saying their prayers in it and every person who believes in the unity of God and the mission of Mahammad as a prophet is a Mussalman, to whatever sect he may belong, and that the Shias satisfy the test; and that there is no such thing as a Sunni or a Shia Mosque though the majority of the worshippers at any particular Mosque may belong to one or other sect either generally or at various times.”

It is also added that in Mahomedan law there cannot be any private Mosque. When once a place is dedicated to be a Mosque, it becomes public property, it is property of God. But, it is pointed out that‘there can be right of exclusion in case of Mosques belonging to a particular sect’.

The Privy Council, in Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116, neither supported nor rejected the view that a mosque is a legal person, though it observed that ‘the argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions’. The Privy Council specifically held as under:

“A gift can be made to a madrasah in like manner as to a masjid. The right of suit by the Mutawali or other manager or by any person entitled to a benefit (whether individually or as a member of the public or merely in common with certain other persons) seems hitherto to have been found sufficient for the purpose of maintaining Mahomedan endowments. At best the institution is but a caput mortum, and some human agency is always required to take delivery of property and to apply it to the intended purposes. Their Lordships, with all respect to the High Court of Lahore, must not be taken as deciding that a ‘juristic personality’ may be extended for any purpose to Muslim institutions generally or to mosques in particular. On this general question they reserve their opinion.”

Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1

In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421, the Supreme Court had (earlier) observed that it was held in , AIR 1940 P C 116, that a mosque was a juristic person.

After analysing, in detail, the same decision , Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116, the Supreme Court affirmed in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. It is observed as under:

“195. This distinction, which highlights the features of immovable property received articulation by the Privy Council in The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar. AIR 1940 PC 116. In that case, a mosque was dedicated in 1722 by one Falak Beg Khan. By the deed of dedication, Sheikh Din Mohammad and his descendants were appointed as Mutawallis. Since 1762, however, the building together with the court-yard, well and adjacent land, was in the occupation and possession of the Sikhs. The land adjacent to the mosque became the site of a Sikh shrine. At the time of the annexation by the British in 1849, the Sikhs were in possession of both the mosque and the adjacent lands.
196. Thereafter, the building was demolished ‘by or with the connivance of its Sikh custodians’. A suit was instituted in 1935 against Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee – who were in possession of the disputed property, seeking a declaration that the building was a mosque in which the plaintiffs and all the followers of Islam had a right to worship along with a mandatory injunction to reconstruct the building. One of the 18 plaintiffs was the mosque itself – the site and the building. The Privy Council assessed the contention that the mosque and the adjoining properties were a juristic person. Rejecting the contention, Justice George Rankin held:
- “The argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions. It is wholly inconsistent with many decisions whereby a worshipper or the mutwalli has been permitted to maintain a suit to recover the land and buildings for the purposes of the wakf by ejectment of a trespasser…
- That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships… the procedure in India takes account necessarily of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognizes certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g. that an idol may be the owner of property…
- The decisions recognising a mosque as a ‘juristic person’ appear to be confined to the Punjab : 153 PR 1884; Shankar Das v. Said Ahmad (1884) 153 PR 1884 59 PR 1914; Maula Bux v. Hafizuddin (1926) 13 AIR Lah 372: AIR 1926 Lah 372.
- 6 In none of those cases was a mosque party to the suit, and in none except perhaps the last is the fictitious personality attributed to the mosque as a matter of decision. But so far as they go these cases support the recognition as a fictitious person of a mosque as an institution – apparently hypostatizing an abstraction. This, as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed out, is very different from conferring personality upon a building so as to deprive it of its character as immovable property.” (Emphasis supplied)
197. The Privy Council noted that if the mosque was a juristic person, this may mean that limitation does not apply to it and that ‘it is not property but an owner of property.’ Underlying the line of reasoning adopted by the Privy Council is that the conferral of legal personality on immovable property could lead to the property losing its character as immoveable property. “

In para 421 it is pointed out as under:

“421. In The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar AIR 1940 PC 116, the Privy Council considered whether a mosque can be considered a juristic person and can be subject to adverse possession. Sir George Rankin observed:
- “That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships. The question whether a British Indian Court will recognise a mosque as having a locus standi in judicio is a question of procedure. In British India the Courts do not follow the Mahomedan law in matters of procedure [cf. Jafri Begum v. Amir Muhammad Khan [I.L.R. 7 All. 822 at pp. 841, 842 (1885).], per Mahmood, J.] any more than they apply the Mahomedan criminal law of the ancient Mahomedan rules of evidence. At the same time the procedure of the Courts in applying Hindu or Mahomedan law has to be appropriate to the laws which they apply. Thus the procedure in India takes account, necessarily, of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognises certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g., that an idol may be the owner of property. The procedure of our Courts allows for a suit in the name of an idol or deity though the right of suit is really in the sebait [Jagadindranath v. Hemmta Kumari [L.R. 31 I.A. 203: s.c. 8 C.W.N. 609 (1605).] ]. Very considerable difficulties attend these doctrines—in particular as regards the distinction, if any, proper to be made between the deity and the image [cf. Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal [I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128, 153: s.c. 14 C.W.N. 18 (1910).] , Golapchandra Sarkar, Sastri’s ‘Hindu Law’, 7th Ed., pp. 865 et seq.]. But there has never been any doubt that the property of a Hindu religious endowment— including a thakurbari—is subject to the law of limitation [Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das [L.R. 37 I.A. 147 : s.c. 14 C.W.N. 889 (1810).] and Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Dey [L.R. 64 I.A. 203 : s.c. 41 C.W.N. 968 (1937).] ]. From these considerations special to Hindu law no general licence can be derived for the invention of fictitious persons…” (Emphasis supplied).
It was concluded thus:
- “The property now in question having been possessed by Sikhs adversely to the waqf and to all interests thereunder for more than 12 years, the right of the mutawali to possession for the purposes of the waqf came to an end under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act and the title derived under the dedication from the settlor or wakif became extinct under sec. 28. The property was no longer, for any of the purposes of British Indian Courts, ―a property of God by the advantage of it resulting to his creatures…”

The Rajasthan High Court in Mohamed Shafindeen Vs. Chatur Bhaj (1958), 1958 Raj. LW 461 definitely held that mosque was not a juristic person. A similar view was taken by various High Courts including the Madras High Courtin Sunnath Jamath Mosque Committee, Puliampatti Vs. Land Administration Commissioner, 1998 (1) LW 69 (See also: Babu Vs. Khudial Qayum: 2013 0 ACJ 1614; 2013 8 ADJ 259; 2013 99 AllLR 123; 2013 2 ARC 839), and Gauhatti High Court in Sahida Khatun Vs. Secretary, Tezpur Hindustani Muslim Panchayat, 2000 3 GauLJ 485; 2000 3 GauLT 152 .

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

“35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

“127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Therefore, apart from it being an Explanation, it also on its very terms, limits the deeming fiction to the purpose sought to be attained in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act.”

Part V

Legal personality of Churches

Halbury’s Laws of England,[1] gives the meaning of ‘Church’, as under:

“Church, when used in relation to a religious body, has two distinct meanings; it may mean either the aggregate of the individual members of the church or it may mean the quasi-corporate institution which carries on the religious work of the denomination whose name it bears.”

Blacks Law Dictionary defines church as under:

“Church. In its most general sense, the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve, and propagate His doctrines and ordinances. It may also mean a body of communicants gathered into church order; body or community of Christians, united under one form of government by the profession of the same faith andthe observance of the same ritual and ceremonies; place where persons regularly assemble for worship; congregation; organization for religious purposes; religious society or body; the clergy or officialdom of a religious body.”

In the New International Bible Dictionary, Church is defined as under:

“Church. The English word derives from the Greek Kuriakos (belonging to the Lord), but it stands for another Greek word ekklesia (where “ecclesiastical’), denoting an assembly. This is used in its general sense in Acts 19:32, but had already been applied in the LXX as an equivalent for the “congregation” of the OT Stephen’s speech makes this equation (Acts 7:38), and in this sense it is adopted to describe the new gathering or congregation of the disciples of Jesus Christ”.

Juristic Personality of churches: Why Law Hesitates?

The ‘church’ being essentially associated with believers, and it is possessed with an endowment (church-building), technically, it can be recognised as a legal person. Salmond has emphasised that the law may attribute legal personality to a group of individuals; or, if it pleases (i.e. if it stands well-accepted), regard an institution also, as a legal person. But, our legal system does not uniformly accept church as a legal person. Following the Privy Council decision, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar,[2] the Supreme Court observed in M. Siddiq (Ayodhya Case) [3] that a mosque is not a juristic person. The same principles apply to churches also. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

The following are the apparent reasons:

It is difficult to point out a tangible-nucleus[4] as Gurugrantha Sahib or Idol,for a church (building), to clinch the juristic personality upon. In this respect a church resembles Mosque. Christians also worship the invisible God Almighty.
As in the case of Muslims, for Christians also, worship is important, rather than the place where they worship. As pointed out earlier, juristic personality is conferred to the idol for its‘identity’on installation.The intentions of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the ardency of the worshippers.
Christians join together in churches in accordance with the divine command:
- “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of them” (Mathew 18: 20).
The Bible elsewhere (Acts 17: 24) expresses the point more emphatically, as under:
- “God that made the world and all things therein, since he is the Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands”

Are Churches and Dioceses Juridic persons it being so accepted in Canon Law

As shown by Salmond[5] and explained by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass,[6] the law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a legal person.

In James Chinnamma v. Joseph Abraham, ILR 1962-1 Ker 591; 1962 KLT 240, referring ‘Civil Ecclesiastical Law’ by Jerome A. Saldanha, it was pointed out that the provisions of canon depicted the diocese and church as legal or moral persons; without recording a definite finding on this point it was held by the High Court that there was no “legal impediment” to treat the parish church as a legal person. It was held that it could claim to be an ‘agriculturist’, inasmuch as the church was capable of holding property (of course, acting through human agency). The judge considered the postulation whether the church could be a voluntary association. It also referred to the theory that the church was under the authority of a corporation-sole, either Vicar or Bishop. It was pointed out that so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church, the Diocesan Bishop alone would have the right in both the spiritual and the temporal matters in respect of the church and its property. (This decision is referred to in: Daisy AP v. Bishop Dr. Thomas Mar Koorilose, 2015-5 KHC 914; 2016-1 KLT 268).

In Seline Fernandez v. Bernard Francis, ILR 2013-1 Ker 56; 2012-4 KHC 427; 2012-4 KLT 283, it is held that on examining the Canon as a whole, what is discernible is that the temporal goods belonging to a parish which, by law, is a public juridic person do not belong to the diocese. It is observed in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan (2016 AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51), also that a (parish) church is a legal person.

But, in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1) our apex Court held that Mosque is not a legal person. The Apex Court rejected the the contention that mosque was held to be a juristic person by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116. In the light of the Supreme Court decision on Mosque, legally it is difficult to support the the view that churches are juristic persons.

‘Law may, if it pleases‘ (i.e. if it stands well-accepted) being the basis for determining a body or entity as a legal person, it is definite that the dioceses can never be treated as a juridic persons even though the Canon declares so.

Even if a (parish) church can be taken as comparable to a temple or Gurudwara (temple and Gurudwara are accepted by our law as juristic persons), a Diocese can never be taken as a juristic person; especially in the light of our Apex Court decision, Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, which authoritatively held that even a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts (as detailed below).

As detailed in the notes below (under the heading – Juristic Personality in Canon), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it should not be assumed that the courts are bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law. In the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (AIR 1958 MP 362) M. Hidayatullah, J. observed as under:

“In matters of property there is always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination can make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.”

In the light of this decision it is illogical to go deep to search an authority to see whether the church or diocese is a legal person for it is so described in the Canon.

Churches are Usually Arrayed as Parties to Suits

Now, we see that our courts including the Supreme Court and High Courts make pronouncements with respect to matters of churches wherein they are arrayed as parties (represented by vicars, trustees etc.). But, when this matter is raised as a specific legal point, the opinion of courts are different.

As stated above, the Kerala High Court, in James Chinnamma Vs. Joseph Abraham[7], while considering a question whether a Catholic church can claim to be ‘an agriculturist’ under a Debt Relief Act, it was observed that there was no ‘legal impediment’ in treating the church as a person.

It is also noteworthy that after analysing, in detail, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116, the Supreme Court affirmed in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

Church: Voluntary Association

Congregation of a church is a voluntary association in the eye of law.[8] The properties are also really vested with the congregation subject to the Bylaws or Cannons.

A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves[9] pointed out that the Roman Catholic Church was described as a voluntary association in the English cases.

Catholic Church differs from the Church of England which is described as ‘established church’. Relying on the cases, Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town[10] and Merriman Vs. Williams,[11]it was observed in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves that the members who joined the church were ‘bound by any rules which it had framed for its internal discipline and for the management of its affairs’.

The Supreme Court held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma[12] as under:

“A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis – their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations.”

ED Devadason in his book on Christian Law in India states as under:

“In regard to the Roman Catholic Church the Canon Law is to be recognised by the Courts of India as customary law binding on the members. However, since 1918 when the Canon Law was codified by the Vatican Council, the Canon Law cannot be regarded as customary law. Such a set of rules which lend themselves to change from time to time by the deliberations of a competent body cannot be classified as customary law. As the Canon Law can be changed by the Vatican, perhaps under recommendations of the curia or a General Council, there is a machinery which can effect the necessary changes in the Canon Law from time to time. Therefore, such a body of rules cannot any longer be treated as customary law. They can be recognised by the Courts in India only as the rules of voluntary associations binding on the members. They are like ‘Club Rules’. When a person becomes a member of a club, he not only subscribes to the existing rules and regulations but also agrees to accept the rules as they may be changed from time to time provided the procedure prescribed for changing them has been followed. As long as a person continues to be a member of a club he is bound by the rules of the club as they are amended from time to time. The rules are binding among the members interse and also between the members of the club. In fact the rules of the club are applicable as though each member has entered into an agreement between himself and the club by which he accepts the rules of the club as terms of the contract he has entered into to become a member of the club. Similarly in accepting membership in the Church a person binds himself with the rules and the regulations of the Church concerned as though he has entered into a contract with the Church binding himself with the rules and regulations of the Church on which conditions alone he has been admitted into membership of the Church.”[13]

Church: Impressed with Principles of Public Trust

Parish churches[14] and trusts created for the benefit of a Church[15]are public religious trusts. The parishioners or members are its beneficiaries. The parishioners have no right to take away the property on the basis of a majority decision or create a new system of administration. Our Apex Court, in KS Varghese v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church,[16] held that the properties of a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for thetime immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’.

The courts in India, from the early times, took the consistent view that the religious institutions, where people worship as of right in large number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’[17] and that the properties thereof vest in the institution.[18]

S. 92 CPC Applies to Churches

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[19] to administer and enforce public trusts.[20] Interest of public is paramount in any religious trust.[21] It is held by Privy Council in Ram Dulari Dularey Vs. Ram Lal[22] that ‘court has a duty, once it finds that it is a trust for public purposes, to consider what is best in the interest of the public’. This ruling is applied in a Church Case by our Apex Court in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[23]

As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[24] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts/ institutions.[25] In In-Re, Man Singh,[26] it is held that in legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant. Courts in India, from the early times, took the view that the religious institutions, the persons who worship there as of right are large in number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’. Sec. 92 CPC expressly authorises designated courts to give directions for administration of trusts.

But, in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan[27] Kerala High Court held that the trust attached to Catholic (parish) church considered in that case was not a public trust to attract Sec. 92 CPC. It is observed that the properties of the (parish) church were vested with church authorities, and the (parish) church was a legal person. As shown above, our Apex Court, in Varghese v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church it is held that Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts.

Vesting of Property – Congregational and Episcopal Churches

It is held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma.[28]

“A Church is either Episcopal or congregational. It cannot be Episcopal in spiritual matters and congregational in temporal matters. …. That is the fundamental difference in congregational and Episcopal. In the former it vests in the parishioners. But in the latter, in endowment. …. The right to manage such property vests in the trustees under the bye-law subject to the control by the Catholicos and Metropolitan in accordance with the Constitution.”

Canon Law and Catholic Church

Canon law refers to the law internal to the church.[29] In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[30]

The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its properties; and so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church the diocesan Bishop alone would have the right, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, in respect of the church and its properties.[31] The rights in respect of the Roman Catholic churches and its property, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, vest in the Diocesan Bishop alone.[32]

Madras High Court, in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan,[33] held as under:

“Therefore we hold that once the church in question was constructed and consecrated by Arch Bishop of Trichy Diocese, the church and its properties would vest in the Pope and the fourth respondent, Arch Bishop as a delegate of the Pope, is entitled to the spiritual and temporal powers over the church and its properties. As already observed, though the church was constructed with the funds mostly provided by the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village, when the church was consecrated according to the Roman Catholic rites, the church and its properties would vest in the fourth respondent.”

It is held further as under:

“Therefore, on the basis of the law, particularly, the law governing the church in question, we hold that the church and its properties vest only in the fourth respondent herein and it is open to him to exercise his power through his delegates, namely, respondents 2 and 3. It is true that it would be open to the fourth respondent to authorise Villagers to administer the secular affairs of the church, but the plaintiffs have not established that they were authorised by the fourth respondent to administer the secular affairs of the church and even if they were so authorised, they would exercise the power of administration as authorised agents of the fourth defendant and not de hors the authorisation. Equally, it would have been open to the Villagers to form a trust to retain the administrative control over the church and its properties at the time of consecration of church subject to the grant of consent by the fourth respondent for retaining such a control. ….. It is, no doubt, true that it is open to the plaintiffs to show that notwithstanding the provisions of the Canon Law, the temporal affairs of the church are being governed by the custom of the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village. If the custom is established, then, the Roman Catholic people of Vakkampatti Village can claim right over the church and its properties by way of custom.”

A Division Bench of Madras High Court, as early as in the year 1915, in Michel Pillai Vs. Rt. Rev. Bartle[34] held as under:

“According to Canon Law a Roman Catholic Church becomes, as soon as it is consecrated, the property of the church authorities, irrespective of the fact that any particular worshipper or worshippers contributed to its construction. The Bishop and other church authorities have the exclusive right to the internal management of the church, whether relating to secular or religious matters, such as accommodating the congregation inside the church and prescribing the part to be taken by the congregation in the services and the ceremonies.”

Roman Catholic Churches are governed under Canon Law.[35] The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its property. In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[36] But, it will not nullify the law of the land.

In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School[37] it was observed that in matters of property there was always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination could make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.[38]

In Molly Joseph Vs. George Sebastian[39] it is held by the Apex Court that the personal law (Canon Law) ‘cannot have any legal impact’ in view of the enacted law – Divore Act.[40]

Juristic Personality in Canon

The Catholic Community in India is governed[41] by either ‘Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches’ (CCEC) or ‘Code of Canon Law’ (CIC).The first one is applicable to Syro Malabar Rite and Syro Malankara Rite; and the second, to the Latin Rite. The Canon Law recognises three categories of personalities; viz., the moral person, the physical person and the juridic person. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person (Canon 113). By baptism an individual or physical person is incorporated into the Church of Christ (Canon 208-223). Both ‘parish’ and the ‘diocese’ are public juridic persons. Canon 1256 stipulates that,‘under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff’, ownership of goods ‘belongs to’ that juridic person which has acquired them legitimately.

As shown above, in the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (supra), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it cannot be assumed that the courts that deal with the matters of those entities will be bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law.

In CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan[42] it is pointed out that Can.1254 and 1257 make it clear that the Catholic Church has the inherent right, independently of any secular power to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal goods, in pursuit of its proper objectives, and all temporal goods would be regulated by the Canons as well as by their own statutes. Sub-clause (2) of Can.1257 provides that unless it is otherwise expressly provided, temporal goods belonging to a private juridical person are regulated by its own statutes, not by these Canons.

Fundamental Rights as to Religion & Administration of Trusts

Church Could Administer Property, Only in Conformity With Law

The secular aspect of the management of the property of a religious trust is to be carried out in accordance with the law of the land. The Supreme Court in Ratilal Panach and Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1954 SC 388: observed that a religious denomination was entitled to own and acquire property and administer the same; ‘but only in accordance with law’ and that the State could ‘regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted’. Also See: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[43] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

Right of Parishioners to Sue against Third Parties

As per the Canon Law of the Catholic Church the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar. But, in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[44] it is found, the parish being by law a public juridic person, that the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were competent to represent the juridic person and that they were competent to initiate civil proceedings before a Civil Court with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church. It is further held that by reading the Canon as a whole, the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary for initiation of such proceedings.

Registration of Church as a Society or Trust

Parish church properties vest in trust. Majority of parishioners have no right to take away the same or create a new system of administration.[45]

The functioning of a Church or other religious trust under a written (registered or unregistered) or unwritten bylaws is recognised by the Constitution of India under various Articles including Ar. 19(1)(c), 25, 26, etc. And, in various States, there is no law at all – such as Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 and Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 – that enables or requires registration of the Church or other religious trust, as a Trust. In such States, the registration of such an already existing Church, as a society, under the Societies Regn. Act for legal recognition, is inapt and uncalled for; because,

Every member of such an existing Church has the Fundamental-Right, guaranteed by the Constitutional of India, to remain as a member of the Church even if he does not join, or refuses to join, the proposed society, as a member (assuming a society is formed officially by the church); and
The properties of such a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for the time immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’ as held by our Apex Court in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[46]

The registration of a Trust Deed or bye laws at a Sub Registry, under the Registration Act, is not ‘Registration of Trust’ as such.

Part VI

Registered Societies are NOT Juridical Persons

The enquiry as to the legal personality of an association of persons is essentially the enquiry whether it has the right of perpetuity in its own name, apart from its members. The basic tests to be applied for determining the same are the following:

(i) Whether it can sue or be sued in its own name.
(ii) Whether its property vests in itself.

Applying these tests authoritative decisions have definitively held that even the registered societies are also not juridical persons in law.

Unani Tibia College Case

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had unequivocally held in the celebrated Unani Tibia College Case,Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic &Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458, that a registered society was not a corporation and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 gave only certain privileges to a society registered under that Act. It is held that (i) the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue or be sued in its own name and (ii) the phrase ‘property belonging to a society’in Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not give the society a corporate status as this phrase merely described the property which had been vested in trustees or governing body.It had been held by several High Courts earlier, giving undue importance to the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ in Sec. 5, that the registered societies possess juristic personality or status.

See also: Benares Hindu University Vs. Gauri Dutt Joshir AIR 1950 All 196. Also see: K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook: AIR 1970 Pat 163; Inder Chand Vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha: AIR 1977 Del 34.

Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society

The law on this point is further expounded by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, as under:

i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
ii) A Society registered under the Societies Regn. Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person. (Para 21)
iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22)
iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

[1] 4th Edition

[2] AIR 1940 PC116.

[3] M. Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1.

[4] ShriomaniGurudwara v. ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[5] Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12^th Edition, page 307.

[6] ShriomaniGurudwaraPrabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[7] 1962 Ker LT 240.

[8] CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs. Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240; Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503, Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283; Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016 AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51.

[9] 35 Mad LJ 407; referred to in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan: 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[10] (1863) 1 Moo. P.C.(N.S.) 411

[11] (1882) L.R.7 A.C.484

[12] AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[13] Quoted in: Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016 AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51

[14] Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhas Vs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.

[15] Christopher Karkada, Bangalore Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503

[16] Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[17] Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790; CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Sony Markose Vs. OusephCherian: ILR 2018-4 Ker 1056; Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. MaganlalMangaldasGameti: 2013-15 SCC 394; Fr.John Jacob Vs Fr. N. I. Paulose: AIR 2014 Ker 95; GheevargheseKoshyVsChacko Thomas: AIR 1963 Ker 191.

[18]M.M. Kathanar Vs. K.E. Kathanar: AIR 1954 TC 51; Referred to in: ThakurjiShrijiLaxmanji VS Shyama Devi: 1970 0 WLN 473

[19] AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Referred to in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[20] C.K. Rajan Vs. GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee: AIR 1994 Ker 179 [Appeal Judgment: GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR 1916 All 115 (PC); C ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; Sridhar Vs. ShriJaganNath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; YogendraNathNaskar Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate: AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[21] RambakeshwarDevasthan Trust Vs. President PurohitSangh: AIR 2012 SC 139.

[22] AIR1946 PC 34.

[23] (2017) 15 SCC 333: Para 181. Ram DulariDulareyVs. Ram Lal : Referred to in NarasimhiahVs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[24] C ChikkaVenkatappaVs.DHanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan Krishnaji Vs. Anjuman E Islamia: AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915.

[25] Ch. Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009-19 Dlh -265. See also Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate AIR 2007 SC 1337; SubramoniaPillaiChellamPillai Vs. SubramoniaPillai: AIR 1953 TC 198; M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[26]AIR 1974 Del. 228

[27] 2016(2) Ker LT 791

[28] AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[29]Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001

[30] Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[31] CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[32] CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs. Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240.

[33]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[34]ILR 39 Mad. 1056. Quoted in 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[35] Major Arch Bishop Vs. LalanTharakan, 2016(2) Ker LT 791.

[36] Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[37]AIR 1958 MP 362

[38] See also: Rev. Fr. Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. State of Bombay: 1960-62 Bom LR 790 (Mudholkar& VM Tharkunde, JJ.); Gnanamuthu Udayar Vs. Anthoni: AIR 1960 Mad 430.

[39] AIR 1997 SC 109

[40] See also: Saly Joseph Vs. Baby Thomas: AIR 1999 Ker 66; Varkey Vs. Thresia: AIR 1955 Ker 255

[41] See: Seline Fernandez Vs. Bernard Francis: ILR 2013-1 Ker 56

[42]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[43] 62 Bom LR 790

[44] 2013(4) Ker LT 283

[45] Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[46] Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333. Churches are public religious trusts: Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.

Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques

Created: 07 Jul 2024 at 23:29