Saji Koduvath.

Abstract

• Generally speaking, the legal ownership of trust property vests in trustees.
• But, in case of a property of a legal person, such as temple, Math, etc., the legal ownership thereof vests with that legal person.
• In English Law there is ‘duel ownership’ upon a trust property; ie., the legal or trust ownership. It is not followed in India. In India the ‘eqiotable ownership’ is not accepted.
• The vesting of property is subject to the basic principles of foundation laid down by the author.

Introduction

English Law asserts ‘duel ownership’ upon a trust property; ie., the legal or trust ownership[1] vested with the trustee; and real, equitable or beneficial ownership, with the beneficiaries or the cestui que trust.

Merely because the property is vested in the trustee as the legal owner, he is not the full owner of the property in the real sense of the term; because, the beneficial interest (is, ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owner) and equitable ownership are carved out in the property. Similarly, the ‘real’ or beneficial ownership with the beneficiary is not the ‘proprietary interest’ pertaining to an owner; but, it is interest pertaining to beneficiaries.

No ‘Equitable Ownership’ With Beneficiaries under Indian Law

But, Indian Law does not recognize legal and equitable estates. [2] There is no ‘equitable/beneficial ownership’ with the beneficiaries as per the Common Law of trust predicated by courts in India and under the Indian Trusts Act, in both public and private trusts. Beneficiaries have, under Indian Law, only beneficial[3] interest.[4] It is not the interest that pertains to (true) owner.

Inasmuch as idols, and trusts like Mutts, are considered as juristic persons by virtue of legal fiction imposed by Common Law of India, exploration of actual vesting of ownership of trust property has much significance. 

Property Vests in the ‘Legal Ownership’ of the Trustees

Salmond on Jurisprudence[5]  reads as under:

• “A trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust.”

As per the definition of trust in the Indian Trusts Act, ‘a trust is (i) an obligation annexed to the ownership of property and (ii) arising out of a confidence accepted by the owner’.  Because the obligation upon the trustee is to administer the trust property, and the obligation is ‘annexed to the ownership of property’, the administration by the trustee is, is as its (legal) owner. When the ‘beneficial interest or interest’ is defined, it is explained that the ‘beneficial interest’ or ‘interest’ of the beneficiary is his right against the trustee ‘as owner of the trust property’.

Because the obligation upon the trustee is to administer the trust property, and the obligation is ‘annexed to the ownership of property’, the administration by the trustee is, is as its (legal) owner.

Read Blog: Indian Law Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership

Inasmuch as the vesting of ownership of trust property with the trustee is under an obligation to manage it for the benefit of the beneficiaries, the trust property vests in the ‘legal ownership’ of the trustees;[6] and not in their absolute or actual ownership, as observed in Kansara  Abdulrehman  Sadruddin Vs. Trustees of the Maniar  Jamat Ahmedabad.[7]. The actual owner loses his title thereto by the creation of a trust[8].  But, in case of a property of a legal person, such as temple, Math, etc., the legal ownership thereof vests with that legal person.[9]

The ingredients of trust stated in the former part of Section 6 (ie. intention, purpose, beneficiary and property), are the legal requirements for endowments also. The differentiating particularity of trust is the ‘transfer of the trust-property to the trustee’. From Sections 10 and 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 it is clear that the (legal) ‘ownership’ of trust property vests with the trustee. 

Sec. 10 reads as under:

• 10. ….. Disclaimer of trust.—Instead of accepting a trust, the intended trustee may, within a reasonable period, disclaim it, and such disclaimer shall prevent the trust property from vesting in him. A disclaimer by one of two or more co-trustees vests the trust property in the other or others and makes him or them sole trustee or trustees from the date of the creation of the trust.

Sec. 75 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 reads:

• 75. Vesting of trust property in new trustees.—Whenever any new trustee is appointed under section 73 or section 74, all the trust property for the time being vested in the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, or in the legal representative of any trustee, shall become vested in such new trustee, either solely or jointly with the surviving or continuing trustees or trustee, as the case may require.

Vesting of Property Held by Associations and Public Trusts

In law, vesting of property is of two kinds.

• Vesting for management 
• Vesting of ownership. 

Vesting for management:

Under Common-Law of trusts in India, properties of associations of people and public trust properties vest for management with the administrators known as managers, trustees, governing bodies, directors, Shebaits, Dharmakarthas, etc. The persons in management have a fiduciary duty to perform the obligations they had undertaken. 

Vesting of Ownership:

There may be no difficulty, in case of a legal entity, such as an idol or a mutt, to determine the person in whom the legal ownership of property vests. But, even in such cases, a further question may arise  – inasmuch as the vesting of property in a legal person is only in an ‘ideal sense’ – in whom the actual or ultimate ownership vests.

General Propositions as to Vesting of Trust Property

‘Ultimate Vesting’: No Practical Importance in Public Trust

The enquiry as to actual or ultimate vesting of ownership of a public trust property (beyond the vesting of the legal ownership) may be commented upon as superfluous, if not redundant, inasmuch as it is a basic principle that ‘once a trust is always trust’[10]; and therefore, the law does not envisage such an enquiry. 

When dedication of property is for the benefit of public, either for religious purposes or for other matters, it is irrevocable. If the endowment created by the dedication is a legal person the dedicated property vests in such person.  If the same is not a legal person, the terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed, if any, or other evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.

In most cases of public trusts, the ‘ultimate vesting’ may not be a matter of practical importance; because, the endowment will be permanent and indivisible; and court takes cognizance, when practical difficulties come to carry-on the object of the trust, by applying cy-pres doctrine or by invoking its statutory/inherent jurisdiction.

It is held in Syed Mohammad Salie Labbai Vs. Mohd Hanifa[11]  that once a Kabarstan has been held to be a public graveyard then it vests in the public and constitutes a wakf and it cannot be divested by nonuser but will always continue to be so whether it is used or not.

But, the nature of vesting of actual ownership of property held by Associations of persons and trusts may be risen up for consideration, while a dissention or valid claim for separation arises or if there could be a lawful winding-up or dissolution. Where the property continues to be that of the Society, change in office bearers who control of management of the Society cannot amount to creation of third party interest in or transfer of property of Society. The same does not amount to creation of any rights in the property of Society in favour of changed management inasmuch as the assets continue to be enjoyed by the Society and the new management does not acquire any personal interest in the assets.

Vesting is Subject to Basic Principles of Foundation

The vesting of trust property is always subject to the basic principles of foundation laid down by the author/founder of the trust. In proper cases, courts enquire, on the basis of evidence, what were the true ‘basic principles of foundation’. The nature of vesting of actual ownership, and the basic principles of its foundation (beyond legal ownership which vests in the trustees; or beyond the ‘ideal ownership’ vest in a legal person), differs according to the nature of the trust.

We can take cue from the following observations of Dr. BK Mukherjea, J., on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts:[12]

• “The idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognized by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests.”[13]

It is further explained in by   Dr. Mukherjea, J. as under:

• “… ‘The dedication to deity’, said Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Bhupati Vs.  Ramlal, ILR 37 Cal. 128, ‘is nothing but a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed’. It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it”.[14]

Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Trusts/Associations

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

• 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
• In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Two views are possible from the 2^nd paragraph of Sec. 5: First, all unregistered associations are ‘living persons’ by this inclusive definition. Second, by virtue of the decisive and directive clause – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property’ – juristic persons alone can be brought-in as ‘living persons’.

The accepted and authoritative view is that companies, incorporated clubs, statutory bodies etc. alone can be considered as ‘living persons’ under Sec. 5. The laws in force accept only ‘juristic persons’, other than individuals, as ‘living persons’ capable of holding/possessing and transferring properties. Therefore, unincorporated or unregistered associations of individuals cannot take benefit of this provision. It is authoritatively pointed out that the first limb of the second part of Sec. 5 –‘living person’ includes a company or association or body of individuals – cannot stand independent from the latter regulative part (‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property’). Usha Rani Kundu  Vs. Agradut  Sangha (2006) 3 Cal LT 139; 2006 (3) CHN 77, eruditely exposes this explanation.

It is now settled law that though an idol is considered by a fiction of law as a juristic person clothed for some purposes with rights of persons, it is not a living person for the purpose of the Transfer of Property Act.

Note: Order 31 rule 1 CPC also makes it clear – a trust is not a legal person. It enables to file a suit by (or be sued) a trustee concerning ‘property vested in trustees’.

“Bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “Bodies of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act (transfer to – “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals) is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in ‘Beneficiaries’ of a Trust.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

‘Law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5 TP Act includes “common law”. It is a reality: the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well-known institutions, organisations, and associations attached to well reputed trusts, institutions etc., though they are not juristic-persons in its strict sense. Our courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

• Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
• Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
• Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
• Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
• Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
• Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
• Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
• Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
• Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
• Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
• Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
• Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
• Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole, AIR 1969 SC 563, that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence reads: “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

Read Blog: Dedication of Property in Public Trusts

Vesting of Actual Ownership of Property of an Association

Ownership of property of a club vests in its members. Salmond on Jurisprudence reads as under:[15]

• “The Club property is the joint property of the members, though in fact, it is often held by trustees on behalf of the members.”

Halsbury’s Law of England lays down:[16]

• “Unincorporated members’ clubs. – An unincorporated members’ club is a society of persons each of whom contributes to the funds out of which the expenses of conducting the society are paid. ……. Subject to any rule to the contrary, the property and funds of the club belong to the members of the time being jointly in equal shares. “

A society is the compendium of its members and its property is the ‘joint property’ held by the members as ‘joint tenants’ (as opposed to ‘tenants in common’, till a decision is taken for dissolution).

If objectives of foundation of a society envisioned permanency; or preservation of its property is mandated for the benefit of its future members also (and therefore encumbered with obligations attached to ‘trust’), the members of a particular time cannot deal with the property disregarding its objectives of foundation.

Gift on Trust for Future and Existing Members: Cannot Appropriate

Underhill, in his treatise ‘Law of Trusts and Trustees’, explained it thus:

• “However, the crucial difference surely is that no absolutely entitled members exist if the gift is on trust for future and existing members, always being for the members of the association for the time being. The members for the time being cannot under the association rules appropriate trust property for themselves for there would then be no property held on trust as intended by the testator for those persons who some years later happened to be the members of the association for the time being.” [17]

Tudor on Charities reads:

• “A gift to a parish church is construed to be a gift to the parson and parishioners of that parish and their successors forever.”[18]

Vesting of Ownership of Trust/Association Property

The following propositions can be presented as to the vesting of ownership of the trust-property and the property held by an association.

1. In most cases of public trusts, the ‘ultimate vesting’ may not be a matter of practical importance; because, the endowment will be permanent and indivisible; and court takes cognizance, when practical difficulties come to carry on the object of the trust, by applying cy pres doctrine or by invoking its statutory/inherent jurisdiction.
2. The terms of dedication (as revealed from the deed of dedication, if any, or on other substantial evidence) determine the person or body of persons in whom/which such property ultimately vest in.
3. If the ownership of the property of a trust vests in a legal person, such vesting is permanent (thereby it cannot be put to an end), and is subject to the purpose envisaged by the founder, as revealed from the document of foundation or byelaws, if any.
4. If the property is that of an association and the members thereof are ascertainable (as in the case of a society) the actual ownership of the property will be presumed to be vested with those members (from time-to-time), only as joint owners (contra-distinct to ownership under tenants-in-common).
5. If the property is one dedicated to public so as to form a public trust and beneficiaries are unascertainable (as in the case of a political party or a Church) the property ultimately vests with the entire members (of such Association or Church), from time to time, permanently (thereby it cannot be put to an end), subject to its objectives, as revealed from the document of foundation or byelaws, if any.
6. If the subject matter of a trust is one partially dedicated to public at large or a section of public (as in the case of a waiting shed or a public well)by a known person and administered and maintained by himself or another person, the property  will continue to vest with the owner.
7. If the subject matter of the trust is dedicated to public at large or a section of public, the title of such subject matter stands separated from the owner and vests in public or a section of public who are the beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of foundation or byelaws, if any.
8. If the property is one acquired by a branch of a larger body, or a parish of a Church, for the benefit of all persons/members of the larger body, the entire members of the larger body, from time to time, will be presumed to be the owners, subject to the byelaws of the association and the objectives of the trust impressed upon the property. 

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

• “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
• 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
• 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

• “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?

Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Vesting of Property in Various Kinds of Associations and Trusts

Club, Society, Firm and Company

No.	Nature of Association.	Vesting of Management and Legal Ownership.	Vesting  of actual/ ultimate ownership	Whether perma-nent or can it be put an end to
1	Club	Trustees or Gov. Body, as per  Byelaws	Members, subject to the byelaws and objectives of foundation.	Presumed to be not permanent.[19]
2	Unregistred. Society/ Association	-do-	-do-	Presumed to be permanent.
3	Registered Society	-do-	-do-	Permanent.  SR Act governs dissolution.
4	Firm	Partners	Partners	Contract/partnership deed governs
5	Trading Company	Board of Directors	Company	Permanent. Co. Act governs winding up.
6	Charitable or Non-trading company	-do-	-do-	-do-

Trusts/Religious-Endowments:

7	Public Trust– English Law[20]	Trustees	Legal ownership in Trustees; beneficial ownership in Beneficiaries.	Permanent
8	Public Trust-Indian (common) Law	Trustees	Beneficiaries have only beneficial interest; and, no beneficial ownership. Theoretically, properties vest in public or section who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of founda-tion or byelaws, if any.	Permanent
9	Public School, Public Library, etc.	Trustees (called by different names).	-do-	Permanent.
10	Private religious or charitable trusts	Management on Trustees (called by different names). If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.	Properties vest in trust/ institution/endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – property vests in such persons as established by evidence or the deed of foundation or byelaws.  Beneficiaries have no beneficial ownership.	Presumed to be permanent.
11	Mosque, Church, Gurudwara, etc.	Management on Trustees (by different names).  If the trust/ institution/ endowment is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership will be vested upon it.	In trust/institution or endowment itself.  If it cannot be – for it is not a legal person – section of public who are beneficiaries, subject to the objectives of foundation, as established by evidence or as revealed from the deed of foundation or bylaws, if any.	Permanent
12	Temple (Public)	Management on Shebaits/ Darmkarta/ Ooralen. Since Idol/deity is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.	Idol/deity	do-
13	Temple (private)	-do-	-do-	-do-
14	Mutt	Management on Madathipathi. Since Mutt is a legal person upon which legal ownership can be vested, legal ownership vests upon it.	Mutt	-do-
15	Private Trust (Coming under the Trusts Act	Trustees	Terms/ Deed of Trust govern.	Trusts Act governs Extinction and Revocation.[21]

Government School, University, etc.

16

University, Govt. Hospital, Govt. College, etc.

Administrators as provided in the statute concerned

In the institution itself, if not expressly stated to be in the Government.

Presumed to be permanent. (Permanent until decided to close by the Government.)

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[1]      Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12^th  Edition, page 256.

[2]      See: ChhatraKumari Devi Vs. Mohan Bikram Shah: AIR 1931 PC 196.

[3]      See: M. R. Goda  Rao Sahib Vs.  State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653; Sree Siddhi Budhi  Vinayakagar  Sree  Sundareswarar  Vs. S V Marimuthu:  AIR 1963 Mad 369.

[4]      Chhatra  Kumari Vs. Mohan Bikram: AIR 1931 PC 196; WO Holdsworth Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 1957 SC 887: 2001-9 SCC 471; Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Kripashankar: AIR 1971 SC 2463; Bai  Dosabai Vs. Mathurdas: AIR 1980 SC 1334; Bomi  Munchershaw  Mistry Vs. Kesharwani Co Op. Hosg. So.: 1993-2 BCR 301; 1993-2 BCR 32. See also: Ramabai  GovindVs. Raghunath  Vasudevo: AIR 1952 Bom 106; Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133; Behari  Lal Vs. Thakur Radha  Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73 .

[5]      Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12^th  Edition, page 256

[6]      Kansara  Abdulrehman  Sadruddin Vs. Trustees of the Maniar  Jamat : AIR 1968 Guj 184.Narayani Amma Vs Eyo Poulose: AIR 1982 Ker 198; S R Varadarajulu Naidu Vs. Papanasam Labour Union:  AIR1969 Mad 401; T C Chacko Vs. Annamma: AIR  1994 Ker 107.

[7]      AIR 1968 Guj 184.

[8]    Baba Badri Dass Vs. Dharma: AIR 1982 P&H  255

[9]      See Chapter: VESTING OF PROPERTY IN HINDU ENDOWMENTS

[10]   KS Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[11]  AIR  1976  SC 1569.

[12]    Page 38.

[13]    Quoted in Yogendra  Nath  Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[14]    Quoted in Yogendra  Nath  Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax: AIR 1969 SC 1089; M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): (2019)  SCC  OnLine SC 1440

[15]    12^th Edition, Page 326

[16]    IV Edition, Vol. 6, Para 205

[17]    Quoted in: Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs. Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[18] Page 208

[19]    If the objectives of foundation envisage benefit to future members also, the present members and administrators are trustees for future members.

[20]    Preferred name: Charities

[21]    It is settled that in the matter of (secular) private trusts, English principles are followed in India which lay down that if the beneficiaries are sui juris and of one mind, the trust can be put to an end or use the trust fund for any purpose (they wish): Profulla  Chorone  Requitte Vs. Satya  Chorone  Requitte: AIR 1979 SC 1682.

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