Snippet #147

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract.

Proof of documents

Proof of documents includes –
- formal proof, and
- truth of its contents.
Generally, proof must be given through persons –
- who can vouchsafe for the truth.
Where inherently-inadmissible document is marked,
- objections thereto can be raised ‘at a later stage’;
Admitted documents –
- need not be proved.
The objection to mode of proof, and proof as to truth of its contents,
- can be waived.
The objection to mode of proof, and proof as to truth, have to be raised
- at the ‘earliest opportunity’.
Where ‘truth’ of a document is in issue, marking without objection
- does not absolve the duty on the concerned party to prove the truth.

Probative value of a document

Mere marking a document as an exhibit
- does not dispense with its proof.
Probative value of a document ‘marked without objection’ is
- low or nil, for want of proper proof.
Even when a document is admitted, the probative value thereof will be
- a matter for the court to determine.
Presumption as to truth of its contents can be invoked in proper cases.
- Official record is taken as correct for the presumption that the entries thereof are made only after satisfying its truth.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

Production of documents in court
Admittance and exhibition
Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Production and Admittance of evidence

Order VII rule 14, Order VIII rule 8A , Order XIII rule 1 say as to ‘Production‘ of documents in court. At this stage the opposite party may not have a role to object. But the Court or even the office of the court (registry) can raise and note objection on the ground of insufficiency of stamp by virtue of the provisions of the Stamp Act concerned.

Order XIII rule 4 requires following endorsements on every document which has been admitted in evidence in the Suit:

(a) the number and title of the suit,
(b) the name of the person producing the document,
(c) the date on which it was produced, and
(d) a statement of its having been so admitted.

Proof – Two Types:

First, Formal Proof: Proof as to existence of the document. The modes of proof of documents are governed under Sec. 64 to 73A of the Evd. Act.

Second, Substantive Proof: Proof as to truth of the contents document. Besides the formal proof, in most cases (excepting a few cases where signature, hand-writing etc. alone are considered), the court acts upon a document, only when ‘truth’ of the same is established. Generally speaking, proof as to truth is to be established-

(i) by oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same or
(ii) by circumstantial evidence or
(iii) by invoking ‘presumption’ or
(iv) by express admission by the other side.

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010 ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Modes of Proof of Documents ‘Required By Law To Be Attested’

Section 68 of the Evd. Act provides that the documents required by law to be attested shall not be used in evidence until at least one attesting witness has been examined, if there be

(i) an attesting witness alive,
(ii) he is subject to the process of court and
(iii) he is capable of giving evidence.

But, the proviso lays down that if its execution is not specifically denied by the person by whom it purports to have been executed, it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document not being a Will if such document is registered in accordance with the provisions of Indian Registration Act, 1908. That is, for the purpose of proving the Will, the examination of the attesting witness is necessary.

Following documents are required by law to be attested by two or more attesting witnesses.

1. Will: section 63 of the Succession Act.
2. Mortgage deed: section 59 of the T P Act.
3. Gift deed: section 123 of the T P Act.
4. Bond: 2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Presumption and Truth

St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:

“Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

In Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi AIR 1938 Nag 152 (Vivian Bose and Puranik JJ.) held as under:

“The initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution. But if nothing else is known the mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution. This inference arises in India directly from Sec. 114, Evidence Act. Persons do not ordinarily sign documents without intending to execute them: that is not the common course of human conduct, nor yet the common course their public or private business. Consequently if any person wants to rely on an exceptional circumstance, if he wants to show that in some particular instance the ordinary rule was abrogated surely he must prove it and thus the burden shifts on him”.

Read Blogs:

Probative Value of Documents

Origin of ‘Probative’ is from ‘Probare’ (Latin), means to prove; and ‘Probatio’ (Latin), means experience, trial, proof, testing, probation etc. In law, the meaning of ‘probative value’ is –

Sufficiency of evidence which is useful to prove something in a trial.
Probability of proof or truth while appreciating a fact.
Value or weight of evidence, considered by the court, in proof of something.
Extent of evidentiary value that can be taken to prove a proffered proposition.

Whenever a document is admitted in court, the probative value thereof will be a matter for the court to determine.

State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed:

“Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

E.g. – Photocopy of a deed certified copy of which is provided in law, ‘objectionable document’ marked without objection, un-cross-examined testimony of a witness etc.

Date of Birth – School Admission Register has More Probative Value Than Horoscope

If there is a dispute regarding age, the Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, AIR 2005 SC 1868, held that the date of birth available in the School Admission Register has more probative value than the horoscope. The probative value of FIR, Scene-Mahazar, Post-Mortem Report, Photocopy of a Registered Deed, etc., by itself, will be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until substantive or regular evidence is offered by examining proper witness.

In Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, 1993(2) CLR 395, and in Jora Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984(2) Crimes 837, it has been held that an entry in the school leaving certificate regarding date of birth of a student is not a conclusive proof or high ‘probity evidence’because it is a matter of common knowledge that the date of birth given at the time of the admission of a boy or girl in a school is seldom correct and more often than not the age given is less than the actual age of the child. (See also: C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy, AIR 2020 SC 1912; Commissioner of Central Excise And Service Tax v. M/S. Sanjivani Non-Ferrous Trading: AIR 2019 SC 203.)

Proof must be by persons who can vouchsafe for the truth

Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal (2003-8 SCC 745) held:

“Reliance is heavily placed on behalf of the appellant on Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the “evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”.

If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085; Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88, 2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)

Effect of Marking Documents Without Objection

Effect of marking a document without formal proof, on admission (or without objection), is also a subject of controversy.

First view	Admission of contents & it dispenses with formal proof, and proof of truth of its contents.
Second View	Admission of contents – but, does not dispense with proof of truth of its contents. [Kaliya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796; Sait Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865]
Third view	If truth is in issue, mere proof of contents, or marking without objection, is not proof of truth. [Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085]
Fourth view	Admission of contents, dispenses with proof and truth; but its probative value will be a matter for the court. [Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri: 2015 AIR(SCW) 6271; Kaliya v. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758].
Fifth view	Court should require the party producing the document to adduce proper evidence, and to cure formal defects.

Objection Regarding Admissibility of Documents – 2 counts

Disputes on admissibility of documents arise on 2 domains. (See: Manakishore Lalbhai Vs. New Era Fabrics: AIR 2015 SC 3796)

document which is ab initio (or inherently) ‘inadmissible’
document liable to be objected on ‘mode or manner of proof’.

Even if an inherently-inadmissible document is marked, objections thereto can be raised ‘at a later stage’. Mode of proof (not inherent admissibility) falls within the realm of procedural law. Therefore, objection thereto can be waived.

Inherently-inadmissible documents

‘Inherent-inadmissibility of documents’ arises from the following:

Irrelevancy
Non-registration.

Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with relevancy. It reads as under:

“5. Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts.—Evidence may be given in any suit or proceedings of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others.
Explanation.—This section shall not enable any person to give evidence of a fact which he is disentitled to prove by any provision of the law for the time being in force relating to Civil Procedure
Illustration s (a) A is tried for the murder of B by beating him with a club with the intention of causing his death. At A’s trial the following facts are in issue:— A’s beating B with the club; A’s causing B’s death by such beating; A’s intention to cause B’s death.
(b) A suitor does not bring with him, and have in readiness for production at the first hearing of the case, a bond on which he relies. This section does not enable him to produce the bond or prove its contents at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, otherwise than in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.”

In Jainab Bibi Saheb v. Hyderally Saheb, (1920) 38 MLJ 532, it was pointed out that neither an omission by an advocate to object to giving of irrelevant and inadmissible evidence nor the failure of the tribunal to exclude it of its own motion would validate a decree based on material which the Evidence Act declares to be inherently and in substance irrelevant to the issue. It was also held in this decision that the primary rule to prove relevant facts by the evidence of witnesses is to call them before the trial Judge and examine them viva voce in the manner stated in Chapter 10 of the Evidence Act.

Document liable to be Objected on ‘Mode or Manner of Proof’

Following are improper modes (liable to objection):

Seeking exhibition through one who cannot vouchsafe veracity or truth.
Objectionable (mode of) secondary evidence. Eg:
- Certified copy produced without proving circumstances that entitles to give secondary evidence under Sec. 65 of the Evd. Act.
- Secondary evidence other than that is recognised under Sec. 63.
Unstamped or insufficiently/improperly stamped document.

Objection to be raised – when document is admitted

It was observed by the Supreme Court in 2001 in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 1158, that that ‘it is an archaic practice that during the evidence collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence the court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection’. And the Court directed as under:

“When so recast, the practice which can be a better substitute is this: Whenever an objection is raised during evidence taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence) subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment.”

But, the subsequent decisions in RVE Venkatachala Gounder: AIR 2004 SC 4082; Dayamathi Bai (2004) 7 SCC 107 took a contra view. It was held that the objection as to ‘mode of proof’ should be taken at the time of marking of the document as an exhibit, so that the defect can be cured by the affected party.

Privy Council in Padman v. Hanwanta, AIR 1915 PC 111, held that the objection to marking of documents and its admissibility should have been taken in the trial court. It was observed as under:

“The defendants have now appeal to the Majesty in Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being led for its admission. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar’s office being put in evidence. Had such objection being made at the time, the District Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention.”

In P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S Perumal, 1972 (2) SCR 646, it was observed as under:

“Counsel contended that the police reports referred to earlier are inadmissible in evidence as the Head-constables who covered those meetings have not been examined in the case. Those reports were marked without any objection. Hence it is not open to the respondent now to object to their admissibility.”

Our Apex Court held in Lachhmi Narain Singh v. Sarjug Singh, AIR 2021 SC 3873, as under:

“24. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that plea regarding mode of proof cannot be permitted to be taken at the appellate stage for the first time, if not raised before the trial Court at the appropriate stage. This is to avoid prejudice to the party who produced the certified copy of an original document without protest by the other side. If such objection was raised before trial court, then the concerned party could have cured the mode of proof by summoning the original copy of document. But such opportunity may not be available or possible at a later stage. Therefore, allowing such objection to be raised during the appellate stage would put the party (who placed certified copy on record instead of original copy) in a jeopardy & would seriously prejudice interests of that party. It will also be inconsistent with the rule of fair play as propounded by Justice Ashok Bhan in the case of RVE Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu, AIR 2003 SC 4548.”

Read Blog: Proof of Documents & Objections To Admissibility – How & When?

If payment of price is disputed, Some Oral Evidence is needed for ‘proof’.

In Suresh CV v. Tobin, ILR 2013(1) Ker. 30, the Kerala High Court held that if payment of price for sale was disputed, such fact would not be proved by mere production and marking of a registered sale deed which stated or narrated the payment, and that it was necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove such fact. The Court relied on Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import (AIR 1981 SC 2085) which held that if the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document and that the truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.

Courts to admit documents Without Proof

Section 163 of the Evidence Act, reads as under:

163. Giving, as evidence, of document called for and produced on notice: When a party calls for a document which he has given the other party notice to produce, and such document is produced and inspected by the party calling for its production, he is bound to give it as evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so.

It is observed in Government of Bengal v. Santiram Mondal, AIR 1930 Cal 370, with respect to a document used under Sec. 163, as under:

“The further contention is that if they are to be admitted, they cannot be put in or at any rate used without proof. But the section itself says that the party calling for it is bound to give it as evidence if required to do so, and that certainly means that it goes in as a record of the particular proceeding and that it can be looked at to see what it includes or omits.”

It is noteworthy that Order XI rule 15 and Order XII rule 8 are the provisions in the CPC to give notice to the other party to produce documents (for ‘inspection’ and ‘show court’, respectively). In Government of Bengal v. Santiram Mondal, AIR 1930 Cal 370, and R v. Makhan, AIR 1940 Cal 167, it was observed that Section 163 of the Evidence Act applies to Criminal Proceedings also.

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

“294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
(2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
(3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

Admission of Documents in Evidence & Proof

In Baldeo Sahai v. Ram Chander, AIR 1931 Lahore 546, it is held as under:

“There are two stages relating to documents. One is the stage when all the documents on which the parties rely are filed by them in Court. The next stage is when the documents proved and formally tendered in evidence. The word “proved” has been used by the Division Bench in the sense of ‘proposed to be proved’ as is clear from its having been used along with the word ‘tendered’ or “admitted” in evidence. The word proved has been loosely used for describing the stage after fling of the documents, when the Court would decide only whether they should be admitted or rejected. The Division Bench cannot be read as holding that the document is not to be endorsed with an Exhibit number unless and until proved. As stated hereinabove, the stages of tendering/admitting/rejecting in evidence and holding a document proved – are two distinct and different stages, not one. They are respectively the second and third stages. Admission of a document in evidence is not to be confused with proof of a document.”

Mere marking– not dispense with proof (of truth of contents)

In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses do not prove contents of a document.

In Kaliya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) it is held as under:

“Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar Vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629; RVE Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and LIC of India Vs. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”

[Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

Dibakar Behera v. Padmabati Behera, AIR 2008 Ori 92, it is observed [referring RVE Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548, Dayamati Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, 2004 SC 4082, Bhagyarathi Das v. Agadhu Charan Das, 62 (1986) CLT 298, Budhi Mahal v. Gangadhar Das, 46 (1978) CLT 287 etc.] that a close reading of the above judicial pronouncements would show that whenever a document is marked as exhibit without objection, it will be presumed that a party having right of objection has waived formal proof of the document and in such situation, the entire contents of the document would be admissible in evidence. How ever, by such admission of document, the truth and correctness of the contents by it self would not be established and there must be some evidence to support the contents of such document.

Secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law.

The court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. [H. Siddiqui Vs. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492; Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics: AIR 2015 SC 3796]

In Rakesh Mohindra Vs. Anita Beri [2015AIR(SCW) 6271] it is held:

“Mere admission of secondary evidence, does not amount to its proof. The genuineness, correctness and existence of the document shall have to be established during the trial and the trial court shall record the reasons before relying on those secondary evidences.”

IF ‘TRUTH’ IS IN ISSUE- Mere Marking Not Amounts to ‘Waiver’

IF the TRUTH is IN ISSUE mere proof of handwriting or execution not evidence of truth: IF the TRUTH of the facts stated in a document is IN ISSUE mere proof of the hand-writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document.

In Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

“If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (See: Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88, 2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)

Admission of contents – may dispense with proof; but probative value may be less or nil

Court examines probative value of secondary evidence: It is well settled that if a party wishes to lead secondary evidence, the Court is obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the Court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence [Rakesh Mohindra Vs. Anita Beri: 2015 AIR(SCW) 6271].

Contents of the document cannot be proved by mere filing the document in a court. Under the Law of Evidence, it is necessary that contents of documents are required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Mere marking a document as an ‘exhibit’ will not absolve the duty of to prove the documents in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. At the most, marking ‘exhibit’may amount to proof of contents, but not its truth.

Documents which are not produced and marked as required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court.

See: LIC Vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010-4 SCC 491 (Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry);
M. Chandra Vs. M. Thangamuthu. Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs.New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796;
Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohitb, 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 (date of birth).

Even when a document is technically admitted in court, the probative value thereof will always be a matter for the court to determine. That is, it is depended upon the nature of each case. The probative value of Scene-Mahazar, Postmortem Report, photocopy of a Registered Deed etc. without supporting legal evidence may be lesser. In such cases the court can refrain from acting upon such documents until regular evidence is tendered.

In Kaliya Vs. State of MP: 2013-10 SCC 758 (relying on H. Siddiqui Vs. A. Ramalingam: AIR 2011 SC 1492, and Rasiklal Manikchand Vs. MSS Food Products: 2012-2 SCC 196) held as under:

“The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
[Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

In Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010-4 SCC 491, it is observed as under:

“26. We are of the firm opinion that mere admission of document in evidence does amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit on a document does dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. …..27. It was the duty of the appellants to have proved documents Exh.-A-1 to Exh. A-10 in accordance with law. Filing of the Inquiry Report or the evidence adduced during the domestic enquiry would partake the character of admissible evidence in Court of law. That documentary evidence was also required to be proved by the appellants in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, which they have failed to do.”

The Calcutta High Court (DB) quoting Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [2010-4 SCC 491] it is observed in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Vs. Smt. Santa Dey (2019-2 ACC 36: 2018-3 TAC 473) as under:

“On the authority of the aforesaid decision, we hold that even if the document had been marked as Exhibit-A without objection, without a formal proof thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, such document lost its credibility and is of no probative value.”

In Kalyan Singh, Vs. Chhoti, AIR 1990 SC 396, it is observed as under:

“A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex. 3 is not certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding content of the original sale deed. Ex.3 cannot therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence.”

Court should allow to adduce proper evidence to prove documents

As stated in detail above, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. (Sec. 58 of Evidence Act and Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC).

Inasmuch as (a) mere marking of a document on admission will not amount to proof, or evidence of the contents of the document or its truth; (b) the probative value of a document ‘marked without objection’ may be low or nil, for want of proper proof; and (c) there is a formal defect to the document for it is a secondary evidence because it is produced without adducing ‘foundational evidence’, it is legitimate to say that before taking an adverse stance as to proof in this count, the court should give an opportunity to the party who relies on the document to cure the deficiency.

Defect for not producing a proper power of attorney being curable, in Haryana State Coop. Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. v. Jayam Textiles, 2014 AIR SC 1926 (a case under Section 138 Negotiable instruments Act), the Apex Court gave opportunity to the petitioner to produce the authorization of Board of Directors. It is observed that the in Raj Narian v. Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1972) 3 SCC 850 it was held that the rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision. It is further pointed out that this principle is reiterated in following cases also:

F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375;
H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda, (1999) 2 SCC 217;
V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis, (1999) 3 SCC 737;
Mahendra Pal v. Ram Dass Malanger, (2000) 1 SCC 261;
Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh, (2007) 3 SCC 617 (observed that facta probanda (material facts) are to be set out in the pleadings and facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings);

Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh, (2004) 11 SCC 196;
(held that defective verification or affidavit is curable);
Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, (2005) 13 SCC 511;
Umesh Challiyil v. K.P. Rajendra, (2008) 11 SCC 740;
KK Ramachandran Master v. MV Sreyamakumar, (2010) 7 SCC 428.

PROOF INVOKING PRESUMPTION – Sec. 114, Evid. Act read with Sec. 35.

The evidence/proof of contents of document may be given by proving circumstances for the same or by invoking presumption also. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. under S. 114, Evd. Act can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

“35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

Under S. 114, Illustration (e) for Judicial and official acts there is presumption as to ‘regularity’. It is not presumption as to correctness or truth. For such presumption, one can resort to main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. (and not ‘regularity’ in Illus.–e).

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

“The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

“Where Sec. 35 properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

PROOF INVOKING PRESUMPTION – Registered deed

As stated earlier, truth of the contents of a document, can be established (i) by oral evidence of one who can vouchsafe the same, (ii) by invoking circumstantial evidence or ‘presumption’ or (iii) by express admission by the other side.

Presumptions can be the (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A or presumptions (general) under Sec. 114. In presumption, a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position (See: St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988).

In Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar, AIR 1977 Ker 41, the Kerala High Court observed that the facts required to be proved under Section 67 could be proved by any kind of evidence, and there was nothing in the section to indicate that the evidence furnished by the registration certificate by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 60 of the Registration Act and by the presumption in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, was to be excluded. It is held as under:

“The Privy Council said in Gangamoy Debi v. Troilukhya Nath (1906) 33 Ind App 60 = ILR 33 Cal 537 (PC)–‘The registration is a solemn act, to be performed in the presence of a competent official appointed to act as registrar, whose duty it is to attend the parties during the registration and see that the proper persons are present and are competent to act, and are identified to his satisfaction; and all things done before him in his official capacity and verified by his signature will be presumed to be duly and in order‘.
15. On the strength of this observation of the Privy Council and on a consideration of Section 60 of the Registration Act, the Lahore High Court held in Piara v. Fatnu (AIR 1929 Lah 711) that the certificate endorsed on a registered deed by the registering officer is a relevant piece of evidence for proving its execution. … …..
19. The question has been considered in depth by Justice Raman Nair (as he then was) in Sumathi Amma v. Kunjuleskhmi Amma (1964 Ker LT 945). The learned Judge observed (at pages 946 and 947) : “… It (Section 67 Evidence Act) only says that facts have to be proved, and, unlike Section 68, does not prescribe any particular mode of proof. The facts required to be proved under Section 67 can be proved by any kind of evidence, and there is nothing in the section to indicate that the evidence furnished by the registration certificate by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 60 of the Registration Act and by the presumption in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is to be excluded.’
We have no hesitation in endorsing the view of the learned Judge as laying down the correct law on the question if we may say so with respect.”

In Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713, it is held as under:

“The deed of sale dated 29.6.1978 was a registered one. It, therefore, carries a presumption that the transaction was a genuine one.”

The Apex Court observed in Bhagat Ram v. Suresh, AIR 2004 SC 43, as under:

“The certificate of registration under Section 60 of the Registration Act, 1908 raises a presumption under Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act that he had regularly performed his duty and therefore the facts spelled out by the endorsements made under Sections 58 and 59 of the Registration Act may be presumed to be correct without formal proof thereof. The duties discharged by the registering officer do not include attestation or verification of attestation of will as required by the rules enacted by Section 63 of the Succession Act. An endorsement by registering officer is not by itself a proof of the will having been duly executed and attested. ……. …
Registration of a document does not dispense with the need of proving the execution and attestation of a document which is required by law to be proved in the manner as provided in Sec. 68 of the Evidence Act. Under Sec. 58 of the Registration Act the Registrar shall endorse the following particulars on every document admitted to registration:

the date, hour and place of presentation of the document for registration :
the signature and addition of every person admitting the execution of the document, and, if such execution has been admitted by the representative, assign or agent of any person, the signature and addition of such representative, assign or agent;
the signature and addition of every person examined in reference to such document under any or the provisions of this Act, and
any payment of money or delivery of goods made in the presence of the registering officer in reference to the execution of the document, and any admission of receipt of consideration, in whole or in part, made in his presence in reference to such execution.

Such particulars as are referred to in Sections 52 and 58 of the Registration Act are required to be endorsed by Registrar along with his signature and date on document under Sec. 59 and then certified under Section 60. A presumption by reference to Section 114 [Illustration (e)] of the Evidence Act shall arise to the effect that the events contained in the endorsement of registration, were regularly and duly performed and are correctly recorded. … [See: Kunwar Surendra Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Behari Singh, AIR 1939 PC 117].

On account of registration of a document, including a will or codicil, a presumption as to correctness or regularity of attestation cannot be drawn. Where in the facts and circumstances of a given case the Registrar of Deeds satisfies the requirement of an attesting witness, he must be called in the witness box to depose to the attestation. His evidence would be liable to be appreciated and evaluated like the testimony of any other attesting witness.

In Sulender Singh v. Pritam, 2013-3 HLR 1443, it is held by the Himachal Pradesh High Court that there was a presumption of correctness to the endorsement/ certificate issued by the Sub-Registrar at the time or registration of gift deed (Rewat Ram Sharma versus Munshi Ram, Latest HLJ 2002 (HP) 165) and that the onus to rebut the presumption on a registered deed was heavily on the plaintiff.

Registered deed: Presumption – Validly Executed

It is held in Prem Singh v. Birbal, AIR 2006 SC 3608, as under:

“52. It is well-settled law that there is a presumption of a registered document being validly executed. A registered document would, therefore, prima facie, be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who questions the same.”

In Bellachi v. Pakeeran, AIR 2009 SC 3293, also it is a observed that a registered document carries with it a presumption that it was executed in accordance with law. The Apex Court observed in Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd., AIR 2019 SC 72: 2018 KHC 7002 as under:

“A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. In Prem Singh and others v. Birbel and others (2006) 5 SCC 353, it was held as under:
- “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.”

The Kerala High Court held in Mariyadas v. Benjamin, ILR 2014-4 Ker 471, as under:

“If a Will has been registered, that is a circumstance which may, having regard to the circumstances, prove its genuineness. But the mere fact that a Will is registered Will it will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion regarding it where suspicion exists, without submitting the evidence of registration to a close examination. The bald fact of registration is insufficient, when there are other circumstances creating suspicion on the execution of the document.”

Determination of Possession by Court By Photographs, CD or Commission

Can a commission be appointed to find out the physical possession of a property?

In Bandi Samuel v. Medida Nageswara Rao, 2017 (1) ALT 493 it is pointed out that the factum of possession of the property in dispute, which is nothing, but fishing of information and not elucidating any matter in dispute.

See also: Malaya Gounder v. Palanisamy (1995) 1 MLJ 626,
Puttappa v. Ramappa, AIR 1996 Kant 257,
Rajendran v. Lilly Ammal alias Nelli Ammal, 1998 (II) CTC 163,
Benz Automobiles Private Limited v. Mohanasundaram, 2003 (3) MLJ 391,
D. Kuttiyappan v. Meenakshiammal Polytechnic Unit, 2005 (4) CTC 676,
Devadoss v. A. Duraisingh, 2002 (3) CTC 748,
Parepally Satyanarayana v, Vutukuri Meeneder Goad, 2008 (1) ALT 461;
KMA Wahab v. Eswaran, 2008 (3) CTC 597,
Ramdas Trimbak v. Bajirao Sanap, 2018-1 MHLJ 866, 2018-5 AIR BomR 57,
S. Kalam v. V. Valliammai, 2021-7 Mad LJ 137,
K. Sellammal v. M. Valarmathy, 2022, Madras High Court.

In Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, 2020-8 SCC 129, AIR 2020 SC 1496, it is observed:

“270. The decision in Velaxan Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs also to hold that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot evidence as to whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a Panchnama is an accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-entry, a photograph can be taken; equally, it taken be taken after committing trespass. Such documents cannot prevail over the established mode of proving whether possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can be of little use, much less can they be a proof of possession. A person may re-enter for a short period or only to have photograph. That would not impinge adversely on the proceedings of taking possession by drawing Panchnama, which has been a rarely recognised and settled mode of taking possession.
271. In the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 the observation made was that it is not possible to take the possession of entire land in a day on which the award was declared, cannot be accepted as laying down the law correctly and same is contrary to a large number of precedents. The decision in Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7 SCC 639, is confined to particular facts of the case. The Commissioner was appointed to find out possession on the spot. DVDs and CDs were seen to hold that the landowners were in possession. The District Judge, Indore, recorded the statements of the tenure-holder. We do not approve the method of determining the possession by appointment of Commissioner or by DVDs and CDs as an acceptable mode of proving taking of possession. The drawing of Panchnama contemporaneously is sufficient and it is not open to a court Commissioner to determine the factum of possession within the purview of Order XXVII, Rule 9 CPC. Whether possession has been taken, or not, is not a matter that a court appointed Commissioner cannot opine. However, drawing of Panchnama by itself is enough and is a proof of the fact that possession has been taken.”

Kerala High Court held in Thomas VY@ Sajimon v. Joseph VY, ILR 2020-3 Ker446, 2020-3 Ker LJ 574, 2020-3 KHC 613, as under:

“15. In a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, the burden is entirely on the plaintiff to bring convincing evidence to show his possession over the plaint schedule property and for so doing, it is not permissible for the plaintiff to invoke Order 26 Rule 9 CPC, which is intended for a different purpose. In a matter relating to the investigation into the disputed question of fact of possession, the power of appointment of Commissioner for local investigation cannot be exercised by the Court to assist the party to collect evidence, where the party can collect evidence by itself. If a party claims that, that party is in possession of the disputed property and if the other party denies the same by filing the written statement, the disputed fact can be adjudicated by the Court after framing of issues and recording the evidence of the parties. So many articles may be found in the building at the time of local inspection by the Commissioner. Even clothes and other articles may be found in the building. The Commissioner has to just make an inventory of the items found in the building. The Commissioner cannot report about the ownership of the articles found in the premises, as the said aspect is a matter for evidence. If at all the Commissioner makes any such report, the Court shall not accept the report, even for primary satisfaction without any other convincing material. If the Advocate Commission is deputed for the purpose of ascertaining the possession of the party over the property, the said aspect can be done only after gathering information from the people in the locality, which amounts to fishing out the evidence or gathering of evidence and hence the same is only hearsay information. The party can even otherwise examine the persons, with whom the Commissioner makes enquiry, before the Court to prove the possession of the person over the property in question. The fishing out of information is to make a local enquiry collecting hearsay materials from the persons gathered there or the like, which is different from collection of materials which he finds at the scene. That apart, if that task is left to be decided by the Advocate Commissioner, any fraudulent litigant can create evidence and with the assistance of the Commissioner, he will be able to prove that he is in possession of the property, which is not the purpose for which Order 26 was enacted. Therefore, it is always advisable not to appoint an Advocate Commissioner, as in the present case, to find out the possession of the property, which has to be decided only from oral and documentary evidence to be adduced by the parties. The High Court of Madras in Mr. D. Kuttiyappan v. Meenakshiammal Polytechnic Unit, (2005) 4 MLJ 592, held that the Advocate Commissioner cannot be appointed to note down the factum of possession or the enjoyment . I respectfully agree with the view of the High Court of Madras in D. Kuttiyappan (Supra). Thus, it is settled law that the power of appointment of Commissioner for local investigation cannot be exercised by the Court to enable any party to collect evidence through the Commissioner to prove the factum of possession or enjoyment. This being the situation, the argument of the learned Counsel for the defendant that the report of the Commissioner would show the possession of the defendant in the plaint schedule property cannot be accepted even for the prima facie satisfaction of the Court.”

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