Saji Koduvath.

Synopsis

1. Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860
2. Bye Laws Bind as Contract
3. Bye laws Must be Reasonable and in Accord with So. Rgn. Act
4. Bye laws – Fundamental
5. Bye Laws Determines Form and Formation of Govg. Body
6. Bye Laws Vs. Rule of Majority
7. Amendment of Bye Laws
8. Sub Rules
9. Churches and Canon Law
10. Disputes be Redressed as Provided by the Rules

1. Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

• 1. Societies formed by memorandum of association and registration
  •  Any seven or more persons associated for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in section 20 of this Act, may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and filing the same with Registrar of Joint-stock Companies form themselves into a society under this Act.
• 2. Memorandum of association
  • The memorandum of association shall contain the following things, that is to say, the name of the society; the object of the society; the names, addresses, and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee, or other governing body to whom, by the rules of the society, the management of its affairs is entrusted. A copy of the rules and regulations of the society, certified to be a correct copy by not less than three of the members of the governing body, shall be filed with the memorandum of association.
• 20. To what Societies Act applies
  • The following societies may be registered under this Act:-
  •  Charitable societies, the military orphan funds or societies established at the several presidencies of India, societies established for the promotion of science, literature, or the fine arts for instruction, the diffusion of useful knowledge, [the diffusion of political education], the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading-rooms for general use among the members or open to the public or public museums and galleries of paintings and other works of art, collections of natural history, mechanical and philosophical inventions, instruments, or designs.

2. Bye Laws Bind as Contract

The members of a club or society, both registered and unregistered, are bound by the memorandum of association and its rules and regulations. The bye laws bind its members as a contract.[1] Even the formation of a society itself is based on a contract.[2] When a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality[3] qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws.[4] It is observed in Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar [5] that the rights of members merge in the rights of the society. In State of UP Vs. CD Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society,[6] our Apex Court explicated it with the analogy that the stream cannot rise higher than the source. It reads:

•  “Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On fulfillment of the qualifications prescribed to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act, Rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, Rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, Rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.”

It is observed in All India Sank Employee’s Association Vs. National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes)[7] as under:

• “As the stream can rise no higher than the source, associations of citizens cannot lay claim to rights not open to citizens, or claim freedom from restrictions to which the citizens composing it are subject.”

If the rules of  the society or club provided that the decision of a particular question must be by a majority, [8]  the decision would bind all the members unless the act complained of is a fraud on the minority or is ultra vires the society or club. In all other matters about which the rules are silent, the majority does not have any right to coerce the minority[9].

Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Hira Devi Vs. District Board of Shahjahanpur[10], it is determined in Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-operative Societies[11] that the secretary of a society cannot perform any function which the rules do not authorise him to perform. The secretary is the creature of the rules.

Salmond reads:

• “The rules of the club or society constitute the basic contract to which all the members are parties.”[12]

The civil court has jurisdiction to interfere where a club had followed a procedure not warranted by the Rules of the Club.[13]

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD  Kaushik[14] it is observed that the Memorandum of Association is a contract amongst the members of the Society and that these are rules which govern internal control and management of the Society. The authority to frame, amend, vary and rescind such rules, undoubtedly, vests in the General Body of the Members of the Society. The power to amend the rules is implicit in the power to frame rules.

3. Bye laws Must be Reasonable and in Accord with So. Rgn. Act

It is trite law[15] that an unfair, unreasonable or irrational clause in a contract is unjust and amenable to Judicial Review. Bye laws of a society or a club is a contract amongst its members. Bye laws must be reasonable.[16] It is liable to be held invalid for uncertainty.[17] It should not militate against the provisions of the Societies Registration Act and Contract Act.

In ABC Laminart Pvt. Ltd. Vs. SAP Agencies, Salem[18] it is held:

• “….   An agreement enforceable at law is a contract. An agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the court absolutely is contrary to public policy and hence void. …”

It was held, with respect to bylaw of a public body, in Repton School Governors Vs. Repton Rural District Council[19] as under:

• “I quite agree that bye laws, especially those of public bodies, should be approached from the point of view of upholding them, if possible, and should be, as it has been described, benevolently interpreted; but still they must be reasonable.”[20]

In H.C. Suman Vs. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees’ Cooperative House Building Society (AIR 1991 SC 2160) it is observed: 

• “In Kruse Vs. Johnson [(1898) 2 QB 91] it was held that in determining the validity of bye-laws made by public representatives bodies, such as country councils, the court ought to be slow to hold that a bye-law is void for unreasonableness. A bye-law so made ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes or unjust, or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of those subject to it…”[21]

In Shanti Swarup Vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha, Dayal Bagh,[22] the bylaws of the society stated the terms for dissolution as under: ‘The society shall stand dissolved in case no Satsang Guru reappeared within two years of the death of the last Satsang Guru’. It was held that such bye laws were invalid and inoperative, they being militated against the provisions of Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Sec 13 relates to dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs).

In Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies[23] it is held that the Rule of the Society which declared a person would cease to be a member merely on his default to make the subscription, without even providing him an opportunity to show cause for not making the payment within a specified period appeared ‘to be very harsh’;  and that ‘confiscatory and deprivatory provisions made, resulting in civil consequences, should not have been allowed’ to be incorporated in the bye laws. The Division Bench struck down the impugned Rule it being contrary to the provisions of the Act. It is also on the principle that rules of natural justice require that that no person can be condemned unheard.[24]

4. Bye laws – Fundamental

If a person voluntarily joins in a particular association, including a Church, he would be bound by the rules which have been framed for the internal discipline and for the management of its affairs.[25]

Any action taken contrary to the bye laws would be ultra vires.[26] Even the entire members of an association, altogether, cannot legally do a thing which is ultra vires; though they are at liberty to change or amend their bye laws and do the thing, provided it is not hit by the  doctrine of ‘basic principles of foundation’. It is held in Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh:[27]

• “Rule of Law demands and dictates that the people follow the Law. The Constitution, whether of the State or of a Society registered under the Societies Act, is paramount. As people are to follow the Law in a State, so the members of a Society are duty-bound to follow the Constitution of the Society. After all, the Constitution is the soul of the Society. The Society, therefore, cannot function in contravention of its Constitution. .… In case the action of the Sabha is contrary to the tenor and spirit of its Constitution, the said action cannot be sustained by a Court of law. The doctrine of factum valet is applicable to cure the violation of a directory provision or a mere matter of form but does not cure the violation of the fundamental principles or the essence of the transaction.”

In Sri Bhaben Chandra Pegu Vs. The State of Assam[28] the Division Bench considered the relevant statutory Rule under which meeting of the governing body of a college had to be convened and pointed out that acts in violation of the Rules would be void, unlawful and illegal and was liable to be set aside.

Dissent and Disagreement be Resolved under the Party Constitution

In the ‘floor test case’ (Maharashtra Assembly), Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (decided on May 11, 2023), the Supreme Court held as under:  

• “88. The political imbroglio in Maharashtra arose as a result of party differences within the Shiv Sena. However, the floor test cannot be used as a medium to resolve internal party disputes or intra party disputes. Dissent and disagreement within a political party must be resolved in accordance with the remedies prescribed under the party constitution, or through any other methods that the party chooses to opt for.”

Strict Compliance of the Bye-Laws

Strict compliance of the bye-law may not be necessary when the member of the Co-operative Sugar Factory is unable to comply with the conditions due to circumstances, over which he could have no control. Non cultivation of sugar cane crop due to paucity of the irrigation facility could be attributed to calamity which occurred in the drought prone area. It is, therefore, clear that noncompliance of the condition was due to vis-major. It is worthy to be mentioned that such bye-law is required to be construed having regard to the object of the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act.[29]

Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[30] In the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers. The courts cannot set aside such elections on the sole ground that certain statutory provisions have not been complied with by it.[31]

When a question arose as to whether the provision in the Co-operative Rules that provides 15 clear days notice for moving a no-confidence motion was directory or mandatory,[32] following the Supreme Court decision in Narasimhiah Vs. Singri Gowda[33] it was held in VA Jose Vs. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies[34] that the provision was only directory since the legislature had not provided any consequence that was to follow if 15 clear days notice had not been given and since the petitioner did not explain in what manner he was prejudiced for not getting 15 clear days’ notice. It was also held that the petitioner being participated in the disputed meeting, he had no right to challenge the invalidity in the notice for convening the meeting.

In Supriyo BasuVs. WB Housing Board[35] it has been held by our Apex Court that it is undisputed that a Co-operative Society is constituted on agreement between members thereof who had agreed to abide by the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Rules framed thereunder or the bye-laws framed by the Society. The Society is undisputedly not a department of the State and is also not a creature of a statute but merely governed by a statute. Only if it is established that the mandatory provision of a Statute has been violated, a writ petition could be maintainable.

5. Bye Laws Determines Form and Formation of Governing Body

It is pertinent to note that the Societies Registration Act enacted in 1860 does not specifically direct ‘election’ of the governing body. The rules and regulations of the society determine the form and details as to formation of the governing body.[36]

 A democratic set up in the associations or unions, subject to its bye laws, is envisioned in that right to form an association itself. Bye laws of several societies, especially religious and Government-controlled societies, provide for permanent or ex-officio Presidents.

Person who Signs Pleadings must be Authorised by the Bye­laws

The Supreme Court, in  P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:

• (i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its bye­laws.
• (ii) The bye­laws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
  • since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
  • in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
• (iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the bye­laws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
  • The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the bye­laws support the institution of such a suit.

6. Bye Laws Vs. Rule of Majority

Can a society be formed disregarding democratic principles?

The immediate answer may be, ‘yes’; mainly because, the So. Regn. Act,[37] enacted in 1880, does not speak as to ‘election’; and because, the members of an association are united on consensual basis whereby the members are voluntarily submitted themselves to the administration under the bye laws. Therefore, they cannot question the reasonableness of the bye laws as ‘the stream cannot rise higher than the source’.

What is in the interest of the society is primarily for the society alone to decide and it is not for an outside agency to say.[38]

Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society. With respect to Co-op. Societies, it is held in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary Vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation[39] as under: 

• “The Co-operative society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or Bye-laws both on the principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles into the Act or Rules or Bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or Bye-law regarding election of an office bearer by the Board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India, and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express provision under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws for removal of an office bearer, such office bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office.”

But, it may also be equally important: an autonomous association, which is formed in a republic which considers doctrines of collective wisdom or democracy important and which is founded under the guarantees given in the ‘fundamental-rights’ of the Constitution of such a republic, it is expected to be (if not should be) a miniature replica of the republic. Therefore, though the members of an association are united on consensual basis and are voluntarily submitted themselves to the administration under the bye laws, if the provisions of its bye laws annihilate democratic principles, the same will be reckoned as illegal as opposed to public-policy.

In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector Rajgad,[40] with regard to removal of an office bearer, the Supreme Court observed: 

• ”34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law.”

Majority of an Association Cannot Alter Fundamental Principles

The fundamental principles upon which a trust is founded cannot be varied. Therefore, the courts cannot sanction any drastic amendment to the document of trust which would destroy the basic purpose for which the trust was created. The trust properties will not be allowed to be sold even to the members of their community for whose benefit the trust is created and the properties were acquired. It is also not open for the majority of the members of an association to alter the fundamental principles upon which it is founded, unless such a power is specifically reserved. These principles laid down in Milligan Vs.  Mitchel,[41]Attorney General Vs. Anderson[42] and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[43] is referred to in Prasanna Venkitesa Rao Vs. Srinivasa Rao.[44]

In Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun the House of Lords (by a majority of 5-2) found that the minority was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that object, their successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church was held.

7. Amendment of Bye Laws

See blog: ‘Amendment of Bye Laws’.

8. Sub Rules

The legal basis and principles for formulating the sub rules can be traced from the doctrine of ‘implied ancillary and incidental powers’. If there is no detailed rules governing an important administrative or quasi-judicial matter, such as election, selection or redressal of disputes, the concerned authority will have the legitimate right to formulate detailed sub rules in that matter. It is, mainly, to provide proclaimed ‘general standards’ in administration and to ensure ‘rule of law’.[45] Nonetheless, it must be intra vires, reasonable and conducive to the intended purpose.

Similarly, in the absence of express or implied regulations to the contrary,[46] the Domestic Tribunals including Syndicate of a University,[47] Enquiry Committees, election authorities, etc. are also free to evolve and follow their own procedure as they are ‘masters of their own procedure’;[48] but, they must ensure natural justice in their actions.[49]

With respect to the procedure to be adopted by the domestic tribunal it is held in Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar[50] as under:

• “It is not the province and the function of this Court to lay down either the time or the mode and manner in which autonomous and high-powered bodies like the Syndicate of the appellant-University are entitled to conduct their business in the meetings. They are equally masters of their own procedure and unless there is an infraction of the clear statutory rules in carrying out their duties and in conforming to the procedure prescribed by law, this Court would be ill-advised to render any gratuitous advice to them in their autonomous field in dealing and disposing of their business.”

Lord Denning, Master of Rolls, in the Court of Appeal in England observed, with respect to the doctrine, ‘masters of their own procedure’, as under, in the matter of a non-statutory domestic tribunal:[51]

• “Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as of right to be legally represented, much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not interfere….”[52]

See Blog: Management – Powers of General Body and Governing Body

9. Churches and Canon Law

Canon-Law refers to the law internal to the church. [53] In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[54]

The Catholic Community in India is governed[55] either by ‘Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches’ (CCEC) applicable to Syro Malabar & Syro Malankara Rites, or ‘Code of Canon Law’ (CIC), applicable to the Latin Rite.  The Canon Law recognizes three categories of personalities; ie., the moral person, the physical person and the juridic person. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person (CIC – 113). By baptism an individual is incorporated into the Church of Christ (CIC -208-223).

Both “parish” and the “diocese” are public juridic persons. Canon (CIC) 1256 specifically provides that under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff, ownership of goods belongs to that particular juridic person which has acquired them legitimately.

10. Disputes be Redressed by the Mechanism Provided by the Rules

In Kowtha Suryanarayana Rao Vs. Patibandla Subrahmanyam[56]  it is held as follows:

• “It is a well established principle that, provided that the acts of the management are within the powers of the society itself any dispute between individual members of the society and those responsible for its management must be decided by the machinery provided by the rules and not in a Court of law. It is only when an act is ultra vires the society that a member is entitled to come to a Civil Court and have the act of the management which is ultra vires declared to be void.”

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD  Kaushik[57] it is observed that in matters of internal management of an association, the courts normally do not interfere, leaving it open to the association and its members to frame a particular bye-law, rule or regulation which may provide for eligibility and or qualification for the membership and/or providing for limitations/restrictions on the exercise of any right by and as a member of the said association.

It is further held in this decision that the Memorandum of Association is a contract amongst the members of the Society and that these are rules which govern internal control and management of the Society. The authority to frame, amend, vary and rescind such rules, undoubtedly, vests in the General Body of the Members of the Society. The power to amend the rules is implicit in the power to frame rules.

It is well settled legal proposition that once a person becomes a member of the association, such a person loses his individuality qua the association and he has no individual rights except those given to him by the rules and regulations and/or bye-laws of the association. Courts will not delve in the internal disputes of an association unless it is shown[58] that the aggrieved parties have worked out and exhausted their remedies[59] (but, failed to resolve disputes) under the bye laws, before:

• (a) the machinery or body (domestic tribunals)[60], if any,  provided in its bye laws,[61] or
• (b) the body or authority which has to take (expressly or impliedly) cognisance of the matter, under its bye laws, or
• (c) the authorities under the statute, if any, holds the field.[62]

The general principle is that when the Act and the Rules made thereunder are silent on a particular aspect, we have to look for guidance into the broad scheme of the Act and the intention of the legislature.[63] This principle applies, with full vigor, to the bye laws of voluntary associations.

In the celebrated decision, TP Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria,[64] the Supreme Court held that a member of a Masonic lodge was bound to abide by the rules of the lodge, and if the rules provide for expulsion, he should be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules;[65] and that the lodge was bound to act strictly according to the rules.[66]

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[1]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commissioner of I T: AIR 2004 SC 4716; Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301; Co- op. Central Bank Vs. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh: AIR 1969  SC 245;  Naresh Chandra Sanyal Vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn Ltd. : AIR 1971  SC 422; Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973.        

[2]      Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Dist. Registrar: AIR 2005  SC 2306; State Bank of India Staff Association Vs. Mohindra Bhattacharyya:  AIR 1991 Cal 378.

[3]      Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985  SC 973; Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966.

[4]      Syed Munir Hoda Vs. Bader Sayeed: TLMAD-2012-0-2262; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: : (2011) 13 SCC 774; State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413.

[5]      Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC 2306

[6]      AIR 1997  SC  1413: Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. H. Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC  2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[7]      AIR 1962 SC 171 

[8]      Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India : ILR2009-19 Dlh216

[9]      Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439

[10]    AIR 1952 SC 362

[11]    Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-Op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439

[12]    Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12^th Edition, Page 326.

[13]    Kalyan Kumar Dutta Gupta Vs. B.M. Verma: AIR 1995 Cal. 140 (DB). Also see: Deepak R Mehtra Vs. National Sports Club of India: ILR 2009-19 Dlh 216. See Chapter: Expulsion of Members & Officers’ Removal.

[14]   (2011) 13 SCC 774

[15]    LIC of India Vs. Consumer Education & Research Centre: AIR 1995 SC 1811; A C Muthiah Vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India: (2011) 6 SCC 617: CTC 2010 (2) 429; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD  Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774.

[16]    Alty Vs. Farrell (1896) 1 QB 638; Kruse Vs. Johnson, (1898) 2 QB 91, Scott Vs. Pilliner, (1904) 2 KB 855, Repton School Governors Vs. Repton Rural District Council, (1918) 2 KB 133; Chester Vs. Bateson, (1920) 1 KB 829; Attorney General Vs. Denhy, 1925 Ch 596: All referred to in: Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[17]    Nash Vs. Finlay. (1901) 85 LT 082; Attorney General Vs. Denhy, 1925 Ch. 596. Both referred to in: Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[18]    AIR 1989 SC 1239

[19]    (1918) 2 KB 133

[20]    It is referred to in: Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[21]    Quoted in Om Prakash Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh: AIR 2004 SC 1896.

[22]    AIR 1969 All 248

[23]    ILR 1997 Kar 3127.

[24]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585: AIR 1990 NOC 26(Del)

[25]   Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves: 35 MLJ 407; Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town (1863) 1 Moo. P.C.(N.S.)411) and Merriman Vs. Williams: (1882) L.R.7 A.C.484) referred to. S Robert Vs. M Kanagappan: (2003)2 MLJ 254.

[26]    Lila Parulekar Vs. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.: AIR 2005 SC 4074; Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh Vs. Additional Registrar Co-op. Societies: AIR1962 All 439. 

[27]    2007-4 Raj LW 3547

[28]    1998 (1) GLR 38

[29]   Yeshwant Khashaba Dubal Vs. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana: 1991 CTJ 230

[30]    Committee of Management  Vs. Commr, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.

[31]    See: Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate: AIR 2007 SC 1337

[32]   Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi. AIR 1970 SC 1244. Quoted in Palakole Co Op Sugars Ltd Vs. P N Raju: 1988-2 ALT 460, 1988-2 APLJ 433

[33]    AIR 1966 SC 330

[34]    ILR 2007 (1) Ker 10

[35]    AIR 2005 SC  4187.         Madhya Pradesh Rajya Sahakari Bank Maryadit Vs. State of MP: AIR 2007 SC 540.

[36]    Sec. 2, 16 and 20 are relevant.

[37]    See Sec. 2 & 16.

[38]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvanagar Sahakari Griha: (2000) 9 SCC 295;         Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar: AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[39]    AIR  2015 SC 1960

[40]    AIR 2012 SC 1339

[41]    40 ER 852

[42]    (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[43]    (1904) AC 515:

[44]    AIR 1931 Mad. 12. See also: Inderpal Singh Vs. Avtar Singh: 2007-4 Raj LW 3547;         Allahabad High School Society Vs. State of UP: 2010-5 ADJ 734, 2010-82 All LR 83; P. Jayader Vs. Thiruneelakanta Nadar Chinnaneela Nadar: ILR  1966-2 Mad 92.

[45]    State of U P Vs. Pawan Kumar Singh [2009-3 ADJ 166].Also see: Vidya Charan Shukla Vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association: AIR 1991 Mad 323; Pati Tripathi Vs. The Board of High School & Intermediate Edn, UP:  AIR 1973 All 1   (FB).

[46]    See: Shyam Narain Shukla Vs. State of UP: 1995-25 All LR 100; 1995-1 LBESR 174; Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta Vs. Asit Ranjan Majumder: AIR 1962 Cal 530; Balaka Co-Operative  Vs. Shri Shibdas Raha: AIR 1992 Cal 122.

[47]    Guru Nanak University Vs. Iqbal Kaur Sandhu: AIR  1976 P & H 69.

[48]    Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 P & H 21; State of Haryana Vs. Ram Chander: 1976 P & H 381; Sarup Singh Vs. State of Punjab: 1990-1 LLJ 285. Board of High School and Intermediate Education Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta: AIR 1962 SC 1110 (Local Government Board Vs. Alridge, 1915 AC 120 referred to); Ramesh Kapur Vs. Punjab University, AIR 1965 Punj 120; Triambak  Pati Tripathi Vs. The Board of H S and Intermediate Edn.:  AIR 1973 All 1; Bansi Lal Gera Vs. University Of Delhi: 1968-4 DLT 353; University of Madras v. Nagalingam : AIR 1965 Mad 107. See as to statutory Tribunal: Annamalai Vs. R. Doraiswamy Mudaliar: 1982 ACJ 371. Sasidharan Vs. State of Kerala: 1980 KerLT  671

[49]    Ramesh Kapur Vs. Punjab University:  AIR 1965 Punj 120; Rakesh Kumar Vs. J And K State Board of School Education: AIR 1992 J&K 22.

[50]   AIR 1977 Pj & Hr 21

[51]    Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. Vs. Football Association Ltd. (1971 Chancery Div. 591)

[52]    Quoted in J K Aggarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation:  AIR 1991 SC 1221.

[53]    Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001.             

[54]    Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez: 2013(4) Ker LT 283; Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan, 2016(2) Ker LT 791.

[55]    Seline Fernandez Vs. Bernard Francis: ILR 2013-1 Ker 56.

[56]    AIR 1940 Mad 902.

[57]   (2011) 13 SCC 774

[58]    Madras Gymkhana Club Vs. KC Sukumar: 2010-1 CTC 199.

[59]    A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan: 2000 (7) SCC 695: AIR 2000 SC 3032; Superintending Engineer Periyar Electricity Distribution Circle Erode Vs. Pavathal: 2002-2 CTC 544; 2002-1 Mad LJ 515. G. Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP Arya Vysya Mahasabha  Vs. Mutyapu Sudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227; Umesh Shivappa Ambi Vs. Angadi Shekara Basappa: (1998) 4 SCC 529: AIR 1999 SC 1566; Avtar Singh Hit Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (2006) 8 SCC 487; Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh: AIR  2006 SC 52; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;NP Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer1952 SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64

[60]    Ujjal TalukdarVs. Netai Chand Koley: AIR 1969 Cal 224. Rashmi Bala Saxena Vs. Jiwaji University Gwalior: AIR  1989 MP 181

[61]    Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774

[62]    G. Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. Bar Council of AP: 2014 (2) ALD 101; 2014 (1) ALT 264; AP Arya Vysya Mahasabha  Vs. Mutyapu Sudershan: 2015 (5) ALD 1: 2015 (6) ALT 227.

[63]    V. Virupakshappa Vs Dangadi Hanumanthappa: AIR 1978  Kar 131

[64]    AIR 1963 SC 1144.             

[65]    See also: Capt. DK Giri Vs. Secunderabad Club: AIR 2018 AP 48; M. Sekar Vs. The Tamil Nadu State Council of the CPI: 2015-7 MLJ 689.

[66]    Board of Control for Cricket Vs. Cricket Asson. of Bihar: AIR  2015 SC 3194;         D. Dwarakanantha Reddy Vs. Chaitnya Bharathi Educational Society : AIR 2007 SC 1794

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